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T h i sp a p e ri n v e s t i g a t e st h ea s y m p t o t i cb e h a v i o ro faB a y e s i a nN a s h
equilibrium in uniform price double auctions among buyers and sellers
with a unit demand and supply who receive private signals indepen-
dently and identically distributed conditional on the unknown state with
the monotone likelihood ratio condition and have interdependent values
with a strictly private value element. Every nontrivial mixed strategy
Bayesian Nash equilibrium converges to the fully revealing rational ex-
pectation equilibrium as the number of buyers and sellers increases and
the bid step size goes to zero. A monotone pure strategy Bayesian Nash
equilibrium exists in suﬃciently large ﬁnite economies, and provides a
consistent and asymptotically normal estimator of the unknown value
when the set of possible bids is continuous.
Keywords: Double auction, information aggregation.
1. INTRODUCTION
The role of market prices in an economy with dispersed information has been a
central question in modern economic theory. In a seminal paper, Hayek (1945) argued
that the price mechanism is an eﬀective method of communicating information and
utilizing knowledge initially dispersed in the economy. Examples of applications of the
idea include the eﬃcient market hypothesis in asset pricing and the use of prediction
markets to estimate uncertain parameters in the economy1.
One approach to study the properties of the market price is a rational expectation
equilibrium which extends the notion of the Walrasian equilibrium to the economy
under uncertainty. Grossman (1981) showed that a fully revealing rational expectation
equilibrium price in an Arrow-Debreu complete market is the suﬃcient statistic for all
of the economy’s information. But Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and others pointed
out that the rational expectation equilibrium does not formulate the process by which
players incorporates the private information into the price.
This observation prompted an investigation of the properties of the market price
formed through auction and bidding processes. In a pioneering paper, Wilson (1977)
claimed that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium price of the ﬁrst price auction among sym-
metric buyers with common values could be a consistent estimator of the unknown
value. Subsequently, fundamental papers by Milgrom (1979, 81) and Pesendorfer and
Swinkels (1997) extended the result to one-sided uniform price auctions with common
values and obtained necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the consistency.
These papers developed the asymptotic theory of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in
one-sided auctions with common values. In view of the Wilson (1977)’s conjecture that
1This version: December 21, 2008.
1See Arrow et al. (2008) for a recent proposal to facilitate the development of prediction markets. Segal (2006) pointed
out the need for a theoretical foundation of the prediction market.
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a theory of price formation can be consistent with a theory of value, and of the fact
that many ﬁnancial markets are organized as large double auctions, it is of signiﬁcance
to study the asymptotic properties of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in double auctions
with interdependent values.
In an important contribution, Reny and Perry (2006) developed the key model of
uniform price double auctions among buyers and sellers with interdependent values.
Reny and Perry (2006) oﬀered a through analysis of the single crossing conditions
(Athey (2001)) of the double auction game and demonstrated that, generically, there
exists a nontrivial monotone pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in suﬃciently
large ﬁnite economies, and that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium converges to the fully
revealing rational expectation equilibrium in the large economy as the number of buyers
and sellers increases and the bid step size goes to zero.
The goal of this paper is to extend and strengthen the universality of the informa-
tion aggregation result of Wilson (1977), Milgrom (1979, 81), Pesendorfer and Swinkels
(1997), and Reny and Perry (2006), among others, by studying the asymptotic prop-
erty of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of uniform price double auctions among buyers
and sellers who receive private signals independently and identically distributed con-
ditional on the unknown state with the monotone likelihood ratio condition and have
interdependent values with a strictly private value element. The main results are:
(a) when the bid grid sizes is suﬃciently small, a nontrivial mixed strategy equilibrium
exists in the ﬁnite economy, and it is asymptotically equivalent to the fully revealing
rational expectation equilibrium in the large economy as the bid grid size goes to
zero
(b) when the set of possible bids is continuum, a monotone pure strategy equilibrium
exists in the large ﬁnite economies, and it provides a consistent and asymptotically
normal estimator of the unknown value with the rate of convergence O(1/n).
In short, the results generalize the results of Reny and Perry (2006) by showing that
information aggregation takes place not only in a monotone pure strategy equilibrium,
but also in a more robust way, in a larger class of mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria, and
that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium price is not only a consistent estimator of the un-
known value, but also an asymptotically normal estimator with the rate of convergence
O(1/n).
An intuition is as follows. In the ﬁnite economy, the structures of one-sided auctions
and double auctions diﬀer since buyers and sellers want to inﬂuence the market clear-
ing price in a diﬀerent way and employ asymmetric strategies. But in a large economy,
buyers and sellers are price takers. Consequently, ex ante buyers and sellers have a sym-
metric best response even when the strategies to which they choose the best responses
are asymmetric. Thus, the structure of double auction game among ex ante symmetric
buyers and sellers is closely related to the structure of one-sided uniform price auctionA STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 3
game among symmetric buyers as the number of buyers and sellers increase. This as-
ymptotic equivalence between one-sided uniform price auction and uniform price double
auctions allows us to extend the monotonic structure of one-sided uniform price auction
to the two-sided uniform price auction in the large economy.
The key structure is that the double auction game in the large economy satisﬁes a
best response strict single crossing property to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy2.
That is, incremental returns from a low bid to a high bid, which is a best response,
cross zero at most once, only from below, as a function of a player’s signal. In other
words, if a player with some signal prefers a high bid to a low bid as a best response
to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy, then a player with a higher signal strictly
prefers this high bid to this low bid. To show that the best reply strict single crossing
property holds in the double auction game in the large economy, we ﬁrst start with
a local comparison when the distance between the high bid and the low bid is small.
Since a signal is aﬃliated with the state, a player with the higher signal has a more
favorable estimate of the value of the good. When the distance between the high bid
and the low bid is small, the increase in the estimate of the value of the good outweighs
the possible increase in the expected price. Thus, the high bid is preferred to the low
bid for a high signal. Even when the distance between the high bid and the low bid
is large, it is still strictly preferable for a player with the high signal to increase a bid
incrementally.
There are two important consequences of the strict single crossing property. The ﬁrst
consequence is that a player’s equilibrium strategy has monotone supports.W h e na
player’s decision problem satisﬁes the strict single crossing condition, every selection
from a best response is monotone nondecreasing in a player’s signal3. Therefore, the
smallest bid of the support of the best response strategy of a player with a higher signal
is at least equal to the largest bid of the support of the best response of a player with
al o w e rs i g n a l .
The second consequence is that the single crossing property implies an existence of
winner’s curse. When a player uses a strategy whose supports are monotone in signals,
losing the good at the tie actually conveys a good news compared with winning the
good at the tie at an equilibrium, since losing the good at the tie indicates there are
more higher bids than the case of winning the good at the tie. An implication is that,
2This single crossing property is diﬀerent than the single crossing conditions (SCC) for games of incomplete information
introduced by Athey (2001), and throughly analyzed by Reny and Perry (2006) for the double auction game. Athey
(2001)’s condition requires that a best response satisﬁes single crossing property to every monotone strategy of other
players. In contrast, the condition here requires that a best response satisﬁes the strict single crossing property to every
equilibrium strategy of other players. This condition is satisﬁed in private value models and versions of this condition are
studied in the interdependent value models of Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) and Reny and Zamir (2004).
3See Milgrom and Shannon (1994), Theorem 4’. This monotonicity is stronger than monotonicity in a strong set order
commonly used in monotone comparative statics. It is a consequence of the fact that the best response in this model
satisﬁes a strict single crossing property, stronger than the standard single crossing property in the sense that it requires
that the incremental return to a best response crosses zero at most at a single point.4 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
for a suﬃciently small bid grid size, when two players are tied for some bid, a player
with a higher signal prefers to change the bid to break the tie.
Using these ideas, the results of the paper can be summarized as follows. We begin
w i t ht h ed o u b l ea u c t i o ng a m ew h e nt h es e to fp o s s i b l eb i d sa n dt h es e to fs i g n a l sa r e
ﬁnite in the ﬁnite economy. By introducing a possibility of nonstrategic bids and then
taking the probability to zero, we can show that there exists a nontrivial mixed Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. We then increase the number of buyers and sellers in the economy.
When the best response satisﬁes the strict single crossing condition, a player’s best
response has a monotone support. We then take the bid grid size go to zero. Winner’s
curse eﬀect then implies that players with distinct signals will place distinct bids. It
follows that the limit equilibrium as the bid grid size goes to zero is separating and
does not involve a tie. This implies that the equilibrium is characterized by the limit
of the ﬁrst order condition of the double auction game with a positive bid grid size. It
follows that a bid is equal to the expected value of the good conditional on the bidder
being on the margin. Consequently, the limit equilibrium is symmetric and increasing,
and equivalent to the fully revealing rational expectation equilibrium.
We then consider a behavior of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the large ﬁnite econ-
omy. Since the payoﬀ changes continuously from the ﬁnite economy to the large econ-
omy, the best response strict single crossing property holds in the large ﬁnite economy.
Thus a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the large ﬁnite economy has monotone supports.
We then take the signal grid size go to zero. Since every Bayesian Nash equilibrium
with a ﬁnite set of signals has monotone supports, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium when
the set of signals is continuous has also monotone supports. When the set of possible
bids is ﬁnite and the set of possible signals is continuous, the Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium has to be pure and monotone almost everywhere. As the bid grid size becomes
small, winner’s curse eﬀect and a strictly private value element in the value implies that
the limit strategy proﬁle does not involve tie, thus we have a monotone pure strategy
equilibrium in the double auction game with a continuous set of bids and a continuous
set of signal in the large ﬁnite economy.
We next study asymptotic distributions, which will be useful when comparing as-
ymptotic eﬃciency of exchange mechanisms, in constructing conﬁdence intervals, and
in conducting hypothesis testing. The asymptotic behavior of a Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium price consists of the sample size eﬀect which deals with the asymptotic behavior
of order statistics and the strategic eﬀect which deals with players’ misrepresentation
of bids from price-taking behavior. In contrast to a case of one-sided auctions (Hong
and Shum (2004)), we need to deal with not only a buyer’s misrepresentation but also
a seller’s misrepresentation. But both buyers’ and sellers’ misrepresentation will vanish
at the rate of O(1/n), since, for every possible state, due to the conditional indepen-
dence of the signal distribution, a room that a player can manipulate the market priceA STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 5
without changing allocation vanishes at the rate of O(1/n). It follows that the strate-
gic eﬀect is asymptotically negligible and that the asymptotic behavior of a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium price can be evaluated based on the asymptotic theory of an order
statistics.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes the model. Section 3
contains the main results of the paper. Section 4 provides a detailed sketch of the
proof. Section 4.1 discusses the existence of a nontrivial mixed strategy Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the double auction game in the ﬁnite economy. Section 4.2 studies the
asymptotic behavior of a nontrivial mixed strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Section
4.3 deals with the existence of a monotone pure strategy equilibrium in the large ﬁnite
market with a continuous set of signals and a ﬁnite set of bids. Section 4.4 examines
asymptotic normality. The supplement to the present paper contains the proof.
1.1. Related literature
This paper puts together three strands of the literature: one-sided uniform price
auctions with common values, uniform price double auctions with private values, and
uniform price double auction with interdependent values.
One-sided uniform price auction with common values. Milgrom (1981) developed the
canonical model of a one-sided uniform price auction of a ﬁxed number of units among
buyers with unit demand, symmetric values, signals distributed iid conditional on the
state, and the monotone likelihood ratio condition. Milgrom (1981) showed that a
symmetric monotone pure strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium converges to the true
value of the good when the distinguishability condition (Milgrom (1979)) is satisﬁed.
The equilibrium identiﬁed by Milgrom (1981) is also the unique equilibrium of the
uniform price double auction game among ex ante symmetric buyers and sellers in the
large economy.
Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) showed that the symmetric monotone pure strat-
egy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of Milgrom (1981) is indeed unique among symmetric
strategies, and that when the signal conveys only a limited amount of information, the
equilibrium price converges to the true value of the good if and only if the double large-
ness condition (i.e. both the number of units of the good and the number of bidders
who do not receive the good grow large) holds. In our double auction setting, buyers
and sellers are asymmetric in the ﬁnite economy. But since buyers and sellers will be
symmetric in the large economy, their uniqueness result extends to the double auction
in the large market.
Hong and Shum (2004) established the rate of convergence and asymptotic distrib-
ution of a monotone pure strategy equilibrium in uniform price and English auctions
under Wilson (1977) and Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) assumptions on the infor-6 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
mation structure. In our double auction setting, buyers and sellers are asymmetric and
there is not any closed form representation of the equilibrium strategies. But since
misrepresentations by buyers and sellers vanish suﬃciently fast, it is still possible to
derive the asymptotic distributions.
Uniform price double auction with private values. Rustichini, Satterthwaite, and Williams
(1994) considered k-double auctions among buyers and sellers with unit demand and
supply and independently distributed types. They showed that the equilibrium bid
converges to the truthful bidding at the rate of O(1/n). In our setting, players have
interdependent values. But since the distribution of signals is iid conditional on the
state, the probability that there is a bid in an interval increases at the rate of O(1/n)
at each state, thus it is possible to extend their results.
Jackson and Swinkels (2005) showed existence of a nontrivial mixed strategy equilib-
rium in the large class of private value auctions. We extend their result to an interde-
pendent value setting by introducing asymptotic expansion of payoﬀs around the limit
where the probability of perturbation is zero.
Cripps and Swinkels (2006) showed that in uniform price double auctions among buy-
ers and sellers with multiple units of demand and supply and much weaker assumptions
of distributions (no asymptotic atoms, no asymptotic gaps, and z-independence con-
ditions), every nontrivial mixed strategy equilibria are asymptotically unique and eﬃ-
cient. In our setting, the values are nonprivate. But in our model, the strictly increasing
private value element of the values, ex ante symmetries and monotone likelihood ratio
conditions provide a set of conditions under which their asymptotic uniqueness and
eﬃciency can be extended, and they serve a ﬁrst step to generalize their results to a
nonprivate value setting.
Uniform price double auction with interdependent values. In Reny and Perry (2006)’s
analysis, they ﬁrst showed existence of a monotone pure strategy Bayesian Nash equi-
librium in the large economy and its convergence to a fully revealing rational expec-
tation equilibrium as the grid size goes to zero. Then they constructed a monotone
pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in large ﬁnite economies by showing that the
strict single crossing condition holds in large ﬁnite economies. In contrast, we ﬁrst show
existence of a nontrivial mixed strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the ﬁnite econ-
omy and then show that it converges to the monotone pure strategy equilibrium of the
double auction game in the large economy. A diﬀerence between the approach by Reny
and Perry (2006) and ours is that they established a strict single crossing condition as
a response to every monotone strategy of other players, and that we need to show a
strict single crossing property only for (possibly mixed) equilibrium strategies.A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 7
2. THE MODEL
2.1. Players
We ﬁrst deﬁne the information structure which generates the state and the signals.
1. The state variable. Let θ0 ∈ (0,1) be the true state of the world. θ0 is unobservable,
and each player considers it as a realization of a random variable θ. Each player has a
correct and common prior that θ takes a value in [0,1] with the distribution function
Fθ and the density function fθ.
Assumption 1 (a). There exists f0 < ∞ such that for every θ, 0 <f θ(θ) < f0 < ∞.
(b). fθ is continuous.
2. The signal. Let Xi be a random variable which represents player i’s private infor-
mation about θ. Xi takes values in [0,1] according to the distribution FXi|θ(xi|θ)a n d
the density function fXi|θ(xi|θ).
We now deﬁne order statistics and quantile functions which play important roles in
analysis of auctions.
3. Order statistics and quantile functions. If the random variables X1,...,Xn are arranged
in the order of magnitude, we write X1:n ≥...≥ Xn:n. For example, Xm:n implies the
mth highest out of n random variables.
For a given α,f o re a c hθ,l e t
xi(θ)=s u p {xi : FXi|θ(xi(θ)|θ) ≤ α}.
That is, given θ, xi(θ) is the largest signal such that there are more than 1 − α of
players whose signal is equal or higher than xi(θ).
For each xi,l e t
θ(xi)={θ ∈ [0,1] : FXi|θ(xi|θ(xi)) = α}4.
That is, when the signal is xi, θ(xi) is the state under which there are 1−α of players
whose signal is equal or above xi.W h e nXi is continuous, for each xi, xi(θ(xi)) = xi
and for each θ, θ(xi(θ)) = θ.
4. Assumptions on the conditional distribution Xi given θ.W eﬁrst distinguish between
two assumptions on the common support of a signal Xi.
The ﬁrst assumption is that the support of the signal is ﬁnite with the signal grid
size γ>05.
4When there are multiple x0 which will give xi as the αth percentile of the distribution, we choose an arbitrary one and
ﬁxi t .
5The assumption of a discrete set of signals is used, for example, in Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1995).8 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
Assumption 2 The common support of Xi is Xγ = {0,γ...,1}.
The second assumption is that the signals are continuum.
Assumption 3 The common support of Xi is X =[ 0 ,1].
We consider the following conditions on the behavior of fXi|θ(xi|θ).
Assumption 4 (a). The signals {Xi} are independent and identically distributed
conditional on θ with the distribution function FXi|θ(xi|θ).( b ) .F o re a c hxi, fXi|θ(xi|θ)
is continuous in θ ∈ [0,1]. (c). When X =[ 0 ,1], for every θ,fXi|θ(xi|θ) is continuous in
xi. (d). There exists f1 < ∞ such that for every θ ∈ [0,1] and xi ∈ X, 0 <f Xi|θ(xi|θ) <
f1. (e). The family of conditional density functions fXi|θ(xi|θ), indexed by θ,s a t i s ﬁes
the monotone likelihood ratio property. (f). xi(0) = 0 and xi(1) = 1.
Assumption 4 (a) and (e) imply that random variables θ,X1,...,a r ea ﬃliated (Milgrom
and Weber (1982a)). Assumption 4 (e) ensures that xi(θ) is a nondecreasing function
of θ and that θ(xi) is a nondecreasing functions of xi. Assumption 4 (g) implies that
every signal can be on the margin. This assumption was used in Proposition 1(d).
We next deﬁne players’ objective functions.
5. The value function. Let v(θ,xi) denote the actual value of a unit of good to player i.
Player i puts zero value on further units of the good. We assume following conditions.
Assumption 5 (a). There exists 0 <v≤ v<∞ such that, for every θ and xi,
0 <v<
∂v(θ,xi)
∂θ < v.( b ) .T h e r ee x i s t s0 <λ≤ λ<∞ such that for every θ and xi,
λ <
∂v(θ,xi)
∂xi < λ. (c). There exists 0 < v<∞ such that, for every θ ∈ [0,1], v(θ,0) = 0
and v(θ,1) = v.
Assumption 5 (c) means that, when the signals are extreme, values are private67.I t s
role is to ensure that a player with a lower signal will have a low estimate of the value
of the object regardless of the state8.
As explained in Introduction, a player’s objectives are diﬀerent depending on whether
a player is a buyer or a seller.
6Reny and Perry (2006) also make an assumption about the behavior of the value function at the boundary.
7The probabilities that a player has these exterme signal can be arbitary small.
8As a concrete example, consider a political prediction market where X 0 takes a value of 1 if a candidate is elected
and 0 otherwise, and Xi is the impression of the candidate held by a player. When a player has a good impression of the
candidate (that is, the signal xi is high), it will not only provide a favorable assessment about electability of a candidate
and but also a higher possibility that the player will be able to work with the candidate for a future project, regardless
of whether the candidate will be elected to this particular pubic oﬃce. Thus, a player with a higher signal will value the
candidate higher than a player with a lower signal regardless of whether the candidate will get elected or not. Furthermore,
if a player has really a good impression of a candidate, the player will value the candidate highly regardless of the outcome
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6. Endowments. Let ei ∈ {0,1} denote player i’s endowment. Players with ei =0a r e
potential buyers and players with ei = 1 are potential sellers.
7. Ex post utility function. Let ui(θ,xi,p,qi)b ep l a y e ri0s ex post utility function when
the state is θ,t h es i g n a li sxi, the market clearing price is p ∈ R, and the allocation is





(v(θ,xi) − p)qi if i is a buyer
(p − v(θ,xi))(1 − qi)i fi is a seller
We assume that every player is risk neutral.
2.2. Rational expectation equilibrium in the large economy
We now consider the rational expectation equilibrium in the large economy.
8. The large economy. The large economy has a unit mass of players of whom α ∈
(1/2,1) are buyers and 1 − α are sellers.
9. The rational expectation equilibrium. A rational expectation equilibrium in the large
economy is a price function pREE(θ) and an allocation qi(xi,pREE(θ)) such that
(a) a player chooses the excess demand taking his signal, the price, and the information
contained in the price as given10.
(b) The demand and the supply balance at each state.
In the large economy, the actual distribution of players’ signals is equal to the prior
distribution of signals. Thus, given the state, there are no uncertainty about the dis-
tribution of players’ signals. It follows that the rational expectation equilibrium in the
large economy is deﬁned as a function of the state variable θ.
10. Characterization of the rational expectation equilibrium. Reny and Perry (2006),
Proposition 3.1 (i) derived a fully revealing rational expectation equilibrium in the
large economy.
Lemma 2.1 (Reny and Perry (2006)). There is a unique fully revealing rational
expectation equilibrium in the large economy with pREE(θ0)=v(θ0,xi(θ0)).
In this equilibrium, for each state, the fully revealing rational expectation equilibrium
price will be the expected value of the good of the player who is on the margin11.
9We sometimes denote ub to be an ex post payoﬀ function of a buyer and us to be an ex post payoﬀ function of a seller.
10We assume that when a player is indiﬀerent between qi = 1 and 0, a tie will be broken in a way so that the resulting
allocation is consistent with the market clearing condition.
11Even when the distribution of the signal is discrete, the argument in Reny and Perry (2006) can be applied and Lemma
1h o l d s .T os e et h i s ,ﬁrst note that v(θ,xi(θ)) is a strictly increasing function of θ since even when xi(θ) is nondecreasing
and constant, v is still strictly increasing in the ﬁrst argument θ. Thus, given the price v(θ0,x i(θ0)), a player can infer the
state θ0. Then, a player strictly prefers to be assigned a good if the value is strictly higher than v(θ0,x i(θ0)), which takes
place if the signal is strictly above xi(θ0). A player does not want to be assigned a good if the signal is strictly less than10 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
2.3. Bayesian Nash equilibrium in uniform price double auctions
We now specify a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the uniform price double auction.
11. Consider a sequence of auctions where the nth auctions has n players of whom nB
players are potential buyers and nS players are potential sellers. That is n = nB +nS.
Let Nn,N n,B, and Nn,S denote the set of players, buyers and sellers in the nth auction.
It follows Nn = Nn,B ∪ Nn,S.
We consider central rank case auctions (Hong and Shum (2004)) where the double
largeness condition (Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997)) holds and the supply grows
proportionally to demand.
Assumption 6 A sequence {nS,n B} satisﬁes the following conditions: (a). 0 < nS
n <
1
2.( b ) .limn→∞
nS
n =1− α.
We suppose that the prices are formed through a uniform price double auction (Rusti-
chini, Satterthwaite, and Williams (1994), Wilson (1995), Cripps and Swinkels (2004),
and Reny and Perry (2006)).
12. Bids. Each buyer submits a bid and each seller submits an oﬀer. Let bi denote the
bid or the oﬀer submitted by player i and let b =( b1,...,bn).
We distinguish between two assumptions about the set of possible bids. The ﬁrst
assumption is that the set of possible bids is ﬁnite and the bid grid size is ∆.L e t
B∆ = {0,∆,2∆,...,b} ∪ b denote the set of possible bids when the bid step size ∆ is
positive where v(1,1) < b<∞ is the largest possible bid and b is a nonparticipation
option with zero expected payoﬀ regardless of the behavior of other players.
The second assumption is that the bids are continuum. Let B0 =[ 0 , b]∪b denote the
set of possible bids in this case.
13. The price function. Let pn(b) denote the market price pn(b)i nt h enth auction
when players submits bids b =( b1,...,bn). We assume that the price is determined by
the k-double auction pricing rule. That is, for a ﬁxed k ∈ [0,1],
pn(b)=( 1− k)bnS+1:n + kbnS:n
14. The allocation function. Let qn(bi,b−i) be the allocation of player i in the nth
auction when player i bids bi and other players’ bids are b−i. When a player’s bid or
oﬀer bi is higher than bnS:n, then the player is assigned a unit of the good. When bi
is lower than bnS:n, then the player is not assigned a unit of good. The ties will be
xi(θ0). When the signal is equal to xi(θ0), the player is indiﬀerent whether a good is assigned or not. By breaking ties in
a way consistent with the market clearing condition, the price function pREE(θ0)=v(θ0,x i(θ0)) satisﬁes the conditions
for the rational expectation equilibrium.A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 11
broken symmetrically among buyers and sellers12, independently from other events in
the game. That is, qn(bi,b−i)s a t i s ﬁes the following condition:
qn(bi,b −i)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1i fbi >b nS:n.
1 with probability
nS−|j:bj>bnS:n|
|j:bj=bnS:n| if bi = bnS:n.
0e l s e .
Let G(γ,f,∆,n) be a non-cooperative game induced by a double auction when the
support of the signal is Xγ, the information structure is f, the size of the economy is
n, and the bid step size is ∆.
15. Distributional strategies. Player i’s distributional strategy (Milgrom and Weber
(1985)) in G(γ,f,∆,n) is a probability measure μγ,∆,n,i on B∆×Xγ with its distribution
function Hγ,∆,n,i(bi,xi) and the probability mass function hγ,∆,n,i(bi,xi) such that the
marginal distribution on Xγ is equal to FXi(xi).
Given a distributional strategy μγ,∆,n,i,l e tβγ,∆,n,i be a corresponding behavioral
strategy in the sense that βγ,∆,n,i(xi) is a random variable whose distribution over B∆
corresponds to the distribution of bids conditional on xi according to Hγ,∆,n,i(bi|xi).
Let suppHγ,∆,n,i(bi|xi) denote the support of βγ,∆,n,i(xi).
Let B∆ be the set of possible behavioral strategies when the set of possible bids is
B∆.
We say that a strategy is pure if there exists a function βγ,∆,n,i(xi) such that Hγ,∆,n,i(bi,xi)
puts a probability 1 on the set {(xi,βγ,∆,n,i(xi))}xi∈Xγ. A pure strategy is monotone if
βγ,∆,n(xi) is a nondecreasing function of xi.
Given a set of strategies by players other than i, we can write down player i’s objective
function as follows.
16. Expected payoﬀs. Let Uγ,∆,n(xi,bi,β∗
γ,∆,n,−i)b ep l a y e ri’s interim expected payoﬀ
in G(γ,f,∆,n) when player i’s signal is xi,ab i di sbi, and other players place bids b−i
according to strategies β∗
γ,∆,n,−i.T h a ti s ,
Uγ,∆,n(xi,b i,β∗
γ,∆,n,−i)=Eθ,X−i|Xi[ui(θ,xi,p n(bi,b −i),q n(bi,b −i))].
Let πγ,∆,n,i(βi,β∗
γ,∆,n,−i)b ep l a y e ri’s ex ante expected payoﬀ function in G(γ,f,∆,n)
when the strategy proﬁle is βγ,∆,n.
We are now in a position to specify a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the double auction
game.
17. Bayesian Nash equilibrium. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of G(γ,f,∆,n)i sap r o ﬁle
of distributional strategies β∗
γ,∆,n where (a) every buyer chooses the symmetric strat-
12See Reny and Zamir (2004) and Reny and Perry (2006) for a discussion of the implication of symmetric tie-breaking
rules.12 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
egy and every seller chooses the symmetric strategy13 and (b) each player’ s strategy
satisﬁes the best response property. That is, for every i,
β∗







18. A nontrivial Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We say that an outcome according to a
strategy proﬁle is nontrivial if trade occurs between buyers and sellers. We say that a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium is nontrivial if the probability the outcome according to the
equilibrium strategy proﬁle is nontrivial is positive. Let τ(β∗
γ,∆,n) denote the probability
that an outcome according to β∗
γ,∆,n is nontrivial. A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium β∗
∆,n
is nontrivial if τ(β∗
γ,∆,n) > 0.
19. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium price. Let Pγ,∆n(β∗
γ,∆,n) be a random variable which
represents the price generated by the equilibrium strategy proﬁle β∗
γ,∆,n of the double
auction game G(γ,f,∆,n).
3. THE MAIN RESULT
20. The main proposition of the paper states asymptotic properties of a nontrivial
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the uniform price double auction game.
(a) Given Assumption 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, there exists a signal grid size γ>0a n da
bid grid size ∆ > 0 such that for every 0 <γ<γ and 0 < ∆ < ∆,t h e r e
exists a nontrivial Bayesian-Nash equilibrium β∗
γ,∆,n of the double auction game
G(γ,f,∆,n).
(b) Given Assumption 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and with conditions in Proposition 1(a), every
sequence of nontrivial Bayesian-Nash equilibrium β∗
γ,∆,n is asymptotically outcome
equivalent to the fully revealing rational expectation equilibrium in the large economy
identiﬁed in Lemma 1 as the number of players n →∞a n dt h eb i ds t e ps i z e∆ → 0.
(c) Given Assumption 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and conditions of Proposition 1(a), there exists
n such that for every n>n, there exists a nontrivial monotone pure strategy
equilibrium β∗
∆,n of the double auction game G(f,∆,n).
(d) Given Assumption 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and condition of Proposition 1(a) and 1(c), there
exists a nontrivial monotone pure strategy equilibrium β∗
n of the double auction
game G(f,n) and it satisﬁes the following relationship √
n(Pn(β∗














)2)a sn →∞ .
13The assumption that equilibrium strategies are symmetric among buyers and also among sellers can be relaxed at the
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We now oﬀer an interpretation of Proposition 1 and its relation to the previous results.
21. Part (a) says that there exists a mixed nontrivial Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the
double auction game with a ﬁnite set of signals and a ﬁnite set of bids in the ﬁnite mar-
ket. It extends the existence result of Jackson and Swinkels (2005) in the private value
environment to an interdependent value environment14. It also complements the result
of Reny and Perry (2006) by showing that there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium in
the small ﬁnite market, even when Reny and Perry (2006)’s Theorem 6.1. (i) does not
ensure the existence of a monotone pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium15.
22. Part (b) says that every nontrivial mixed strategy equilibrium in the ﬁnite economy
converges to the fully revealing rational expectation equilibrium in the large economy. It
extends Theorem 6.1. (ii)-(iv) of Reny and Perry (2006) by showing that information
aggregation can take place in the larger class of nontrivial mixed strategy Bayesian
Nash equilibria. It also extends Theorem 1 of Cripps and Swinkels (2006) by show-
ing that asymptotic uniqueness and eﬃciency of mixed strategy equilibria in private
value uniform price double auctions can be extended to a class of interdependent value
uniform price double auctions.
23. Part (c) says that there exists a monotone pure strategy equilibrium of the double
a u c t i o ni nt h es u ﬃciently large ﬁnite economy. This result was ﬁrst proved by Reny
and Perry (2006) as Theorem 6.1 (i).
Part (a), (b) and (c), taken together, generalize Theorem 6.1 of Reny and Perry (2006)
in the following sense. Reny and Perry (2006) Theorem 6.1 showed that the uniform
price auction among suﬃciently large number of buyers and sellers has a monotone pure
strategy equilibrium in the suﬃciently large ﬁnite economies where bidding behavior is
arbitrary close to a price taking behavior, the market clearing price is arbitrary close
to the rational expectation equilibrium price, and the allocation is arbitrary close to
eﬃcient. This paper shows that every nontrivial mixed strategy equilibrium, including
the monotone pure strategy equilibrium identiﬁed in Reny and Perry (2006), satisﬁes
these properties16.
14To be precise, Jackson and Swinkels (2005) assumed a continuum set of bids and signals, while the result here assumes
a ﬁnite set of bids and signals. It is straightforward to extend the existence result of Part (a) to the case of a continuum
set of signals. But an assumption of a ﬁnite set of bids is somewhat necessary since it is harder to deal with discontinuities
due to ties in the interdependent value models without monotonicity structure of equilibrium strategies.
15Reny and Perry (2006) considered a continuum set of signals and the ﬁnite set of bids, while the result here assumes
a ﬁnite set of bids and signals. It is straightforward to extend the existence result of Part (a) to the case of a continuum
set of signals.
16To be precise, the ﬁrst result (asymptotic uniqueness and eﬃciency of nontrivial mixed strategy Bayesian Nash
equilibria) assumes the ﬁnite set of signals and the second result (existence of a monotone pure strategy Bayesian Nash
equilibrium in the suﬃcienlty large economies) assumes the contiuum of signals, while Reny and Perry (2006) assumes
the continuum of signals.14 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
24. Part (d) says when the signal is continuum, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium price
of the double auction is not only a consistent and asymptotically normal estimator of
the value of the good. It follows that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium price provides a
consistent and asymptotically normal estimator of the uncertain state of the world.
This result extends the result of Reny and Perry (2006) by showing that a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium price is not only a consistent estimator of the value but also an
asymptotically normal estimator. Also this result generalizes the asymptotic normality
result of Hong and Shum (2004) in the one-sided auctions to a uniform price double
auction.
We now provide a short sketch of the proof. We elaborate a detailed sketch in the
next subsections.
25. Proof of Part (a). We ﬁrst deﬁne a modiﬁed game G(γ,f,∆,n,δ) where a nonstrate-
gic bidding takes place with probability δ. When the set of possible bids is ﬁnite, the
mixed extension of the game is continuous. When there is a possibility of nonstrategic
bidding, buyers and sellers place a serious bid to trade. Thus, there exists a nontrivial
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium β∗
γ,∆,n,δ of G(γ,f,∆,n,δ). Furthermore, since buyers and
sellers prefer to bid seriously even with small δ, the limit strategy proﬁle β∗
γ,∆,n as
δ → 0 is a nontrivial equilibrium of G(γ,f,∆,n).
26. Proof of Part (b). Consider a limit β∗
γ,∆ of a sequence of nontrivial Bayesian Nash
equilibria {β∗
γ,∆,n} of G(γ,f,∆,n). Since the payoﬀ function of G(γ,f,∆,n)c o n v e r g e s
to the payoﬀ function in the large economy G(γ,f,∆)a sn →∞ , β∗
γ,∆ is a nontrivial
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of G(γ,f,∆). Then we consider the behavior of β∗
γ,∆ for small
bid grid size ∆. In the large economy, a player’s bid cannot aﬀect the market clearing
price and every player faces a symmetric distribution of strategies of other players.
Thus, buyers and sellers’ decision problems are symmetric. Then, for suﬃciently small
∆, a best response to β∗
γ,∆ satisﬁes the strict single crossing property. It follows that
β∗
∆ has monotone supports. When we take the bid grid size ∆ → 0, winner’s curse
eﬀect implies β∗
γ,∆ will be separating. Thus the limit β∗ is characterized by the limit
of ﬁrst order conditions for a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in G(γ,f,∆). It follows that
the limit equilibrium is outcome equivalent to the rational expectation equilibrium.
27. Proof of Part (c).F r o mP a r t( b ) ,w ek n o wt h a tt h eb e s tr e s p o n s et oβ∗
γ,∆ sat-
isﬁes the strict single crossing property for G(γ,f,∆). Since the convergence of the
expected payoﬀ of G(γ,f,∆,n)t ot h a to fG(γ,f,∆) is uniform when the set of signals
and the set of bids are ﬁnite, for suﬃciently large n, the best response to β∗
γ,∆,n satisﬁes
strict single crossing property. It follows that both buyer’s and seller’s strategies have
monotone supports. We now set the signal grid size γ → 0 and consider G(f,∆,n).
Then, since equilibrium strategies have monotone supports for every γ>0, the limitA STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 15
equilibrium β∗
∆,n also has monotone supports. Since the set of signals is continuum and
the set of possible bids is ﬁnite in G(f,∆,n), β∗
∆,n has to be pure and monotone almost
everywhere.
28. Proof of Part (d). We ﬁrst extend the result of Part (c) to G(f,n)b yt a k i n g
the bid grid size ∆ → 0. Since the equilibrium strategies β∗
∆,n is monotone, winner’s
curse eﬀect implies that the limit strategy proﬁle β∗
n does not involve ties and thus a
monotone pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We can now derive the asymptotic
distribution of β∗
n by decomposing into the diﬀerence between v(θ(xnS:n),xnS:n)a n d
v(θ,xi(θ)) and the diﬀerence between v(x0(xn:nS),xn:nS)a n dβ∗
n.T h eﬁrst diﬀerence
can be evaluated by the delta method. The second diﬀerence goes to zero because β∗
n
converges to v(θ(xi),x i) at the rate of O(1/n).
4. PROOF
4.1. P r o o fo fP a r t( a )
We begin with the deﬁnition of the modiﬁed game.
29. The modiﬁed game G(γ,f,∆,n,δ). Given G(γ,f,∆,n), let G(γ,f,∆,n,δ) denote the
game where, in addition to players in Nn, there is a nonstrategic player b i who partic-
ipates in the auction as a buyer with probability δ/2 and participates as a seller with
probability δ/2. Either as a buyer or a seller, b i bids uniformly over b ∪ {0,∆,2∆,...,b},
independent of other events in the game. Let Hb i,∆ denote its distribution function and
let hb i,∆ denote the probability mass function.
The auction mechanism treats players in Nn and a nonstrategic player b i symmetri-
cally. Let pn(bi,b−i,bb i)a n dqn(bi,b−i,bb i) be the market clearing price and the allocation
of player i when players Nn submitted bids (bi,b−i) and a nonstrategic player b i sub-
mitted a bid bb i.
30. We now introduce notations to describe strategies and equilibrium of the modiﬁed
game G(γ,f,∆,n,δ).
Let β∆,n,δ,i be player i’s distributional strategy in G(γ,f,∆,n,δ). Let H∆,n,δ,i be its
distribution function and let h∆,n,δ,i(b,xi) be its probability mass function.
Let Uγ,∆,n,δ,i(xi,bi,βγ,∆,n,δ,−i) denote player i’s interim expected utility given xi, bi,
and βγ,∆,n,δ,−i where the expectation is taken over the participation and the distrib-
ution of bids by nonstrategic bidders, in addition to the distribution of the state and
other players’ signals conditional on xi.L e tπγ,∆,n,δ,i(βγ,∆,n,δ,i,βγ,∆,n,δ,−i) denote the
ex ante expected utility given players’ strategies βγ,∆,n,δ,i and βγ,∆,n,δ,−i.
3 1 .C o n t i n u i t yo fe xa n t ep a y o ﬀ functions πγ,∆,n,δ(βγ,∆,n,δ,i,βγ,∆,n,δ,−i). We ﬁrst note
that the payoﬀ function πγ,∆,n,δ is continuous, since the set of possible bids B∆ is ﬁnite
and we consider distributional strategies.16 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
Lemma 4.1 πγ,∆,n,δ(βγ,∆,n,δ,i,βγ,∆,n,δ,−i) is continuous in (βγ,∆,n,δ,i,βγ,∆,n,δ,−i).
32. Deﬁnition of a best response correspondence. Let Φ : B∆ ×B ∆ → B∆ ×B ∆ denote
a correspondence deﬁned by
Φ(βγ,∆,n,δ,b,βγ,∆,n,δ,s)=
⎛





















nS−1s e l l e r s
)
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
This correspondence takes bidding strategies of a buyer βγ,∆,n,δ,b, and a seller βγ,∆,n,δ,s,
and returns a best response of a buyer when all other buyers follow βγ,∆,n,δ,b and
every seller follows βγ,∆,n,δ,s, and a best response of a seller when every buyer follows
βγ,∆,n,δ,b and all other sellers follow βγ,∆,n,δ,s.
33. Existence of a nontrivial Bayesian Nash equilibrium β∗
γ,∆,n,δ. Since the set of distri-
butional strategies is compact and ex ante payoﬀ function πγ,∆,n,δ is continuous, there
exists a ﬁxed point of Φ, which is a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium. Furthermore, since
a nonstrategic player oﬀers a serious bid with a positive probability, this equilibrium
is nontrivial.
Lemma 4.2 There exists ∆ > 0 such that for every 0 < ∆ < ∆ and δ>0,t h e r e
exists a nontrivial Bayesian-Nash equilibrium β∗
γ,∆,n,δ of G(γ,f,∆,n,δ).
We now take the probability of nonstrategic bidding δ → 0.
34. Construction of an equilibrium of G(γ,f,∆,n,δ). Let {β∗
γ,∆,n,δ}δ be a sequence of a
nontrivial Bayesian-Nash equilibrium G(γ,f,∆,n,δ). Then there is a subsequence δ and
a subsequence limit β∗
γ,∆,n such that β∗
γ,∆,n,δ → β∗
γ,∆,n in the sense that, for each xi
and bi, the probability that a player with signal xi chooses a bid bi converges as δ → 0.
Since the expected utility function πγ,∆,n,δ is continuous, β∗
γ,∆,n is an equilibrium of
G(γ,f,∆,n). Since the probability of trade τ is a continuous function of equilibrium
strategies, the probability of trade also converges.
Lemma 4.3
(a) β∗
γ,∆,n is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the double auction game G(γ,f,∆,n).A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 17






We now suppose that β∗
γ,∆,nis trivial and derive an estimate of the distribution of
bids.
35. Estimates of the distribution of bids in G(γ,f,∆,n,δ) for small δ. Suppose that
β∗
γ,∆,n is trivial. That is, τγ,∆,n(β∗
γ,∆,n) = 0. The only way that β∗
γ,∆,n can be trivial is
that sell bids will be very high and buy bids will be very low. Consequently, when δ is
small, the probability of a high buy bid and a low sell bid need to be very small.
Lemma 4.4 Suppose β∗










We now consider whether a seller with a low signal might prefer to lower the oﬀer
rather than the high oﬀer required to sustain a trivial equilibrium.
36. An alternative strategy. By Assumption 5 (c), v(x0,0) = 0 for every x0.T h e n ,f o r
suﬃciently small ∆ > 0,
Pr{xi ∈ Xγ : v(1,1) − 6∆ − v(1,x i) > 0} > 0.
We note that this ∆ are independent of other structure of the economy.
Consider an alternative strategy for seller i whose signal xi satisﬁes the above con-
dition such that whenever the equilibrium sell bid is at least v(1,1), seller i lowers the
bid to v(1,1) − 2∆.
37. The change in payoﬀs from the alternative strategy. Let Wi,n be the nS-th highest
bid among bids by players other than i,t h a ti s ,Wi,n = bnS:|Nn∪{b i}−{i}|. There are four
cases to be considered.
(a) Consider the case Wi,n = v(1,1). An oﬀer of v(1,1) can be accepted (subject to
ties). An oﬀer of v(1,1) − 2∆ will be accepted. But the sales price will be lower
with an oﬀer of v(1,1)−2∆. An upper bound of the loss from changing to an oﬀer
of v(1,1) − 2∆ can be obtained by assuming that both oﬀers will be accepted for
sure. The k double auction pricing rule implies that the loss is bounded above by
2∆.
(b) Consider the case Wi,n = v(1,1) − ∆.A no ﬀer of v(1,1) is above Wi,n,s oi tw i l l
not be accepted. An oﬀer of v(1,1) − 2∆ is below Wi,n, so it will be accepted.18 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
With an oﬀer of v(1,1) − 2∆, the sales price is between Wi,n = v(1,1) − ∆ and
v(1,1)−2∆. The lowest possible price is v(1,1)−2∆. On the other hand, the largest
possible value is of the good is v(1,xi). Thus the lower bound of payoﬀ from sales
is v(1,1) − 2∆ − v(1,xi).
(c) Consider the case Wi,n = v(1,1)−2∆.A no ﬀer of v(1,1) is above Wi,n,s oi tw i l ln o t
be accepted. An oﬀer of v(1,1)−2∆ is equal to Wi,n, so it can be accepted. When
there is a sale, the lower bound of payoﬀ from sales price is v(1,1) − 2∆ − v(1,xi).
(d) When Wi,n <v (1,1) − 2∆,b o t ho ﬀers of v(1,1) and v(1,1) − 2∆ is above Wi,n.
Consequently, neither oﬀers will be accepted and payoﬀs are zero.
The gain from the sales at case (c) is larger than 4∆ and the loss of sales at case (a)
is at most 2∆.
It remains to evaluate the probabilities of case (a) and case (c). We use an asymptotic
expansion method to evaluate the distribution of the equilibrium bids at small δ by
ignoring the higher order terms in terms of δ.F o rs u ﬃciently small δ, the probability
of event (a) and (c) can be approximated by the probability that a nonstrategic player
b i chooses a bid of v(1,1) and v(1,1) − ∆, respectively. Since Hb i,∆ is uniform, these
probabilities are approximately equal. Consequently, the expected beneﬁt from new
sales outweighs the expected cost of lower prices from existing sales.
Lemma 4.5 Suppose that β∗
γ,∆,n is trivial. Then there exists δ>0 and ∆ > 0 such
that for every 0 <δ<δ and ∆ < ∆, the set of signals such that every seller i with the
signal in that set prefers to deviate from βγ,∆,n,δ,i has a positive measure.
This is a contradiction to the assumption that β∗
γ,∆,n,δ is an equilibrium of G(γ,f,∆,n,δ).
Consequently, it has to be that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium β∗
γ,∆,n is nontrivial. This
establishes Part (a) of Proposition 1.
4.2. P r o o fo fP a r t( b )
Having established existence of a nontrivial Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the double
auction game in the ﬁnite economy, we now study its asymptotic properties.
38. Convergence to a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of double auction in the large economy.
It follows from Part (a) that for suﬃciently small ∆, there exists a sequence of nontrivial




γ,∆,s) be its subsequence limit.
We need to show that β∗
γ,∆ is a nontrivial equilibrium of the double auction game in
the large economy G(γ,f,∆). For that purpose, we show that the ex ante payoﬀ func-
tion πγ,∆,n,i(β∗
γ,∆,n,i,β∗
γ,∆,n,−i)o fG(γ,f,∆,n) converges to the ex ante payoﬀ function
πγ,∆,i(β∗
γ,∆,i,β∗
γ,∆,i)o fG(γ,f,∆) .T h ec h a n g ei nt h ee xa n t ep a y o ﬀsi st h es u mo ft w o
eﬀects:
(a) The ﬁrst eﬀect concerns the eﬀect of change of strategies from β∗
γ,∆,n to β∗
γ,∆ whileA STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 19





γ,∆,i) converges to zero since β∗
γ,∆,n converges to β∗
γ,∆.
(b) The second eﬀect concerns the eﬀect of the change of the size of the economy n
while keeping the strategy β∗





γ,∆,n,−i) converges to zero because of convergence of the empiri-
cal distribution of bids generated by β∗
γ,∆,n converges to the distribution of bids
generated by β∗
γ,∆,n.
It remains to show that β∗
γ,∆ is nontrivial. To see this, suppose β∗
γ,∆ is trivial. Then,
it follows that for suﬃciently large n, the probability of trade under β∗
γ,∆,n has to be
very small. But an argument similar to a previous lemma implies that it cannot be the
case. Thus we have
Lemma 4.6 β∗
γ,∆ is a nontrivial Bayesian Nash equilibrium of G(γ,f,∆).
We now examine the structure of a best response to β∗
γ,∆. We ﬁrst begin with its
symmetry.
39. Symmetry of interim expected payoﬀs and best responses.L e tBRγ,∆,i(xi,β∗
γ,∆,b,β∗
γ,∆,s)
be the set of best responses for player i when, except for player i, all buyers use
β∗
γ,∆,b and all sellers use β∗
γ,∆,s. Then, since buyers and sellers are symmetric in val-
ues and informations, their interim expected payoﬀ functions are symmetric. That
is, and since they face a symmetric distribution of bidding strategies of other players,
their best responses are symmetric. That is, there exists a best response correspondence
BRγ,∆(xi,β∗
γ,∆,b,β∗





γ,∆,s) for every i. That is, although buyers and sellers’ best responses
are asymmetric in the ﬁnite economy, players’ best responses will be symmetric in the
double auction in the large economy.
We now proceed to examine its monotonicity structure.
40. The strict single crossing property. Let bi ∈ BRγ,∆(xi,β∗
γ,∆,b,β∗
γ,∆,s). We now want
to show that the best response to β∗
∆ satisﬁes the best reply strict single crossing
property17.T h a ti s ,
If bi is a best response for xi to (β∗
γ,∆,b,β∗
γ,∆,s),
then, for bi >b i, xi >x i,
Uγ,∆(xi,b i,β∗
γ,∆,b,β∗




if bi is preferred to a lower bid by a player with the signal xi
→ Uγ,∆(xi,b i,β∗
γ,∆,b,β∗




then bi is still, and strictly preferred to the lower bid by a player with the higher signal xi
17Reny and Zamir (2004) ﬁrst introduced a notion of the best reply single crossign condition (BR-SCC).20 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI














then bi is still, and strictly preferred to the higher bid by a player with a lower signal xi
Intuitively, the strict single crossing property holds when the incremental return from
bi to bi ∈ BRγ,∆(β∗
γ,∆,b,β∗
γ,∆,s) crosses zero only once, only from below, and at most
at a single point.
We now proceed to show that the best response correspondence BRγ,∆ satisﬁes the
strict single crossing properties. We proceed in the following steps.
41. We ﬁrst estimate the eﬀect of a change in the signal from xi to xi on the estimate
of the value of the good. The change is the sum of the following two eﬀects:
• Private value eﬀect: By Assumption 5, a player with a signal xi increases the
estimate of the value of the good at least by λ(xi − xi).
• Aﬃliation eﬀect: By Assumption 4 and 5, the estimated value is nondecreasing in
the signal.
Thus, in total, the value estimate increases at least by λ(xi − xi).
Next we establish the strict single crossing property holds locally.
42. Local strict single crossing property. Suppose that bi and bi are one grid size apart
(bi − bi = ∆).
• The change in the estimated value is at least λγ.
• On the other hand, the possible increase in the payment is bounded above by
bi − bi = ∆.
Thus, for suﬃciently small ∆, the increase in the expected value of the good outweighs
the possible increase in the payment, and the strict single crossing holds.
Lastly, we extend the local result to a more general case.
43. Strict single crossing property in a general case. Suppose that the diﬀerence bi−bi
is more than one grid size apart. We sketch the argument in three cases.
• Suppose that no other players place a bid between bi and bi. It follows that the
player with signal xi should have a nonnegative payoﬀ from winning with the price
bi, otherwise the player could have lowered the bid. Then, a player with the high
signal xi should have a positive expected payoﬀ from winning with the price bi.
Thus, even when the probability that the price is bi increases with signal xi,t h e
player with signal xi strictly prefers bi over bi.
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between bi and bi. It follows from the previous local argument, the player with
signal xi will prefer to increase a bid incrementally from bi to bi.
• The remaining case is that the player who places a bid between bi and bi has a signal
strictly higher than xi. But in this case, this player should have strictly preferred
bi over the bid between bi and bi in the ﬁrst place, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, we have
Lemma 4.7 There exists ∆ > 0 such that for all 0 < ∆ < ∆, in the double auction
game in the large economy G(γ,f,∆), a best response to an equilibrium strategy β∗
γ,∆
satisﬁes the strict single crossing property for bids in the range of the equilibrium prices.
The ﬁrst important consequence of the strict single property is that the distribution
of bids according to β∗
γ,∆ has supports nondecreasing in signals.
44. Monotone supports. Since the player’s best response satisﬁes the strict single cross-
ing property, a Monotone selection theorem (Milgrom and Shannon (1994), Milgrom
(2004)) implies that every selection from a best response correspondence is nonde-
creasing in the player’s signal. A consequence is that an equilibrium strategy β∗
γ,∆ has
monotone supports in the sense that every selection from suppβ∗
γ,∆(xi) is nondecreas-
ing in xi. That is, for the minimum bid placed by a player with a high signal is no less
than the maximum bid placed by a player with a low signal.
Lemma 4.8 β∗
γ,∆(xi) has monotone supports in the range of the equilibrium prices.
Strict single crossing property in a decision problem itself still does not imply that the
optimizer is strictly increasing18. That is, it is still possible that the minimum bid placed
by a player with a high signal is equal to the maximum bid placed by a player with a
high signal so that β∗
γ,∆ is not separating. But in aﬃliated value auctions, monotonicity
of bidding strategies can aﬀect a player’s inference, and thus choice, through winner’s
curse, and it will lead to a separation of β∗
γ,∆ for ∆ suﬃciently small.
45. Winner’s curse and separation at β∗
γ,∆. The next step is to show that players with
distinct signals will place distinct bids. Suppose otherwise that players with two distinct
signals xi >x i place the same bid in bi according to β∗
∆ with positive probability.
First, a previous lemma implies that winner’s curse is present at the tie. That is,
when the state is higher, the bids will be higher, and a player is more likely to lose the
tie. It follows that the expected value of the good conditional on the event of losing
the tie at bi is higher than the expected value of the good conditional on the event of
winning at the tie at bi.
18See Athey, Milgrom, and Roberts (forthcoming) for a counterexample.22 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
On the other hand, since bidders with distinct signals bid the same amount, it has to
be that the player with signal xi should have a negative expected payoﬀ from losing
the tie at bi, otherwise the player will increase the bid to outbid the player with the
low signal. Also, the player with signal xi should have a positive expected payoﬀ from
winning the tie at bi, otherwise the player will decrease the bid so that the player will
not be tied with the player with the high signal.
These three conditions are mutually exclusive. Therefore,
Lemma 4.9 There exists ∆ > 0 such that for all ∆ < ∆, for every player i 6= j,




We now proceed to prove Proposition 1 part (b).
46. Asymptotic equivalence of β∗
γ,∆ to a fully revealing rational expectation equilibrium
as ∆ → 0.
We now take ∆ → 0 and consider the property of a limit strategy proﬁle β∗
γ. Winner’s
curse eﬀect will imply that there would not be a tie at β∗
γ,t h u sβ∗
γ is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of G(γf).










(v(θ,xi) − bi)(1 − q(bi,b −i))h∆(b−i|x−i)
fθ|Xi(θ|xi)dxi
≤ 0.
The ﬁrst term deals with the case where a bid bi+∆ wins the good at the price bi+∆.
The second term deals with the case when the bid of bi previously lost the tie but now
ab i dbi +∆ wins the tie. Similar condition holds for a change in bid from bi to bi −∆.
The previous lemma implies that there will not be a tie between bids by players
with diﬀerent signals for suﬃciently small ∆.T h u s ,f o r∆ small, a changing a bid
a little bit will not aﬀect the allocation. Furthermore, winner’s curse eﬀect implies
that there would not be a tie at the limit strategy proﬁle β∗
γ(xi). It follows that,
q(bi + ∆,b−i) → q(bi,b−i)a s∆ → 0. Therefore, the ﬁrst order condition implies that
E[(v(θ,Xi) − bi)|Xi = xi,p(bi,b−i)=bi] = 0. In words, the bid is equal to the expected
value of the good conditional on the bid being on the margin.
Given the monotone likelihood ratio condition, the bidding strategy is strictly in-
creasing in xi. This implies that the limit strategy β∗
∆,b is outcome equivalent to theA STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 23
fully revealing rational expectation equilibrium. Thus we have:
Lemma 4.10 The limit strategy proﬁle β∗
γ is outcome equivalent to the fully revealing
rational expectation equilibrium identiﬁed in Lemma 2.1.
This lemma concludes the proof of Proposition Part (b).
4.3. P r o o fo fP a r t( c )
This subsection studies the property of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the double
auction game in the large ﬁnite economies. We begin with understanding the rela-
tions between the double auction games in the large economy and in the large ﬁnite
economies.
47. Uniform convergence of the interim expected payoﬀ functions from G(γ,f,∆,n) to
G(γ,f,·). We saw in Lemma 4.6 that the ex ante payoﬀ functions in G(γ,f,∆,n)a s
the size of the economy increases. Since the set of possible bids and the set of possible
signals are both ﬁnite, the convergence is uniform.





γ,∆,n,s) → Uγ,∆(xi,b i,β∗
γ,∆,b,β∗
γ,∆,s) as n →∞
uniformly for player i,s i g n a lxi,a n dab i dbi.
Lemma 4.11 implies that, when the economy is suﬃciently large, (a) the diﬀerence of
the expected payoﬀs between the large ﬁnite economy and the large economy is small,
a n d( b )t h ed i ﬀerence of payoﬀs between a buyer and a seller is small.
48. Best responses. It follows from the previous lemma that for suﬃciently large n,a
player’s expected payoﬀ in G(γ,f,∆,n) will be very close to the player’s expected payoﬀ
in G(γ,f,∆). Since the set of signals and the bids are ﬁnite, for suﬃciently large n,ab e s t
response to β∗
γ,∆,n in G(γ,f,∆,n) is also a best response to β∗
γ,∆ of G(γ,f,∆). To see this,
suppose that bγ,n,i is a best response for a player with signal xi to β∗
γ,∆,n in G(γ,f,∆,n)
but not to β∗
γ,∆ of G(γ,f,∆). Then, there should be a best response b0
i which does
better than bγ,n,i to β∗






it follows from Lemma 4.11 that, for suﬃciently large n, b0
i does better than bi,n in
G(γ,f,∆,n). It is a contradiction to the fact that bi,n is a best response to (β∗
∆,n,b,β∗
∆,n,s)
in G(γ,f,∆,n). Since the number of possible combinations of xi and bi is ﬁnite, it is
possible to ﬁnd a ﬁnite lower bound n.







This relation of best responses between double auction games in the large ﬁnite
economy and in the large economy allows us to extend the best response strict single
crossing properties to the large ﬁnite economy.
49. Strict single crossing properties in the large ﬁnite economy. Consider a buyer with
signal xn,i and a bid bγ,∆,n,i ∈ BRγ,∆,n,b(xn,i,β∗
γ,∆,n,b,β∗
γ,∆,n,s). We now increase the
signal from xi to xi and we would like to see that a buyer with signal xi still and
strictly prefers b∆,n,i t oal o w e rb i dbi <b ∆,n,i.T h a ti s ,
Uγ,∆,n,b(xi,b ∆,n,i,β∗
∆,n,b,β∗
∆,n,s) >U γ,∆,n,b(xi,b i,β∗
∆,n,b,β∗
∆,n,s).
From Lemma 4.12, bγ,∆,n,i is also a best response of a buyer with signal xn,i to β∗
γ,∆
in G(γ,f,·). It follows from the strict single crossing condition of the double auction in
the large economy (Lemma 4.7)t h a t
Uγ,∆(xi,b ∆,n,i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) >U γ,∆(xi,b i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s).










γ,∆,s) will be suﬃciently small. Therefore, the best response
strict single crossing condition holds for suﬃciently large ﬁnite economies.
Lemma 4.13 There exists ∆ > 0 and n<∞ such that for all 0 < ∆ < ∆ and n> n ,
the uniform price auction game in the large ﬁnite economy G(γ,f,∆,n) satisﬁes a best
response strict single crossing property for bids in the range of the equilibrium prices.
50. Monotone and separating supports in the large ﬁnite economy. It follows from a
reasoning similar to Lemma 4.9 that both the support of equilibrium strategies of
buyers and sellers increase monotonically in signals and the supports are separating
for suﬃciently small ∆.
Lemma 4.14 There exists ∆ > 0 and n< ∞ such that for all ∆ < ∆ and n> n ,( a ) .
β∗
γ,∆,n,i has a monotone supports. (b). for each player i,s i g n a lxi 6= xj,a n dab i dbi




Reny and Perry (2006) considered the setting where the set of possible bids is ﬁnite
and the set of possible signals is continuous. We now take the signal grid size γ → 0
and characterize a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium β∗
∆,n of the double auction with a ﬁnite
set of possible bids in the large ﬁnite economy with continuum signals G(f,∆,n).A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 25
51. We approximate G(f,∆,n) by a sequence of double auction games with a ﬁnite
set of signals {G(γ,fγ,∆,n)}γ by approximating the posterior distribution fXi|θ(xi|θ)








i if xi = kγ ∈ [0,1] for some k ∈ N.
0e l s e
It follows from Lemma 4.15 that G(γ,fγ,∆,n) has a nontrivial Bayesian-Nash equilib-
rium β∗
γ,∆,n with monotone and separating supports for each γ>0.
52. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of G(f,∆,n).Let β∗
∆,n be a limit strategy proﬁle of
{β∗
γ,∆,n}γ as γ → 0. Since fθ|Xi,γ(θ|xi) converges weakly to fθ|Xi, β∗
∆,n is a Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium of G(f,∆,n).
Furthermore, since every β∗
γ,∆,n has monotone and separating supports and β∗
γ,∆,n
changes continuously in n,β∗
∆,n also has monotone supports. Since the set of possible
bids is ﬁnite and signals is continuum, β∗
∆,n is monotone and pure almost everywhere.
Lemma 4.15 There exists n< ∞ such that for n> n , there exists a monotone pure
Bayesian Nash equilibrium β∗
∆,n of the double auction game in the large ﬁnite market
G(f,∆,n).
Lemma 4.15 corresponds to Theorem 6.1 (i) of Reny and Perry (2006). This concludes
the proof of part (c).
4.4. P r o o fo fP a r t( d )
In this subsection we establish the asymptotic normality of a monotone pure strategy
Bayesian Nash equilibrium price. We ﬁrst show that a monotone pure strategy Bayesian
Nash equilibrium exists of the double auction game with a continuum set of bids in
the large ﬁnite economy.
53. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the double auction game in the large ﬁnite economy
G(f,n). Let β∗
∆,n be a sequence of monotone pure strategy equilibria in G(f,∆,n). Let
β∗
n be a limit of {β∗
∆,n}∆ as ∆ → 0.β ∗
n is a strategy proﬁle in the double auction
game with a continuum of bids G(f,n). Due to winner’s curse eﬀect, when there are
ties in the limit, a buyer with a high signal prefers to increase the bid in the suﬃciently
large ﬁnite economy. Analogous relation holds for a seller. Therefore, the limit strategy
proﬁle does not involve a tie among players. Therefore, β∗
n does not involve a tie and
is a monotone pure strategy equilibrium of G(f,n).
Lemma 4.16 There exists n< ∞ such that for each n> n , there exists a nontrivial
monotone pure strategy equilibrium β∗
n in the double auction game in the ﬁnite market
G(f,n).26 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
We now study the limit behavior of β∗
n as n →∞ .
54. Asymptotic outcome equivalence to the fully revealing rational expectation equilib-
rium in the large economy. Let β∗ denote a limit of a sequence of monotone pure
strategy equilibria β∗
n in {G(f,n)}n.S i n c eβ∗
n does not involve a tie due to winner’s
curse eﬀect and the outcomes in the ﬁnite economies converge to the outcome in the
large economy. it is possible to extend Lemma 4.11 to show that β∗ is a nontrivial
monotone pure strategy equilibrium of G(f). Furthermore, analysis of the ﬁrst order
conditions show that, similar to Lemma 4.10, β∗ is outcome equivalent to the fully
revealing rational expectation equilibrium in the large economy.
Lemma 4.17 As n →∞ , a nontrivial monotone pure strategy equilibrium β∗
n in the
double auction game G(f,n) is asymptotically outcome equivalent to the fully revealing
rational expectation equilibrium identiﬁed in Lemma 2.1.





n) − v(θ0,xi(θ0))). Let Pn(θ0) be the transaction price
where each player uses a bidding strategy in the rational expectation equilibrium
v(θ(xi),xi). Since buyers and sellers can bid asymmetrically in the ﬁnite market, the
transaction price PBNE
n (β∗
n) can very well be diﬀerent from Pn(θ0). Then we split the
diﬀerence as follows: √
n(Pn(β∗
n) − v(θ0,x i(θ0)))
=
√
n(Pn(θ0) − v(θ0,x i(θ0)))
| {z }








56. The sample size eﬀect. Our analysis is based on a standard result of the asymptotic
distribution order statistics of a continuous random variable (David and Nagaraja
(2003)):
√












n(Pn(θ0) − v(θ0,x i(θ0))) can be evaluated by ap-
plying the delta method (e.g. van der Vaart (2000)).




n(Pn(β∗) − v(θ(xi),x 0)) ≤ x) −
Pr(
√
n(Pn( θ0) − v(θ(xi),θ0)) ≤ x).
Suppose, hypothetically, that every player use the same strategy. In this case, ηn(x)A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 27
can be evaluated as
ηn(x)=
1







n) tnS−1(1 − t)n−nS
where Hn is the distribution of Pn(θ0), H∗
n is the distribution of Pn(β∗
n), and Beta(a,b)
denotes a beta function. By evaluating this integral, we can show that it is suﬃce
that the distribution of bidding strategies HBNE




By extending the argument to the case where buyers and sellers use asymmetric
strategies, we can see that it is suﬃce that both H∗
n,b and H∗




58. The rate of convergence of β∗
n,b and β∗
n,s. It now remains to show that β∗
n,b and
β∗
n,s converge to v(θ(xi),xi) at a rate faster than O(1/
√
n).
We ﬁrst show that the size of misrepresentation v(θ(xi),xi) − β∗
n,i(xi) converges to
0 at the rate of O(1/n). To see this, consider a buyer who bids below v(θ(xi),xi)a n d
increases a bid from bi by a small amount ε. This change in the payoﬀ is the sum of
the following two eﬀects:
• If the bid bi is on the margin and losing and if there is a bid between bi and bi +ε,
then the bid bi + ε wins.
• If the bid bi is on the margin and winning, then increasing the bid from bi to bi+ε
will increase the payment.
As the number of buyers and sellers increases, the probability that a buyer or a seller
have placed a bid in the interval [bi,bi + ε] increases at the rate of O(n). On the other
hand, a probability that a buyer wins at bid bi will not drift as the n increases. That is,
as n →∞ , even if a buyer increases a bid just a small amount of ε, the buyer can win
the good additionally with a signiﬁcant probability while the cost from this increased
bid is small. The rate by which the buyer can proﬁtably increases a bid is O(1/n),
corresponding to the rate of increase in the probability that there will be a buyer and
seller in the interval.
Since the same argument holds for the seller, the asymmetry between the buyer and
the seller will vanish at the rate of O(1/n) and their equilibrium bidding strategies
will approach to the rational expectation equilibrium demand and supply at the rate
of O(1/n).
Thus we have,
Lemma 4.18 Let Pn(β∗
n) be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium price in an equilibrium β∗
n28 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
in the large ﬁnite economy G(n).T h e n , √
n(Pn(β∗













)2) as n →∞ .
If we hypothetically set the value function v(θ0,xi)=θ0, the limit distribution in
this case will be the same with the limit distribution of the one-sided uniform price
auction of Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) derived by Hong and Shum (2004), due
to the asymptotic equivalence of one-sided uniform price auctions and uniform price
double auctions. Lemma 4.18 concludes the proof of part (d).
The Center for Advanced Research in Finance, the University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku,
Tokyo, Japan 113-0033.
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Eiichiro Kazumori
This supplement presents the proof of Proposition 1 in the main paper.
5. INTRODUCTION
In this supplement we proceed as follows. In section 2, We explain the proof of
Proposition 1(a). Section 3 contains the proof of Proposition 1(b). Section 4 the proof
of Proposition 1(c). Section 5 is devoted to the proof of Proposition 1(d). All symbols,
deﬁnitions, and assumptions are as given in the text.
6. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1(A)
6.1. Lemma 2.1
Lemma 4.1. In G(γ,f,∆,n,δ)a n dG(γ,f,∆,n), for each player i, for each strategy proﬁle
of other players β−i,∆,n,δ, the ex ante payoﬀ function πn,i(β∆,n,δ,i,β∆,n,δ,−i) is contin-
uous in player i0ss t r a t e g yβi,∆,n.
Proof: Before proving the lemma, we ﬁrst transform the seller’s payoﬀ by a term
which is independent of the seller’s choice variable1. Then we show that the ex ante
expected payoﬀ function πi,n(βi,∆,n,β−i,∆,n,δ) is continuous in G(γ,f,∆,n). The proof
for G(γ,f,∆,n,δ) is analogous.
60. Deﬁnition of a modiﬁed seller’s payoﬀ function in G(γ,f,∆,n). Let pn(b−i)
denote the market clearing price calculated hypothetically assuming that every bidder
but i submits the bid b−i.F o re a c hi ∈ NX,d e ﬁne a modiﬁed interim expected payoﬀ
1This device was ﬁrst introduced by Reny and Perry (2006).









B∆ × ... × B∆ | {z }
n−1
×X×... ×X | {z }
nS−1
(pn(bi,b −i) − v(θ0,x i))
| {z }
the proﬁt when the seller sells the good
(1 − qn(bi,b −i))
| {z }
the probability that an oﬀer bi sells
h∆,n,−i(b−i|x−i)fθ,X−i|Xi(θ0,x −i|xi)dθ0
| {z }





B∆ × ... × B∆ | {z }
n−1
×X×... ×X | {z }
nS−1
(pn(b−i) − v(θ0,x i))
| {z }
the adjustment term intended to approximate pn(bi,b−i)−v(θ0,xi)
h∆,n,−i(b−i|x−i)fθ,X−i|Xi(x0,x −i|xi)dx0.
This device was ﬁrst introduced by Reny and Perry (2006). U0
n,i(xi,bi,β4,n,−i)i sa d -
justed by the term which is independent of seller i’s choice variable bi.As the size of
the economy n grows large, the payoﬀ function of a seller converges to the payoﬀ of a
buyer with the same signal and the bid given other players’ strategies.
61. Deﬁnition of the modiﬁed game. Suppose that, in G(γ,f,∆,n),the seller’s pay-
oﬀ function is replaced from Un,i to U0
n,i. Then, for each seller i,ab i dbi is a best
response to β−i,4,n in a game where the seller’s payoﬀ function is Un,i(xi,bi,β4,n,−i)i f
a n do n l yi fi tw i l lb es oi nag a m ew h e r et h es e l l e r ’ sp a y o ﬀ function is U0
n,i(xi,bi,β4,n,−i).
Therefore, these two games are strategically equivalent. Therefore, it is without loss of
generality to consider the game where the seller’s payoﬀ is U0
i,n(xi,bi,β−i,4,n,δ). Here-
after, to simplify the notation, we denote Ui,n(xi,bi,β−i,4,n)b yU0
i,n(xi,bi,β−i,4,n).
We now show that the ex ante payoﬀ function πi,n,δ(βi,∆,n,β−i,∆,n,δ)o fG(γ,f,∆,n,δ)
is jointly continuous in players’ strategies.32 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI














B∆ × ... × B∆ | {z }
n−1
×X... ×X | {z }
n−1
ui(x0,x i,p n(bi,b −i,b b i),q n(bi,b −i,b b i))
| {z }
the ex post expected payoﬀ with a nonstrategic bid
h−i,∆,n,δ,m(b−i|x−i)fθ,X−i|Xi(x0,x −i|xi)
| {z }
the conditional density of the state and the other players’ bid given the signal of player i
· hb i(bb i)
| {z }




the density of a player’s bid and a signal
+( 1 − δ)
| {z }







B∆ × ... × B∆ | {z }
n−1
×X... ×X | {z }
n−1
ui(x0,x i,p(bi,b −i),q(bi,b −i))
| {z }
the ex post payoﬀ without a nonstrategic bid
h−i,∆,n,δ,m(b−i|x−i)fθ,X−i|Xi(x0,x −i|xi)
| {z }
the conditional density of the state and the other players’ bid given the signal xi
]
hi,∆,n,δ,m(bi|xi)fXi(xi).
That is, a player’s ex ante payoﬀ πi,n,δ(βi,∆,n,δ,m,β−i,∆,n,δ,m)i st h es u mo fp a y o ﬀsw h e n
there is a nonstrategic bidder and when there is no strategic bidder. When there is a
nonstrategic bidder, the expected payoﬀ is obtained by taking expectations in terms
of other players’ signal and bids, the state, and the behavior of a nonstrategic bidder
given the player’s signal.
63. Convergence of strategies in G(γ,f,∆,n,δ). We note, in G(γ,f,∆,n,δ), both
the set of possible signals and the set of possible bids are ﬁnite in G(γ,f,∆,n,δ), a
distributional strategy βi,∆,n,δ is deﬁned by a (b/∆ +1 )· (1/γ + 1) dimensional ﬁnite
dimensional vector {hi,∆,n,δ(bi|xi)}bi∈B∆,xi∈X. Therefore, we can deﬁne a topology on
a set of strategies in a standard way. That is, a sequence of distributional strategiesA STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 33
βi,∆,n,δ,m,m =1 , 2 , ...,converges to βi,∆,n,δ as m →∞ , if and only if, for each bi and xi,
lim
m0→∞hi,∆,n,δ,m0(bi|xi)=hi,∆,n,δ(bi|xi). (2)
That is, for each signal xi, for every bid bi, the probability that a player uses a bid bi
given signal xi converges.
64. Joint continuity of πi,n,δ(βi,∆,n,δ,β−i,∆,n,δ) in G(γ,f,∆,n,δ). Suppose that By
substituting (2)i n t o( 1), we obtain
lim m→∞πi,n,δ(βi,∆,n,δ,m,β−i,∆,n,δ,m)=πi,n,δ(βi,∆,n,δ,β−i,∆,n,δ). (3)
6.2. Lemma 2.2
Lemma. There exists ∆ > 0 such that for every 0 < ∆ < ∆ and δ>0, there exists a
nontrivial Bayesian-Nash equilibrium β∗
∆,n,δ of G(γ,f,∆,n,δ).
Proof: We ﬁrst show existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and then show that
this equilibrium is nontrivial.
65. Deﬁnition of a best response correspondence. Recall the deﬁnition of Φ∆,n,δ :
























nS−1s e l l e r s
)
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
.
That is, Φ∆,n,δ returns a best response of a buyer when all other buyers use β∆,n,δ,b
and every seller uses β∆,n,δ,s and a best response of a seller when every buyer uses
β∆,n,δ,b and all other sellers use β∆,n,δ,s.
66. Existence of a ﬁxed point of Φ∆,n,δ. We will show existence of a ﬁxed point of
Φ∆,n,δ by showing that Φ∆,n,δ satisﬁes the conditions for Kakutani ﬁxed point theorem.
• Nonemptiness. Follows from continuity of π∆,n,δ, established in Lemma 4.1.
• Closed graph. It follows from continuity of π∆,n,δ and the Maximum theorem.
• Convex-valued. It follows from (1)t h a tπn,∆,δ is a linear function of hi,∆,n,δ(bi|xi).
Therefore, Φ∆,n,δ is convex-valued.
Since B∆ is a compact, convex subset of ((1/γ)+1)·((b/∆)+1) dimensional Euclidean
space, and since Φ∆,n,δ is nonempty, has a closed graph, and is convex-valued, then it
follows from Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem that there exists a ﬁxed point β∗
∆,n,δ of
Φ∆,n,δ.
It remains to show that β∗
∆,n,δ is nontrivial.34 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
67. Assumption of triviality. Contrary suppose that β∗
∆,n,δ is trivial. Then, by
deﬁnition in the text, the probability of trade between buyers and sellers is zero. By
the deﬁnition of trading rule, almost surely, the highest buy bid in the support of the
buyer’s strategy is strictly less than the lowest sell bid in the support of the seller’s
strategy. It is because, otherwise, a buyer’s buy bid would be at least equal to a seller’s
sell oﬀer with a positive probability, and it would lead to a trade with a positive
probability.
68. Conditions for the support of seller’s trading strategy. We now claim that,
in order for β∗
∆,n,δ to be trivial, it has to be that every sell oﬀer in the support of the
seller’s bidding strategy, including the one of a nonstrategic seller, is at least v = v(1,1).
Suppose not and that the seller will choose an oﬀer strictly less than v with some
positive probability. Then, with the positive grid size ∆ > 0, a seller’s oﬀer will be
equal or less than v − ∆ with some positive probability. In order for this equilibrium
to be trivial, it has to be that all buy bids have to be strictly less than v − ∆ almost
surely.
We now show that then there will be some buyers who wants to trade with these
oﬀers. By Assumption 5 (c), when xi =1 ,v(x0,1) = v for every x0. By Assumption 4
(c), for every x0, the probability that xi = 1 conditional on x0 is positive. Suppose that
a buyer with xi =1b i d sv − ∆ instead of an equilibrium strategy which will ensure
the triviality. Then, this bid v − ∆ wins with some positive probability, since the sell
oﬀer is equal or less than v−∆ with positive probability and all buy bids are less than
v − ∆ almost surely. When the buyer trades, from the k-double auction pricing rule,
the transaction price is equal or less than v − ∆. Therefore, the buyer gets a positive
expected payoﬀ for every x0 ∈ [0,1]. Since the buyer’s payoﬀ at any trivial equilibrium
is zero, the buyer prefers to deviate. It is a contradiction. Thus it follows that every
sell oﬀer in the support of the seller’s bidding strategy is at least v.
69. Derivation of contradiction. But in G(γ,f,∆,n,δ), there is a positive probability











Proof: We proceed in three steps. We ﬁrst prove the statement (a). Then we derive
af o r m u l af o rτ∆,n,δ(β∗
,∆,n,δ|x0) and show it converges to τ∆,n(β∗
∆,n|x0)a sδ → 0.A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 35
70. Equilibrium conditions for β∗
∆,n. By deﬁnition, β∗
∆,n is a Bayesian equilibrium





Let {β∆,n,δ}δ denote a sequence of distributional strategies such that β∆,n,δ → β∆,n.
Since β∗



















That is, it is suﬃce to show that the expected payoﬀsi nG(γ,f,∆,n,δ)c o n v e r g et ot h e
expected payoﬀ in G(γ,f,∆,n).
We now show (8). An argument for (7) is similar.






















change in player’s strategies
without taking into account of a nonstrategic player
That is, the change in expected payoﬀ can be decomposed into the change caused by
a change in the probability of participation by a nonstrategic bidder and the eﬀect
caused by a change in players’ strategies without taking into account of a change in
the probability of a nonstrategic bidding.
We now evaluate these two terms one by one.








B∆ × ... × B∆ | {z }
n−1
×X... ×X | {z }
n−1
ui(x0,x i,p(bi,b −i,b b i),q(bi,b −i,b b i))
h∆,n,δ,−i(b−i|x−i)fθ,X−i|Xi(x0,x −i|xi)hb i(bb i)]h∆,n,δ,i(bi|xi)fXi(xi)
→ 0a sδ → 0
Thus, from similar calculation for the second term of (1)t h a tπn,δ,i(β∆,n,δ,i,β∗
∆,n,δ,−i)−
πn,i(β∆,n,δ,i,β∗
∆,n,δ,−i) → 036 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
73. Convergence of the second term of (9). It follows from (1)t h a t








B∆ × ... × B∆ | {z }
n−1
×X... ×X | {z }
n−1









B∆ × ... × B∆ | {z }
n−1
×X... ×X | {z }
n−1






75. Conclusion of the proof. It follows from (9)a n d( 11), that (8) holds. Similarly,
(7)h o l d s .T h e r e f o r e ,( 5)h o l d s .
Having established convergence of expected payoﬀs, we now show that the proba-
bility that an equilibrium is nontrivial converges from G(γ,f,∆,n,δ)t oG(γ,f,∆,n).
F o rt h a tp u r p o s e ,w eﬁrst derive the probability that an equilibrium is nontrivial at
G(γ,f,∆,n,δ).
76. Calculation of the probability that an equilibrium is nontrivial. Let β∆,n,δ
be a strategy proﬁle of G(γ,f,∆,n,δ). We note that
an outcome is nontrivial
⇐⇒ the highest buy bid is equal or higher than the lowest sell oﬀers
Thus,
Pr(an outcome is nontrivial)
= Pr(the highest buy bid is equal or higher than the lowest sell oﬀer)
Thus we need to calculate this probability.
78. Decomposition into cases depending on the behavior of a nonstrategic
player. The probability that the highest buy bid is equal or higher than the lowest
sell oﬀer can be calculated by conditioning on the behavior of a nonstrategic player.
• (a) the nonstrategic player b i does not participate
• (b) b i participates as a buyer
• (c) b i participates as a seller.A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 37
That is, the probability that a strategic proﬁle is nontrivial is
τ∆,n,δ(β∆,n,δ|x0) (12)








τ∆,n,δ(β∆,n,δ|x0, b i participates as a seller).
We now calculate the ﬁrst term.
79. The case when b i is nonactive. Let b1:nB be a random variable which indicates
the highest buy bid. Let bnS:nS be a random variable which indicates the lowest sell
bid. Then trade takes place if and only if b1:nB ≥ bnS:nS. Thus we next calculate these
probability distribution function of b1:nB and bnS:nS.
80. The probability distribution function of b1:nB.F o re a c hxi, each buyer chooses
a bid according to a behavioral strategy h∆,n,δ,b(bi|xi). Consequently, a probability that












Since players’ signals are independently distributed conditional on x0, the conditional

















That is, the probability that the maximum buy bid is less than bi conditional on x0 is
given by the probability that every buy bid is less than b0 conditional on x0.
81. The probability mass function of b1:nB.I tf o l l o w sf r o m( 15) that the probability
that b1:nB takes a value of bi conditional on x0 is
Pr(b1:nB = bi|x0) (16)
































82. The probability distribution function of bnS:nS. Similarly, the probability
that a seller chooses a bid bi in state x0 is
P
xi∈Xγ h∆,n,δ,s(bi|xi)fXi|θ(xi|x0)a n dt h e








Since a seller’s signal is independently distributed conditional on x0, the probability
that the minimum sell bid bnS:nS is less than bi is given by, from (17),

















That is, the event that a minimum bid is less than bi is a complement of the event that
t h e r ei sab i da b o v ebi.
83. The probability mass function of bnS:nS. It follows from (18) that the proba-
bility mass function of bnS:nS is
Pr(bnS:nS = bi|x0) (19)








































































84. Calculation of the probability of trade. For each value of the minimum sell
bid hnS:nS = bi,0≤ bi ≤ b, trade takes place if the maximum buy bid b1:nB ≥ bi.
Since the minimum sell bids hnS:nS and the maximum buy bids b1:nB are distributed






i|x0)Pr(bnS:nS = bi|x0). (20)
By summing up, the probability that trade takes place conditional on the state x0 andA STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 39
that b i being not active is, from (20),









We now consider the second case of (12).
85. The case where b i participates in the auction as a buyer. Let b1:|Nn,B∪b i| be
a random variable which indicates the highest buy bid among the bids by Nn,B ∪ b i.
Then trade takes place if and only if b1:|Nn,B∪b i| ≥ bnS:nS. Since we already calculated the
probability distribution of bnS:nS, we need to understand the probability distribution
of b1:|Nn,B∪b i|.
86. Calculation of the probability distribution function of b1:|Nn,B∪b i|. Since bids
by buyers in Nn,B and a bid by a nonstrategic buyer are independently distributed
conditional on x0, the probability distribution function of the maximum bid among
bids by i ∈ Nn,B ∪ b i is
Pr
µ




























87. The probability mass function of b1:|Nn,B∪b i|. Thus, the probability mass func-
tion of b1:nB conditional on x0 is



















































88. The probability that β∆,n,δ is nontrivial when b i participates in the auction
as a buyer. Similarly to (21),







Pr(bi:|Nn,B∪b i| = b0
i|x0)Pr(bnS:nS = bi|x0).
We now consider the third case of (12).
89. The case where b i is a seller. Let b|Nn,S∪b i|:|Nn,S∪b i| be a random variable which
indicates the lowest sell bid among sell bids by i ∈ Nn,S ∪ b i. Then trade takes place if40 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
b1:nB ≥ b|Nn,S∪b i|:|Nn,S∪b i|.
90. Calculation of the probability mass function of b|Nn,S∪b i|:|Nn,S∪b i|. Following a
similar reasoning in the case b i is a buyer, the probability that the maximum bid among
bids by i ∈ Nn,S ∪ b i is less than bi is given by
Pr
µ




























Thus, the probability mass function of bnS∪b i:nS∪b i conditional on x0 is



















































91. Calculation of the probability of nontriviality when b i is a seller. Similar
to (21),








i|x0)Pr(bnS∪b i:nS∪b i = bi|x0).
The trading probability τ∆,n,δ(β∆,n,δ|x0) is obtained from substituting (21), (24), and
(27)i n t o( 12). We now proceed to show Part (b) of the lemma. We ﬁrst decompose the
change into two terms:
92. Decomposition of τ∆,n,δ(β∗
∆,n,δ|x0) − τ∆,n(β∗
∆,n|x0). We now decompose the

















That is, the change in the probabilities that an equilibrium is nontrivial is decomposed
into the eﬀect of changes in β∗
∆,n,δ while keeping the probability of nonstrategic bidding
constant and the eﬀect of changes in δ while keeping the strategy constant.
We now deal with these two cases one by one.
93. Convergence of τ∆,n,δ(β∗
∆,n,δ|x0) − τ∆,n,δ(β∗
∆,n|x0). We ﬁrst consider the case




∆,n,δ|x0,b i not active) → τ∆,n,δ(β∗
∆,n|x0,b i not active) (29)A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 41
In view of (21), it is suﬃce to show Pr(b1:nB = bi|x0)a n dP r ( bnS:nS = bi|x0) calculated
when players follow β∗
∆,n,δ converges to Pr(b1:nB = bi|x0)a n dP r ( bnS:nS = bi|x0)c a l c u -
lated when players follow β∗
∆,n for each bi ∈ B∆.F o rP r ( b1:nB = bi|x0), we recall, from
(16),





























Then, Pr(b1:nB = bi|x0) under β∗
∆,n,δ converges to Pr(b1:nB = bi|x0) under β∗
∆,n. Simi-
larly, Pr(bnS:nS = bi|x0)c o n v e r g e sa sβ∗
∆,n,δ to β∗
∆,n.T h u s( 29) holds. Following similar
reasoning, it is straightforward to show the other terms of (12) also converge. Thus,
the convergence of the ﬁrst term of (28)h o l d s .
94. Convergence of τ∆,n,δ(β∗
∆,n|x0) − τ∆,n(β∗
∆,n|x0). For the second term of (28),
when the strategies β∗
∆,n are ﬁxed and δ goes to 0, the convergence follows from the
fact that τ∆,n,δ(β∗
∆,n|x0) is a continuous function of δ.
It follows that, from (28), τ∆,n,δ(β∗
∆,n,δ|x0) → τ∆,n(β∗
∆,n|x0)a sδ → 0.
6.4. Lemma 2.4
Lemma. Suppose β∗






the probability that a buyer will bid anything other than lowest possible bid of 0,
will go to zero
(31)






the probability that a seller will bid less than the highest possible value
will go to zero
(32)
Proof. Suppose that the conclusion does not hold. Suppose that, although (31)h o l d s ,




∆,n,δ,s(bi|xi) > 0. (33)
Then, there exists a signal x0
i such that for every x0,
v(x0,x 0
i) >b i. (34)42 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
Suppose a buyer with a signal x0
i chooses to bid bi,although (31) requires that the player
with signal x
0
i will not bid bi.I tf o l l o w sf r o m( 31) that buyers with other signals will
not place a competing bid, that is, a bid higher than bi. It follows that a buyer i will
get the good with a positive probability. From (34), the expected payoﬀ is positive. It
is a contradiction to the assumption that β∗
∆,n is an equilibrium.
6.5. Lemma 2.5
Lemma. Suppose that β∗
∆ is trivial. Then there exists δ>0 and ∆ > 0 such that for
every δ<δ and ∆ < ∆, the set of signals such that sellers with a signal in that set
prefer to deviate from β∗
i,∆,n,δ has a positive measure.
Proof:
95. Introduction. We ﬁrst recall from the text that the deﬁnition of the alternative
strategy from the text. We ﬁrst evaluate the change in expected payoﬀs, by evaluating
the gains from an additional sales and the losses from a lower price for existing sales.
We then evaluate the likelihood of these events by evaluating the probability of these
events using an asymptotic expansion.
Jackson and Swinkels (2005) provided an ingenious proof about existence of a non-
trivial mixed strategy equilibrium in a large class of private value double auctions using
a device of a nonstrategic bidder. This proof builds on their argument to show exis-
tence of a nontrivial mixed strategy equilibrium in an uniform price double auction
with a ﬁnite set of possible bids in an interdependent value setting. The argument here
assumes a strictly private value element and the private value at the boundary to avoid
nontrade equilibrium seen in, for example, in lemon’s market. Also the argument here
uses asymptotic expansion to simply the estimation of trading probability when the
probability of nonstrategic bid is suﬃciently small and close to zero.
96. Deﬁnition of alternative strategies. From the text, consider a signal xi which
satisﬁes the condition of
v(1,1) − 6∆ − v(1,x i) > 0 (35)
For suﬃciently small ∆, the probability that a player gets the signal which satisﬁes
the condition of (35) is positive. Now consider an alternative strategy for a seller
that whenever the equilibrium sell bid is at least v(1,1),the seller lowers the bid to
v(1,1) − 2∆.
We ﬁrst introduce notations on the order statistics by other players’ bids.
97. Notations. Let Wi,n be the nS-th highest bid among bids by players other than
i,t h a ti s ,Wi,n = bnS:|Nn∪{b i}−{i}|.L e t Wi,n be the nS +1st highest bid among bids by
players other than i.T h a ti s ,Wi,n = bnS+1:|Nn∪{b i}−{i}|.A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 43
Figure 1.–
Using this notation, we can estimate the change in the expected payoﬀs.








the seller’s payoﬀ from bidding v(1,1)
. (36)
99. Decomposition into cases depending on Wi,n. The change in outcomes and
payoﬀs will depend on the behavior of the highest bid among bid made players other
than i.
• Case 1. Wi,n = v(1,1).
• Case 2 Wi,n = v(1,1) − ∆.
• Case 3. Wi,n = v(1,1) − 2∆.
• Case 4. Wi,n <v (1,1) − 2∆.
We consider each case one by one.
100. Case 1: Wi,n = v(1,1). In this case,
• An oﬀer of v(1,1) may be accepted (subject to ties). The price is v(1,1).
• An oﬀer of v(1,1) − 2∆ will be accepted. The price is k(max(v(1,1) − 2∆,,Wi,n)+
(1 − k)v(1,1).
The maximum loss can be obtained by making the assumptions that
• An oﬀer of v(1,1) will be accepted for sure.
• T h es a l e sp r i c ei sv(1,1) − 2∆.
With these assumptions, the maximum loss in payoﬀ is
E[v(1,1) − 2∆ − v(1,1)|xi,Wi,n = v(1,1)] ≥− 2∆. (37)
We now turn to the second case.
101. Case 2. Wi,n = v(1,1) − ∆. In this case,44 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
• An oﬀer v(1,1) will not be accepted.
• An oﬀer v(1,1) − 2∆ will be accepted. The sales price is k(v(1,1) − 2∆)+( 1−
k)(v(1,1) − ∆).
Figure 2.–
Assuming that the sales price is v(1,1) − 2∆, the minimum gain is
E[v(1,1) − 2∆ − v(1,x i))|xi,Wi,n = v(1,1) − ∆] (38)
≥ v(1,1) − 2∆ − v(1,x i)
> 4∆ from (35).
We now turn to the third case.
102. Case 3. Wi,n = v(1,1) − 2∆. In this case,
• An oﬀer v(1,1) will not be accepted.
• An oﬀer v(1,1)−2∆ may be accepted (subject to ties). When an oﬀer of v(1,1)−2∆
is accepted, the price is v(1,1) − 2∆.
Figure 3.–
The payoﬀs from sales is at least
v(1,1) − 2∆ − v(1,x i) > 0b y( 35). (39)A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 45
The probability of sales from an oﬀer of v(1,1) − 2∆ is positive depending on the
number of bidders who is tied at v(1,1) − 2∆. In order to obtain the lower bound of
the beneﬁt from the alternative strategy, we assume that the probability to be zero.
103. Case 4. Wi,n <v (1,1)−2∆. Neither of v(1,1) and v(1,1)−2∆ will be accepted.
In this case, the change in payoﬀ is zero.
From the above cases, we can estimate the change in expected payoﬀ from the alter-
native strategy.
104. An estimate of change in expected payoﬀs. Collecting (36),(37), (38), and




> (−2∆)Pr(Wi,n = v(1,1)|xi)




−i,∆,n,δ) > 0 (41)
⇔ Pr(Wi,n = v(1,1)|xi) < 2Pr(Wi,n = v(1,1) − ∆|xi).
Thus it remains to show (41).
In order to show (41), we now estimate Pr(Wi,n = bi|Xi = xi)f o rδ small. For
that goal, we ﬁrst derive the formula for Pr(Wi,n = bi|Xi = xi). We ﬁrst simply the
expression by conditioning on the state x0.
105. Conditioning Pr(Wi,n = bi|Xi = xi)o nx0. We note
Pr(Wi,n = bi|Xi = xi) (42)
=
Z
Pr(Wi,n = bi|θ = x0,X i = xi)fθ|Xi(x0|xi)dx0
=
Z
Pr(Wi,n = bi|θ = x0)fθ|Xi(x0|xi)dx0
2
.
107. Decomposition depending on the behavior of a nonstrategic bidder.46 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
We now decompose the
Pr(Wi,n = bi|θ = x0) (43)












We now calculate A, B, and C. Before starting the calculation, we recall the distrib-
ution of bids by buyers and sellers.
108. Calculation of A. We ﬁrst decompose A into cases. We observe
Pr(Wi,n = bi|θ = x0, b i nonactive) (44)
=P r ( Wi,n = bi|θ = x0, b i nonactive, there is a buy bid at bi)
| {z }
A1




Pr(Wi,n = bi|θ = x0, b i nonactive, there is a sell bid at bi)
| {z }
A3




109. The distribution of bids in case A1. We note that
³





⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
out of n − 1 bids (other than a bid by seller i)
there are nS − 1 bids equal or above bi
there is a buy bid equal to bi
a n dt h e r ea r en − nS − 1 bids strictly lower than bi
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
Let j denote the number of sell oﬀers equal or above bi. We note that, there are
freedoms for nS −1 sell bids after taking oﬀ o n es e l l e rw h o mw eh a v eb e e nw o r k i n go n .
Given j, we can determine the distribution of bids.
• since there are nS − 1 bids in total equal or above bi (other than a buy bid equal
to bi), there will be nS − j − 1 buy bids
• since there are nS − 1 sell bids (other than the seller whom we have been working
on ), n − j − 1 sell bids below bi
• since there are nB −1 buy bids (other than a buy bid equal to bi), nB −nS +j buy
bids below bi
The distribution of bids is given in the following table.A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 47
bid # of buy bids #o fs e l lb i d s total # of bids
e q u a lo ra b o v ebi nS − j − 1 j nS − 1
below bi nB − nS + j nS − j − 1 nB − 1
total # of bids nB − 1 nS − 1 nB + nS − 2
It follows that




Pr(Wi,n = bi,j sell bids equal or higher than bi






j!(nS − j − 1)!
(1 − H∆,n,δ,s(bi − 4|x0))jH∆,n,δ,s(bi − 4|x0)nS−j−1
(nB − 1)!
(nS − j − 1)!(nB − nS + j)!
(1 − H4,n,δ,b(bi − 4|x0))n−j−1H4,n,δ,b(bi − 4|x0)nB−nS+j].
We now estimate (46) around δ = 0 as follows. First we estimate the distribution of
bids around δ =0 .
110. Asymptotic estimation of the distribution of bids. It follows from (31)a n d
(32)t h a t
H4,n,δ,s(bi|x0) → 0 for every 0<bi <v (1,1).
| {z }




H4,n,δ,b(bi|x0) → 1for every 0<bi<v(1,1)
| {z }
all the buy bids will concentrate on 0
so the probability that a buy bid take the value above 0 goes to zero
(49)
Thus, for suﬃciently small δ, given that the set of possible bids is ﬁnite, there exists
 >0s u c ht h a t
H4,n,δ,s(bi|x0)<ε for every 0<bi <v (1,1), (50)
H4,n,δ,b(bi|x0)>1 − ε for every 0<bi ≤ v(1,1), (51)
h4,n,δ,s(bi|x0)<ε for every 0<bi <v (1,1)
| {z }
,




4,n,δ,b(bi|x0)<ε for every 0 <b i ≤ v(1,1)
| {z }
the probability that a buy bid will be more than 0 will go to zero
. (53)
We now estimate (46)b yﬁnding the principal term.
111. Asymptotic estimation of (46). We note, by substituting (50)a n d( 51)i n t o
(46),
• 1−H4,n,δ,s(bi −4|x0) ≈ 1−ε. That is, a probability that a sell bid is higher than
bi − 4 is very high.
• H4,n,δ,s(bi − 4|x0) ≈ ε. The probability that a sell bid is less than bi − ∆ is very
low.
• 1 − H4,n,δ,b(bi − 4|x0) ≈ ε. The probability that a buy bid is higher than bi − ∆
is very low.
• H4,n,δ,b(bi − 4|x0) ≈ 1 − ε. The probability that a buy bid is less than bi − ∆ is
very high.
Thus,(46) has the principal term from setting j = nS − 1. That is, the probability is
highest when the number of the seller who bids highest is largest. In this case, we can
evaluate each term of (46)
•
(nS−1)!
j!(nS−j−1)! =1w h e nj = nS − 1. That is, since every seller bids equal or above bi,
there is only one possible combination.
• (1 − H4,s,n,δ(bi − 4|x0))jH4,s,n,δ(bi − 4|x0)nS−j−1 ≈ (1 − ε)nS−1ε0 ≈ 1. That is,
since every seller bids equal or above bi and it is a high probability event that a
seller bids high, it is a high probability event.
•
(nB−1)!
(nS−j−1)!(nB−nS+j)! =1 . That is, since every buyer bids strictly less than bi. there
is only one possible combination.
• 1 − H4,b,n,δ(bi − 4|x0))n−jH4,b,n,δ(bi − 4|x0)nB−nS+j ≈ (1 − ε)nB−1 ≈ 1. That is,
since every buyer bids less than bi −∆ and since it is a high probability event that
a buy bid is less than bi − ∆, it is a high probability event.
By combining these four terms, we get
(A1) ≈ 1 (54)
We then calculate A2.
112. Calculation of A2. We observe
Pr(there is a buy bid at bi|θ=x0,b inonactive) ≈ nBε (55)A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 49
113. Calculation of A3. W en o t e ,a si nc a s eo fA 1 ,
³





⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
out of n − 1 bids (other than a bid by seller i)
there are nS − 1 bids equal or above bi
there is a sell bid equal to bi
a n dt h e r ea r en − nS − 1 bids strictly lower than bi
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
Let j be the number of sell bids. There are nS −2 freedom of sell bids other than the
sell bid by the seller i we have been working on and the seller who will bid bi.
For each 0<j<nS − 2, the distribution of bids will be determined as follows:
• since there are nS − 1 bids in total equal or above bi (other than a buy bid equal
to bi), there will be nS − j − 1 buy bids equal or above bi
• since there are nS − 2 sell bids (other than the seller whom we have been working
on ), n − j − 2 sell bids below bi
• since there are nB buy bids, nB − nS + j +1b u yb i d sbe l o wbi
The distribution of bids is given in the following table.
bid # of buy bids #o fs e l lb i d s total # of bids
equal or above bi nS − j − 1 j nS − 1
below bi nB − nS + j +1 nS − 2 − j nB − 1
total # of bids nB |Nn,S| − 2 nB + nS − 2
It follows that




Pr(Wi,n = bi,j sell bids equal or higher than bi






j!(nS − j − 2)!
(1 − H∆,n,δ,s(bi − 4|x0))jH∆,n,δ,s(bi − 4|x0)nS−j−2
(nB)!
(nS − j − 1)!(nB − nS + j +1 ) !
(1 − H4,n,δ,b(bi − 4|x0))n−j−1H4,n,δ,b(bi − 4|x0)nB−nS+j+1
It is maximized at j = nS − 2. We now evaluate each term at
Thus,(46) has the principal term from setting j = nS − 2. That is, the probability is
highest when the number of the seller who bids highest is largest. In this case, we can
evaluate each term of (57)
•
(nS−2)!
j!(nS−j−2)! =1w h e nj = nS − 2. That is, since every seller bids equal or above bi,
there is only one possible combination.
• (1 − H4,s,n,δ(bi − 4|x0))jH4,s,n,δ(bi − 4|x0)nS−j−1 ≈ (1 − ε)nS−1ε0 ≈ 1. That is,
since every seller bids equal or above bi and it is a high probability event that a50 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
seller bids high, it is a high probability event.
•
(nB)!
(nS−j−1)!(nB−nS+j+1)! = nB. That is, since there are only nS − 1s e l lb i d se q u a l
or above bi, it has to be one buy bid equal or above bi,and there is nB possible
combination.
• (1−H4,b,n,δ(bi −4|x0))n−j−1H4,b,n,δ(bi −4|x0)nB−nS+j+1 ≈ ε. That is, since one
buyer has to bid above bi, it is a probability ε event.
By combining these four terms,
(A3) = nB . (59)
114. Calculation of A4. We recall
Pr(there is a sell bid at bi|θ=x0,b inonactive) (60)
≈ nSε
115. Calculation of A. We can now collect these terms to estimate A.T h a ti s ,
A =( A1) · (A2) + (A3) · (A4) (61)
=1 · nBε + nB  · nSε
≈ nBε.
An intuition is as follows. When there is no nonstrategic bid, in order for the nSth order
statistics out of the bids other than seller i equal to be bi, there are two possibilities.
The ﬁrst possibility is that a bid bi is provided by a buy bid. In this case, the proba-
bility is highest when every nS−1 seller stays above bi and every nB buyers stay below
bi. In this case, one buyer bids bi, and it is the event which take place with probability
ε.
The second possibility is the case where a bid bi is provided by a sell bid. In this case,
even when every remaining nS −2 seller stays above bi, there is only nS −1b i d so u to f
the sellers which will be equal or above bi.I ti m p l i e st h a tt h e r eh a st ob eo n eb u yb i d
equal or above bi. In this case, one seller has to bid below v(1,1) and one buyer has to
bid above 0, thus it is the event which take place with probability ε2.
Therefore, asymptotically, the ﬁrst possibility dominates the second.
We now calculate B,that is, Pr(Wi,n = bi|θ = x0,b i buyer).
116. Decomposition of B. We now decompose the event Wi,n = bi|θ = x0,b i buyerA STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 51
by conditioning on the behavior of a nonstrategic bidder. We note
Pr(Wi,n = bi|θ = x0, b i buyer) (62)
=P r ( Wi,n = bi|θ = x0, b i buyer, there is a buy bid at bi)
| {z }
B1




Pr(Wi,n = bi|θ = x0, b i buyer, there is a sell bid at bi)
| {z }
B3




Pr(Wi,n = bi|θ = x0, b i buyer, there is a bid by a nonstrategic bidder at bi)
| {z }
B5
·Pr(there is a nonstrategic bid at bi|θ = x0, b i buyer)
| {z }
B6
That is, the probability that Wi,n = bi takes the value bi can be calculated from the
case where there is a buyer who bids bi,or the seller, or the nonstrategic bidder.
We now calculate B1, Pr(Wi,n = bi|θ = x0,b i buyer, there is a buy bid at bi).
117. Decomposition of B1.In this case, the distribution of bids is
³





⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
out of n bids (other than a bid by seller i, but with a nonstrategic bid)
there are nS − 1 bids equal or above bi
there is a buy bid equal to bi
a n dt h e r ea r en − nS + 1 bids strictly lower than bi
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
B1 can be further decomposed depending on whether ˆ ı bids equal or above bi.
Pr(Wi,n = bi|θ = x0, b i buyer, there is a buy bid at bi)
| {z }
B1
=P r ( Wi,n = bi|x0,ˆ ı buyer,there is a buy bid at bi, b i bids strictly above bi)
| {z }
B1-1
·Pr(ˆ ı bids strictly above bi|x0,ˆ ı buyer, there is a buy bid at bi)
| {z }
B1-2
+Pr(Wi,n = bi|x0,ˆ ı buyer,there is a buy bid at bi, b i bids strictly below bi)
| {z }
B1-3
·Pr(ˆ ı bids strictly below bi|x0,ˆ ı buyer, there is a buy bid at bi)
| {z }
B1-452 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
118. Calculation of B1-1. We consider
[Wi,n = bi| ˆ ı buyer, there is a buy bid at bi, b i bids equal or above bi]
⇔
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
out of nB buy bid, (nS − 1) sell bids, and a nonstrategic bid,
there are nS − 2
| {z }
there should be nS bids above or equal bi
and there is a nonstrategic bid above bi
there is one bid at bi by a buyer
bids equal or higher than bi
and
there is one bid equal or above bi by a nonstrategic bidder b i
and
there is one bid at bi by a buyer
and
there are n − nS + 1 bids lower than bi
Let j denote the number of sell bids above bi. There are nS−1 freedoms of allocation
of sell bids after a seller whom we have been working on.
For each 0 ≤ j ≤ nS − 1, the distribution of bids will be determined as follows:
• since there are nS − 2 bids in total equal or above bi (other than a buy bid equal
to bi and a bid by a nonstrategic bidder b i), there will be nS −j −2 buy bids equal
or above bi
• since there are nS − 1 sell bids (other than the seller whom we have been working
on ), n − j − 1 sell bids below bi
• since there are nB − 1 buy bids (other than the buyer who bids bi), there are
nB − nS + j + 1 buy bids below bi
The distribution of bids is given in the following table.
bid # of buy bids #o fs e l lb i d s total # of bids
e q u a lo ra b o v ebi nS − j − 2 j nS − 2
| {z }
there is a buyer bid at bi
b i bids equal or above bi
below bi nB − nS + j +1 nS − j − 1 n − nS
total # of bids nB − 1 nS − 1 nB + nS − 2A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 53
It follows that the principal term is obtained by
(B1-1) (64)






j!(nS − j − 1)!








(nS − j − 2)!(nB − nS + j +1 ) !







We note that, from (68), it follows that the principal terms is obtained by setting
j = nS − 2.In this case,
•
(nS−1)!
j!(nS−j−1)! = nS−1. It is because, since there is a buy bid above bi and a nonstrategic
bid equal or above bi, in order for the number of bids equal or above bi to be equal
to nS, it has to be that one sell bid is below bi, and there is nS − 1p o s s i b l e
combinations for this.
• (1 − H4,n,δ,s(bi − 4|x0))jH4,n,δ,s(bi − 4|x0)nS−j−1 ≈ ε. It is because, one sell bid
has to be strictly below bi, and it is a probability ε event.
•
(nB−1)!
(nS−1−j)!(nB−nS+j+1)! = 1. It is because every nB buy bids stays strictly below bi.
• (1 − H4,n,δ,b(bi − 4|x0))n−2−jH4,n,δ,b(bi − 4|x0)nB−nS+j+2 ≈ 1.
By combining these four terms, we get
(B1 − 1) ≈ (nS − 1)ε (66)
Intuitively, in order for the nSth bid equal to bi, at least one sellers need to bid less
than bi, which occurs at the probability at the order of ε2.
119. Calculation of B1-2. We note
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120. Calculation of B1 − 3. We note
[Wi,n = bi conditional on ˆ ı being a buyer, there is a buy bid at bi, b i bids strictly below b
⇔
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
out of n bids
by nB buyers, (nS − 1) sellers, and one nonstrategic bidder
there are nS − 1 bids equal or higher than bi
and
there is one bid at bi by a buyer
and
there is one bid strictly below bi by a nonstrategic bidder b i
and
there are n − nS + 1 bids lower than bi
Let j denote the number of sellers who bids equal or above bi. There is a nS − 1
degrees of freedom available sell bids.
For each j, the allocation of bids will be determined as follows:
• since there are nS − 1 bids in total equal or above bi (other than a buy bid equal
to bi), there will be nS − j − 1 buy bids equal or above bi
• since there are nS − 1 sell bids (other than the seller whom we have been working
on ), n − j − 1 sell bids below bi
• since there are nB − 1 buy bids (other than the buyer who bids bi), there are
nB − nS + j buy bids below bi
The distribution of bids is given in the following table.
bid # of buy bids #o fs e l lb i d s total # of bids
e q u a lo ra b o v ebi nS − j − 1 j nS − 1
| {z }
take oﬀ ab i db yab u y e ra tbi
below bi nB − nS + j nS − j − 1 n − nS − 1
total # of bids nB − 1 nS − 1 nB + nS − 2
It follows that the principal term is obtained by
(B1-3) (68)






j!(nS − j − 1)!








(nS − 1 − j)!(nB − nS + j)!
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We note that, from (68), it follows that the principal terms is obtained by setting
j = nS − 1.In this case,
•
(nS−1)!
j!(nS−j−1)! = 1. It is because every remaining sell bid stays equal or above bi,a n d
there is only one possible combination for this.
• (1−H4,n,δ,s(bi−4|x0))jH4,n,δ,s(bi − 4|x0)nS−j−1 ≈ 1. It is because every remain-
ing sell bid stays equal or above bi is a high probability event.
•
(nB−1)!
(nS−1−j)!(nB−nS+j+1)! = 1. It is because that every remaining buy bid (other than
the one bidding bi) stays below bi.
• (1 − H4,n,δ,b(bi − 4|x0))n−1−jH4,n,δ,b(bi − 4|x0)nB−nS+j+1 ≈ 1.Because every re-
maining buy bid stays below bi is a high probability event.
By combining these four terms, we get
(B1 − 3) ≈ 1. (70)
Intuitively, when there is one buy bid at bi,i ti ss u ﬃce that all remaining sell nS − 1
bids stay at v(1,1) in order to have Wi,n = bi.
121. Calculation of B1-4. We note






We now collect terms for B1.
122. Calculation of B1.We now combine these terms to calculate
(B1) = (B1 − 1) · (B1 − 2) (72)
+(B2 − 1) · (B2 − 2)
















The intuition is as follows. When b i is a buyer, there is a buy bid at bi,t h e r ea r et w o
possibilities about the behavior of bb i.
The ﬁrst possibility is that b i bids strictly above bi. In this case, there are already 2
bids equal or above bi. Therefore, it has to be that one sell bid has to be less than bi.
It is a probability ε event.
The second possibility is that b i bids strictly less bi. In this case, there is one bid equal
or above bi by a buyer, Therefore, it is suﬃce that every remaining nS −1s e l lb i ds t a y
e q u a lo ra b o v ebi, and it is a high probability event.56 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
Therefore, the probability of the second event dominates the probability of the ﬁrst
event.
We now consider B2.
123. Calculation of B2. We note






We now consider B3
124. Calculation of B3. We consider Pr(Wi,n = bi|θ = x0,b i buyer, there is a sell bid
at bi)
Wi,n = bi ⇔
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
out of n bids
there arenS − 1bids equal or higher than bi
t h e r ei sas e l lb i da tbi
and there are n − nSbids strictly lower than bi
(76)
B3 can be further decomposed depending on whether ˆ ı bids equal or above bi.




=P r ( Wi,n = bi|x0,ˆ ı buyer,there is a sell bid at bi,b i bids strictly above bi)
| {z }
B3−1
·Pr(ˆ ı bids equal or above bi|x0,ˆ ı buyer, there is a sell bid at bi)
| {z }
B3−2
+Pr(Wi,n = bi|x0,ˆ ı buyer,there is a sell bid at bi, b i bids strictly below bi)
| {z }
B3−3
·Pr(ˆ ı bids strictly below bi|x0,ˆ ı buyer, there is a sell bid at bi)
| {z }
B3−4
We now need to calculate B3-1.A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 57
125. Calculation of B3 − 1. We consider
Wi,n = biconditional on ˆ ı buyer, there is a sell bid at bi, b i bids strictly above bi
⇔
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
out of n bids
by nB buyers, (nS − 1)
| {z }
other than the seller who is deviating
sellers, and one nonstrategic bidder,
there are nS − 2
| {z }
there should be nS bids above or equal bi
and there is a nonstrategic bid above bi
there is one bid at bi by a seller
bids equal or higher than bi
and
there is one bid equal or above bi by a nonstrategic bidder b i
and
there is one bid at bi by a seller
and
there are n − nS + 1 bids lower than bi
Let j denote the number of sellers who bid equal or above bi. Since there are nS − 2
freedoms of sell bids other than the seller we have been working on and the bid at bi,
For each j,the distribution of bids will be determined as follows:
• since there are nS −2 bids in total equal or above bi (other than a sell bid equal to
bi and a nonstrategic bid), there will be nS − j − 2 buy bids equal or above bi
• since there are nS − 2 sell bids (other than the seller whom we have been working
on and a sell bid at bi), n − j − 2 sell bids below bi
• since there are nB buy bids, there are nB − nS + j + 2 buy bids below bi
The distribution of bids is given in the following table.
bid # of buy bids #o fs e l lb i d s total # of bids
equal or above bi nS − 2 − j j |Nn,S| − 2
| {z }
there is a sell bid at bi
there is a nonstrategic bid above bi
below bi nB − |Nn,S| + j +2 |Nn,S| − 2 − j n − |Nn,S|
total # of bids nB |Nn,S| − 2 nB + |Nn,S| − 258 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
It follows that the principal term is obtained by
(B3-1) (78)






j!(nS − j − 2)!








(nS − 2 − j)!(nB − nS + j +2 ) !







We note that, from (68), it follows that the principal terms is obtained by setting
j = nS − 2.In this case,
•
(nS−2)!
j!(nS−j−2)! = 1. It is because every seller will stay above bi and there is only one
combination.
• (1−H4,n,δ,s(bi −4|x0))jH4,n,δ,s(bi − 4|x0)nS−j−2 ≈ 1. Because it is a high prob-
ability event that every seller will stay above bi.
•
(nB)!
(nS−2−j)!(nB−nS+j+2)! = 1. It is because every buyer will stay below bi and there is
only one combination.
• (1−H4,n,δ,b(bi −4|x0))n−2−jH4,n,δ,b(bi −4|x0)nB−nS+j+2 ≈ 1.It is because every
buyer will stay below bi and there is only one combination.
By combining these four terms, we get
(B3 − 1) ≈ 1 (80)
We now consider B3-2.
126. Calculation of B3-2. We note
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127. Calculation of B3 − 3. We note
Wi,n = biconditional on ˆ ı buyer, there is a sell bid at bi, b i bids strictly below bi
⇔
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
out of n bids by nB buyers, (nS − 1) sellers, and one nonstrategic bidder,
there are nS − 1 bids equal or higher than bi
and
there is one bid at bi by a seller
and
there is one bid strictly below bi by a nonstrategic bidder b i
and
there are n − nS + 1 bids lower than bi
Let j denotes the number of sellers who bid equal or higher than bi.T h e r ea r e
0<j<nS − 2 freedom of the number of sell bids after the seller we have been working
on and the seller who bids bi.
The distribution of bids are
• since there are nS −1 bids in total equal or above bi (other than a sell bid equal to
bi), there will be nS − j − 1 buy bids equal or above bi
• since there are nS − 2 sell bids (other than the seller whom we have been working
on and a bid at bi ), n − j − 2 sell bids below bi
• since there are nB buy bids, there are nB − nS + j + 1 buy bids below bi
The distribution of bids is given in the following table.
bid # of buy bids #o fs e l lb i d s total # of bids
equal or above bi nS − 1 − j j nS − 1
below bi nB − nS + j +1 nS − 2 − j n − nS − 1
total # of bids nB |Nn,S| − 2 nB + nS − 2
It follows that the principal term is obtained by
(B3-3) (81)






j!(nS − j − 2)!








(nS − j − 1)!(nB − nS + j +1 ) !







We note that, from (68), it follows that the principal terms is obtained by setting
j = nS − 2.In this case,60 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
•
(nS−2)!
j!(nS−j−2)! =1 .Since every seller’s bid is equal or above bi.
• (1−H4,n,δ,s(bi−4|x0))jH4,n,δ,s(bi − 4|x0)nS−j−2 ≈ 1. Since it is a high probability
e v e n tt h a te v e rs e l l e r ’ sb i di se q u a lo ra b o v ebi.
•
(nB)!
(nS−2−j)!(nB−nS+j+2)! = nB. Since, in order to have nS bids equal or above bi,w h e n
b i bids strictly below bi,i th a st ob et h a to n eb u yb i dh a st ob ee q u a lo ra b o v ebi.
There is nB possible choices.
• (1−H4,n,δ,b(bi−4|x0))n−2−jH4,n,δ,b(bi−4|x0)nB−nS+j+1 ≈ ε. Since, it is an event
with probability ε that one bid is equal or above bi.
By combining these four terms, we get
(B3 − 1) ≈ nBε. (83)
128. Calculation of B3-4. We note






129. Calculation of B3. We now combine the above calculations to get
B3=( B3 − 1) · (B3 − 2)


















Intuitively, when there is a sell bid at bi, there are two possibilities.
The ﬁrst possibility is that b i bids strictly above bi. In this case, if every seller bids
equal or above bi,t h e r ea r ej u s tnS bids equal and above bi.T h u si ti ss u ﬃce that
every seller bids equal or above bi and every buyer bids below bi. It is an event with
probability O(1).
The second possibility is that b i bids strictly below bi. In this case, if every seller bids
e q u a lo ra b o v ebi, there are only nS −1 bids equal or above bi.That is, it is needed that
one buyer bids equal or strictly above bi. It is an event with probability O(ε).
Since the probability of the ﬁrst possibility dominates the possibility of the second
possibility, it is an event with probability O(1).A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 61
130. Calculation of B4. We note
P r ( t h e r ei sas e l lb i da tbi|θ = x0, b ibuyer) ≈ nSε. (84)
We now move to the calculation of B5 where there is a nonstrategic bid at bi.
131. Calculation of B5. We consider Pr(Wi,n = bi|θ = x0,b i buyer, there is a non-
strategic bid at bi). We note that
Wi,n = biconditional on ˆ ı buyer, there is a nonstrategic bid at bi
⇔
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
out of n bids by nB buyers, (nS − 1) sellers, and one nonstrategic bidder,
there are nS − 1 bids equal or higher than bi
and
there is one bid at bi by a nonstrategic bidder
and
there are n − nS bids strictly below bi
Let j denote number of possible sell bids equal or above bi. Since there are nS − 1
degree of freedom about the bids by the seller, 0<j<nS − 1.
For each j, the distribution of bids is as follows:
• since there are nS −1 bids in total equal or above bi (other than a sell bid equal to
bi), there will be nS − j − 1 buy bids equal or above bi
• since there are nS − 1 sell bids (other than the seller whom we have been working
on ), n − j − 1 sell bids below bi
• since there are nB buy bids, there are nB − nS + j + 1 buy bids below bi
The distribution of bids is given in the following table.
bid # of buy bids #o fs e l lb i d s total # of bids
e q u a lo ra b o v ebi nS − 1 − j j nS − 1 |{z}
a nonstrategic bid at bi
below bi nB − nS + j +1 nS − 1 − j n − nS
total # of bids nB |Nn,S| − 1 nB + nS − 162 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
It follows that the principal term is obtained by
(B5) (85)






j!(nS − j − 1)!








(nS − 1 − j)!(nB − nS + j +1 ) !







The principal terms is obtained by setting j = nS − 1.In this case,
•
(nS−1)!
j!(nS−j−1)! =1 .Since every seller chooses to bid equal or above bi, there is only one
possibility.
• (1−H4,n,δ,s(bi−4|x0))jH4,n,δ,s(bi − 4|x0)nS−j−1 ≈ 1. Since it is a high probability
event that every seller bids equal or above bi.
•
(nB)!
(nS−1−j)!(nB−nS+j+1)! = 1. Since every buyer chooses to bid strictly less than bi,i t
is the only possibility.
• (1 − H4,n,δ,b(bi − 4|x0))n−2−jH4,n,δ,b(bi − 4|x0)nB−nS+j+1 ≈ 1. Since it is a high
probability event that every buyer bids strictly below bi.
By combining these four terms, we get (B5) ≈ 1.
132. Calculation of B6.We observe




We now calculate B.
133. Collecting terms for B. We have
Pr(Wi,n = bi|θ = x0, b ibuyer) (87)





















Intuition is very simple. For all three cases where a buyer, a seller, or a nonstrategic
bidder places a bid at bi, when a nonstrategic bidder places a bid bi, every seller
bids equal or above bi, and every buyer bids below bi, the probability is highest and
dominates other possibilities.A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 63






By collecting above cases, we can derive the formula for Pr(Wi,n = bi|θ = x0).
135. Formula for Pr(Wi,n = bi|θ = x0). From (43), (46), and (88),
Pr(Wi,n = bi|θ = x0) (89)






















which is independent of bi. Intuitively, for suﬃciently small ε and δ, the most probable
case is that (1) every nS − 1 seller chooses a bid equal or above bi,o n eb u y e rb i d sbi,
and every other buyer bids strictly below bi (this corresponds to the ﬁrst term), and
(2) every nS−1 seller chooses a bid equal or above bi, every buyer chooses a bid strictly
below bi, and a nonstrategic bidder chooses a bid bi (this corresponds to the second
term). Since a nonstrategic bidder chooses a bid uniformly over B∆, the probabilities
is approximately uniform, independent of the speciﬁc value of bi.
136. Veriﬁcation of (41). It follows from (89)t h a t
Pr(Wi,n = v(1,1)|xi) ≈ Pr(Wi,n = v(1,1) − 4|xi). (90)
It follows from (90)t h a t( 41)h o l d s .
7. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1(B)
7.1. Lemma 3.1
Lemma. β∗
∆ is a nontrivial equilibrium of G(γ,f,∆).
Proof.
137. Overview of the proof. We ﬁrst derive the double outcome functions in the
large economy G(γ,f,∆). We then show that β∗
∆ is an equilibrium of G(γ,f,∆). Finally,64 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
we show that β∗
∆ is nontrivial. We ﬁrst begin with the deﬁnition of the price and the
allocation function in the auction mechanism in the large economy.
138. The price function p(b). Let b be a proﬁle of bids. Given a proﬁle of bids b,w e
can construct an empirical distribution function of b as follows. Let μ be an uniform
measure on the unit interval. Since the set of possible bids B∆ is ﬁnite, it is legitimate
to deﬁne, for each bi ∈ B∆,
μ(bi)={j ∈ [0,1] : bj = b}. (91)
μ(bi) is the ratio of players who bid bi.B yd e ﬁnition,
P
bi∈B∆ μ(bi)=1 .
We now recall that 1 − α is the ratio of the seller in the economy. We deﬁne
p(b)=m i n {bi ∈ B∆ :
X
b0≥bi
μ(bi) ≤ 1 − α}. (92)
and
p(b)=m a x {bi ∈ B∆ :
X
b0≥bi
μ(bi) > 1 − α}. (93)
That is, p(b) is the smallest bid such that the ratio of bids equal or above bi is less
than 1−α. p(b) is the largest bid such that the ratio of bids equal or above bi exceeds
p(b). Here p(b)a n dp(b) is an extension of bnS:n and bnS+1:n in the ﬁnite economy to
the large economy.
The market clearing price p(b) is determined as p(b)=kp (b)+ ( 1− k)p(b)3.
139. The allocation function. A bid which is greater than p(b)i ss u r et ob ea s s i g n e d
a good, since the ratio of bids above p(b)i sl e s st h a n1− a. But the players who bid




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1i fbi ≥ p(b)
1 with probability
(1−α)−μ(j:bj>p(b))
μ(j:bj=p(b)) if p(b) >b i = p(b)
0e l s e .
Given these price and the allocation functions, we can deﬁne the game induced by
t h ed o u b l ea u c t i o n sd e ﬁned by p(b)a n dq(bi,b−i).
140. Notations for the double auction game in the large market G(γ,f,∆).
Let Ui(xi,bi,β−i)a n dπi(βi,β−i) be the interim and the ex ante expected payoﬀ at
G(γ,f,∆). Let BRi(xi,β−i,∆) = argmaxb0
i Ui(xi,b0
i,β−i,∆)b ep l a y e ri’s best response to
other players’ strategies β−i,∆.
3When there are multiple possible values of p(b)a n dp(b) which are consistent with the deﬁnition of (92)a n d( 93)
because of negligible number of bids, we will choose the one which will be consistent with the behavior of the market
clearing price in the ﬁnite economy. That is, we deﬁne p(b)a n dp(b) as the limit of b|Nr,S|:|Nr| and b|Nr,S|+1:|Nr|.A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 65




be its subsequence limit of a sequence of a nontrivial mixed strategy equilibria β∗
∆,n as
n →∞ .
We now show that β∗
∆ is an equilibrium of G(γ,f,∆). Following the discussion in









∆,−i). We ﬁrst show the convergence in terms of the buyer’s payoﬀ.T h ea r -


























i,∆ implies that h∗
i,∆,n(bi|xi) → h∗

















∆,−i). For that purpose, We ﬁrst take a
look at the ex post payoﬀ function.















































T h u s ,i ti ss u ﬃce to show weak convergence of the distribution of the price and the
allocation conditional on x0 as the size of the market increases. In order to show this,
we ﬁrst deﬁne the empirical distribution of bids and its convergence.








That is, the distribution function has a jump of 1
n at each bid. Then, decomposing the











































145. Convergence of the empirical distribution of bids. By assumption 4, con-
ditional on x0, players’ signals are iid. Thus, as n increases, for each of buyer and seller,
the empirical distribution of bids according to β∆,i converges uniformly to the distrib-
ution of bids under β∆,i. Since, as is seen in (100), the distribution of bids is a convex
combination of the distribution of buyers’ bids and the distribution of sellers’ bids,
the empirical distribution of bids under the strategies β∆,i in G(γ,f,∆,n,δ)c o n v e r g e s
uniformly to the distribution of bids in G(γ,f,∆) under the strategies β∆,i.
146. Convergence of the distribution of the price. Since the distribution function
of the order statistics is a continuous function of the distributions function of bids,
by the continuous mapping theorem, the empirical distribution of order statistics also
converges uniformly in the distribution of order statistics. By k-double auction rule, the
price is a convex combination of the nSth and the nS +1st bids. Thus the distribution
function the price in the ﬁnite game G(γ,f,∆,n,δ) under the strategies βi,∆ converges
uniformly to the distribution function of the price in G(γ,f,∆) under the strategies βi,∆.
147. Convergence of the distribution of allocation. We note, by ﬁxing β∆,t h e
probability that a bid bi win is
Pr n (qi(bi,b −i)=1 |x0) (101)
=P r n (bi >W i,n|x0)+
nS − #(j : bj >W i,n)
#(j : bj = Wi,n)
· Pr n (bi = Wi,n|x0)
→ Pr(bi >W i|x0)+
1 − Pr(bj >W i,n|x0)
Pr(bj = Wi,n|x0)
· Pr(bi = Wi|x0)a sn →∞ .
The last line follows since the distribution of bids converges. Therefore, the distribution
of allocation also converges.
148. Convergence of the expected payoﬀs. From the arguments above, since
πi,n(β∗
i,∆,n,β∗
−i,∆,n) is a continuous function of the allocation qn and the price pn,a n dpn
and qn converges in distribution for each x0, πi,n(β∗
i,∆,β∗
−i,∆)c o n v e r g et oπi(β∗
i,∆,β∗
−i,∆).A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 67
149. Nontriviality of β∗
∆. Suppose β∗
∆ is trivial. Then, it has to be that for very
large n, the probability of trade has to be arbitrary small. This implies that even the
seller with signal xi = 0 will choose to bid at least v(1,1), although there are some buy
bids (in order to keep the probability of trade positive). But then the argument similar
to the previous Lemma shows that these sellers will prefer to trade by decreasing the
bid, and it is a contradiction to an assumption of that β∗
∆ is trivial
7.2. Lemma 3.2
Lemma. In G(γ,f,∆),t h e r ee x i s t s∆ > 0 such that for all ∆ < ∆, for every player
i, player i0sb e s tr e s p o n s et oβ∗
i,∆ satisﬁes the strict single crossing condition for bids
bi >b i such that bi is in the range of equilibrium prices.
Proof.
151. Introduction. The argument is based on the point made in the text that buyers
and sellers in G(γ,f,∆) are symmetric. we then show that when a player has a more
optimistic signal, the expected value of the good increases with a uniform lower bound
of the rate of increase. Then we study strict single crossing conditions for adjacent
signals and bids. Then we extend the local single crossing condition to a more general
case.
Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) provided a strikingly beautiful proof that the single
crossing condition holds for the best response to a mixed strategy equilibrium in a
one-sided uniform price auction with a continuous set of bids among a ﬁnite number
of symmetric bidders. The proof here extends their argument to show the strict single
crossing condition holds for best response to a possibly asymmetric mixed strategy
equilibrium in a large uniform price double price auction with a ﬁnite set of bids in the
large economy with a ﬁnite set of signals.
152. Symmetry of payoﬀs functions between buyers and sellers in G(γ,f,∆).
Let i ∈ Nn,S. In the large economy, a player’s bid is negligible. Thus it does not aﬀect
the market clearing price of the double auction in the large economy. That is, pn(b−i)
will converge to p(bi,b−i)a sn →∞ .T h u s ,68 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI




















(v(x0,x i) − p(bi,b −i))q(bi,b −i))h(b−i|x−i)
fθ,X−i|Xi(x0,x −i|xi)dx0
which is equal to a buyer’s payoﬀ in G(γ,f,∆). That is, in G(γ,f,∆), buyers and sell-
ers have symmetric payoﬀs. Let U(xi,bi,β−i,∆)d e n o t et h ep a y o ﬀ function common to
buyers and sellers. Let BR(xi,β) denote a best response correspondence of player with
signal xi when all other players follows strategy β, which is common to buyers and
sellers.
Let me now introduce notations to deﬁne strict single crossing condition.
153. Setup. Let xi >x i and bi ∈ BR(xi,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s). Then it follows that
U(xi,bi,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) − U(xi,b i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) ≥ 0. (103)
we now would like to show
U(xi,bi,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) − U(xi,b i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) > 0. (104)
That is, we would like to show that when a player with a signal xi prefers bi to bi and
a signal increases from xi to xi, then a player with a signal xi still prefers bi to bi.W e
now focus on the argument for The other condition of strict single crossing condition
We now introduce a useful event to express (103)a n d( 104).
154. The event of winning from increasing the bid. When a player increases a
bid from bi to bi, a player wins a tie at price bi and will be possibly tied at price bi.L e t
Y (bi,bi) be this event, that is, an event that a bid bi may not lead to an assignment of
the good with positive probability the but a bid bi will lead to an assignment of the
good with positive probability given other players use an equilibrium strategy β∗
∆.
The event Y (bi,bi)m a yb ee m p t yi fb i d sbi and bi are too high so that both bids lead
to the assignment for sure or too low so that both bids will not lead to an assignment
for sure. To deal with this possibility, we ﬁrst deﬁne the range of prices which can take
place with positive probability when buyers and sellers choose strategies β∗
∆,b and β∗
∆,s.A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 69





be the lowest and the highest prices that can arise with a positive probability as an




∆,s) be the set of prices which take
place with positive probabilities given that players use strategies β∗
∆,b and β∗
∆,s.
Given this deﬁnition, we only consider cases where Y (bi,bi) is relevant.
156. Cases when Y (bi,bi) is nonempty. We note that
bi ≤ pmax(β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s)a n dbi ≥ pmin(β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) (105)
→ f(Y (bi,bi)|x0) > 0.
To see this, suppose bi ≤ pmax(β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s)a n dbi ≥ pmin(β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s). Then, with some
positive probability, bi will not be assigned a good and bi will be assigned a good and
f(Y (bi,bi)|x0) > 0. On the other hand, if bi >p max(β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s)o rbi <p min(β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s),
then both bids bi and bi have the same outcome. By Assumption 4, f(xi|x0) > 0f o r
every xi.T h u s ,i ff(xi,Y (bi,bi)) > 0f o rs o m exi,t h e nf(xi,Y (bi,bi)) > 0 for every xi.
Therefore, for every xi,the support of f(xi,Y (bi,bi)) is the same and equal to {(bi,bi):
bi ≤ pmax(β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s)a n dbi ≥ pmin(β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s)}. Hereafter, in the rest of the analysis,
we consider bi and bi such that bi ≤ pmax(β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s)a n dbi ≥ pmin(β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s).
In order to evaluate the marginal change in expected payoﬀs when a signal changes,
we decompose the change into the change which comes from the change in the expected
value of the good and the change which comes from the change in the expected payment.
157. Decomposition of payoﬀs. We note that
U(xi,bi,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) − U(xi,b i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) (106)
= E[v(θXi) − p(bi,b −i)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)]
= E[v(θXi)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)] − E[p(bi,b −i)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)]
where the ﬁrst term denotes the change in the estimated value and the second terms
denote the expected changes in the price.
We ﬁrst estimate the change in the expected value of the good when a player’s
signal increases. For that purpose, we ﬁrst consider a property of the distribution of θ
conditional on Xi and Y (bi,bi).
158. Monotone likelihood condition for fθ|Xi,Y(x0|xi,Y (bi,bi)). From conditional70 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI




















































Therefore, f(x0|xi,Y (bi,bi)) satisﬁes the aﬃliation inequality. Intuitively, f(x0|xi,Y (bi,bi))
is considered a garbling of f(x0|xi,x−i)a n dx−i does not aﬀect the statistical relation-
ship between θ and Xi
4.
Building on this property of the conditional distributions, we can now estimate the
change in the expected value of the good.
4Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) proposed this interpretation.A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 71

































common value eﬀect while keeping the private value element constant




≥ λ(xi − xi).
For the last inequality, for the private value eﬀect, by Assumption 5, v(x0,xi)i si n c r e a s -
ing in xi with uniform lower bound of the rate of increase λ.T h u s ,t h ed i ﬀerence is at
least λ(xi − xi). For the common value eﬀect is nonnegative because of the aﬃliation
inequality (108) and Theorem 5 of Milgrom and Weber (1982a).
We prove the single crossing conditions using mathematical induction. As a ﬁrst step,
we consider the local case where two bids are adjacent and then extend to then case
w h e r et w ob i d sa r em o r et h a no n eb i ds t e ps i z ea p a r t .
160. Strict single crossing condition for adjacent signals and bids. Suppose
that two bids are adjacent (bi = bi + ∆) and two signals are adjacent (xi = xi + γ).





∆,s) − U(xi,b i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) (111)
= E[v(θXi)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)] − E[p(bi,b −i)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)]
≥ E[v(θXi)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)] + λγ
| {z }
by (109)
−(E[p(bi,b −i)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)] + ∆)
| {z }
upper bound of the possible increase in payment







That is, when bi − bi is suﬃciently small, the increase in the value estimate outweighs
the possible change in the price and the single crossing condition holds. Finally, we
note that it is immediate to extend the argument to the case where the two signals are
more than γ apart.72 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
We now move to the next step of the induction. For a simplicity of the argument, we
consider the case where bids are two step size apart. We start by deﬁning cases.
161. Strict single crossing conditions for the case of bi = bi+2∆ and xi = xi+γ.
Let
e xi =m a x
xi∈X
{xi : bi + ∆ ∈ BR(xi,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s)}. (112)
That is, e xi is the highest signal such that a player with signal e xi will bid bi+∆. Then,
depending on the bids at e xi,t h e r ea r et h r e ep o s s i b l ec a s e s .
• There is no e xi. That is, no player bids bi + ∆.
• e xi ≤ xi.
• e xi > xi.
To see this, please consult the ﬁgure below.
Figure 4.–
We now consider the ﬁrst case where there is no e xi. In this case, we decompose the
change into two cases where the price is bi and where the price is bi. When there are
no bids at bi + ∆, then it has to be that player with signal xi has nonnegative payoﬀs
from winning at bi. Thus, even when the price bi becomes more likely, the player with
signal xi has a positive expected payoﬀ. We elaborate this intuition below.
162. Decomposition of payoﬀs. We note that 106 can be further expanded into
U(xi,bi,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) − U(xi,b i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) (113)
=P r ( p(b)=bi|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi))
h





E[v(θXi)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi),p(b)=bi] − bi
i
.
That is, the change in payoﬀs come from the case of winning the tie at the price bi and
the case of winning (may be at the tie) at the price bi.
We ﬁrst estimate the expected payoﬀ from winning at the price bi.A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 73
163. Estimation of E[v(θXi)|Xi = xi,Y (bi,bi),p(b)=bi] − bi. By assumption, it is
a best response for a player with signal xi to bid bi. Then, it has to be that winning
at the price bi provides a nonnegative payoﬀ, otherwise the player could bid bi + ∆ to
avoid this outcome keeping the payoﬀs from other events the same. That is,
E[v(θXi)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi),p(b)=bi] − bi ≥ 0. (114)
From 109 and 114, we can estimate
E[v(θXi)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi),p(b)=bi] − bi (115)
≥ E[v(θXi)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi),p(b)=bi]+λγ − bi
> 0.
That is, a player with the high signal gets a positive expected payoﬀ from winning at
the high price.
We now consider two cases: (a) the probability that the price is bi decreases with the
high signal and (b) the probability that the price is bi increases with the high signal
and show that the single crossing condition holds for both cases.
164. Case (a). This is the case where
Pr(p(b)=bi|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)) ≤ Pr(p(b)=bi|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)) (116)
Since the prices can be either bi or bi conditional on Y (bi,bi) given that no one bids
bi + ∆,i tf o l l o w st h a t
Pr(p(b)=bi|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)) > Pr(p(b)=bi|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)). (117)
It follows from (113) that the marginal increase in the expected payoﬀ from a higher
bid is decomposed into
U(xi,bi,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) − U(xi,b i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) (118)
= E[v(θXi)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)] −
biPr(p(b)=bi|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)) − biPr(p(b)=bi|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)).
That is, the change in the expected payoﬀ from a higher bid is decomposed into the
change in the expected value from winning at the high bid (and losing at the low bid)
and the expected change in the payment.
Now from (109),
E[v(θXi)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)] > E[v(θXi)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)]. (119)
That is, the change in the expected payoﬀ increases when the signal increases. It
remains to evaluate the change in the payment when the signal changes.74 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
165. Change in the expected payment. From (116)a n d( 117),
biPr(p(b)=bi|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)) + (120)
biPr(p(b)=bi|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi))
≤ biPr(p(b)=bi|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)) +
biPr(p(b)=bi|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)).
That is, since the probability of the high price (bi) is lower when the signal is high by
the assumption of (116), it has to be that the expected payment decreases.
We now have the estimate of changes in the expected value of the good and the
expected payment. Thus,
166. Strict single crossing for case (a). Therefore, by substituting (119)a n d( 120)
into (118), we get
U(xi,bi,β∗
∆,b,β∗





∆,s) − U(xi,b i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s)
≥ 0f r o m( 103).
Intuitively, in this case, when the signal increases, the expected value of the good
increases and the expected payment decreases. Thus the player with the high signal
still prefers the high bid.
167. Case (b). This is the case where
Pr(p(b)=bi|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)) ≥ Pr(p(b)=bi|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)) (121)
It follows that
Pr(p(b)=bi|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)) < Pr(p(b)=bi|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)). (122)






=P r ( p(b)=bi|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi))
h





E[v(θXi)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi),p(b)=bi] − bi
i
.
That is, the change in the expected payoﬀ is the weighted sum of the payoﬀ when the
price is low (bi) and high (bi).
We ﬁrst evaluate the change in the expected payoﬀ when the price is high.
169. Expected payoﬀ when the price is high. We recall, following the same line
of calculation of (107)a n d( 108),
E[v(θXi)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi),p(b)=bi] (124)
> E[v(θXi)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi),p(b)=bi].A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 75
That is, the player with the high signal has the high expected value of the good.
It follows from (115), (121), and (124), we have
Pr(p(b)=bi|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)) (125)
h
E[v(θXi)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi),p(b)=bi] − bi
i
> Pr(p(b)=bi|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi))
h
E[v(θXi)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi),p(b)=bi] − bi
i
.
That is, the player with the high signal has the higher expected payoﬀ from winning
at the high price compared with the player with the lower signal. Since the player with
the low signal has a nonnegative expected payoﬀ from winning at the high price, the
expected payoﬀ from winning at the high price is positive for the player with the high
signal. Since the probability that the price will be high increases when the signal is
high in this case, the expected payoﬀ from the high price will be higher.
Using this information, we can study single crossing condition for case (b).
171. Strict single crossing condition for case (b). It follows from (113)a n d
(125), if there is a violation of single crossing conditions, it has to be that
Pr(p(b)=bi|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi)) (126)
h
E[v(θ,Xi)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi),p(b)=bi] − bi
i
< Pr(p(b)=bi|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi))
h
E[v(θXi)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi),p(b)=bi] − bi
i
That is, the expected payoﬀ when the price is low should be lower with the high signal.
It follows from (122), for (126) to hold, it has to be that
E[v(θXi)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi),p(b)=bi] (127)
< E[v(θXi)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi),p(b)=bi].
That is, since the probability of the low price decreases with the high signal for case
(b), in order to have a lower expected payoﬀ, it has to be that the expected value of
the good decreases with the high signal.
But from a similar calculation with (124),
E[v(θXi)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi),p(b)=bi] (128)
> E[v(θXi)|Xi = xi,Y(bi,bi),p(b)=bi].
That is, monotone likelihood ratio conditions on the distribution ensures that the player
with the high signal has the higher expected value of the good than the player with
the low signal.
It follows that (127) cannot happen. Therefore, the single crossing condition holds.
So far we have covered the case where there is no e xi. We next consider the case where
e xi ≤ xi where, e xi is the highest signal who will bid bi + ∆ as deﬁned in (112).76 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
172. Decomposition of payoﬀs. This is the case where the highest signal who will
bid bi+∆ is very low, lower than xi. In this case, we decompose the diﬀerence in payoﬀ

















U(xi,b i + ∆,β∗
∆,b,β∗





That is, the diﬀerence in the payoﬀ is the sum of diﬀerences of the payoﬀ when the
player with the signal xi increases the bid from bi to bi + ∆ and the payoﬀ when the
player increases the bid from bi + ∆ to bi.
We ﬁrst evaluate the ﬁrst case, the payoﬀ changes from bi + ∆ to bi from the result
in the local case.





∆,s) − U(xi,b i + ∆,β∗
∆,b,β∗




∆,s) − U(xi,b i + ∆,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) > 0. (131)
That is, since the higher bid bi is a best response for a player with signal xi and bi and
bi + ∆ are adjacent, by applying the local strict single crossing condition above, the
player with the high signal xi has the strictly prefers the high bid bi.
We now evaluate the second term.
176. Change in the payoﬀ from bi to bi + ∆. It follows from the deﬁnition of e xi
that
U(e xi,b i + ∆,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) − U(e xi,b i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) ≥ 0. (132)
Then, it follows from the same argument of (111),
U(xi,b i + ∆,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) − U(xi,b i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) ≥ 0. (133)
Intuitively, the player with signal e xi has bi +∆ as a best response. Since bi +∆ and bi
are adjacent, and since xi is higher than e xi, by applying the local strict single crossing
condition, it follows that the player with the signal xi strictly prefers bi + ∆ over bi.
178. Strict single crossing condition for e xi ≤ xi. It follows from (129), (131),and





So far we have considered the ﬁrst two cases. It remains to consider the case of e xi > xi.A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 77
Figure 5.–
Figure 6.–
179. Case where e xi >.xi. This is the case that there is a player who bids bi +∆ can
have a very high signal, higher than xi. In this case, from (130)a n d( 111),
U(e xi,bi,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) − U(e xi,b i + ∆,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) ≥ 0. (134)
That is, since a player with signal xi prefers to bid bi over bi + ∆, the player with
the higher signal e xi will prefer to bid bi over bi + ∆ by the local strict single crossing
condition. Since it is a strict condition, it is a contradiction to the assumption that
bi+∆ is a best reply for player with signal e xi. Consequently, this case will not happen.
The ﬁgure below describes the argument.
Thus we covered the case of bi = bi +2 ∆ and xi = xi + γ. It follows from the
argument of mathematical induction that the single crossing condition follows for the
general case.78 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
7.3. Lemma 3.3
Lemma. There exists ∆ > 0 such that for all ∆ < ∆, for each player i and j, signal





181. Introduction. We start from assuming a contradiction. We ﬁrst examine the
monotonic relationship about the distribution of the support of equilibrium bids and
then stochastic dominance relationship of the distribution of bids. It follows that there
exists a winner’s curse that for each price winning a good is a bad news compared with
losing a good. Its consequence is that it is not compatible that players with distinct
signals choose the same bid.
The arguments that there would not be a mass point in the distribution of equi-
librium bids in an interdependent value environment are presented, among others, in
Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997), Athey (2001), Reny and Zamir (2004), and Reny and
Perry (2006). The proof here extends the argument to a possibly asymmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium in a large uniform price double auctions with a discrete set of bids
in an interdependent value environment.
182. Suppose that there is no ∆ > 0 which satisﬁes (135). It follows that for every
∆ > 0, there exists player i,j and signal x∆,i >x ∆,j and a bid bi,∆ such that
Pr(β∗
∆,i(x∆,i)=bi,∆) · Pr(β∗
∆,j(x∆,j)=bi,∆) > 0. (136)
That is, for every grid size ∆ > 0, there are two signals x∆,i >x ∆,j and a bid bi,∆ such
that players with these two signals will choose bi,∆ with positive probability.
The strict single crossing conditions implies a monotonic relationship about the sup-
ports of the distribution of bids under β∗
∆,b.
183. The supports of the distribution of the equilibrium bids of a buyer and
as e l l e r .For each xi,l e t
suppβ4,b(xi)={bi ∈ B∆ : h∆,b(bi|xi) > 0}.
and
suppβ4,s(xi)={bi ∈ B∆ : h∆,s(bi|xi) > 0}.
In words, suppβ4,b(xi) is the set of bids that a buyer with signal xi will choose with
positive probability. For a buyer’s bid, let
pmax(β4,b(xi)) = maxsuppβ4,b(xi)A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 79
and
pmin(β4,b(xi)) = minsuppβ4,b(xi).
That is, since the set of possible bids B∆ is ﬁnite, pmax(β4,b(xi)) is the largest bid that
a buyer with signal xi will choose with a positive probability. Similarly, pmin(β4,b(xi))
is the smallest bid that a buyer with signal xi will choose with a positive probability.




The ﬁgure below explains these deﬁnitions.
Figure 7.–
Since it is possible that the supports of the distribution of bids by the buyer and the
seller are diﬀerent even though the buyer and the seller have identical preferences, we
deﬁne the union of the supports as follows:
184. The support of the equilibrium bids of buyers and sellers with the same
signal. For each xi,d e ﬁne suppβ4(xi) as follows:
• Suppose
max(pmax(βB,4(xi)),p max(βX,4(xi))) ≤ pmax(βB,4,βX,4)
and
min(pmax(βB,4(xi)),p max(βX,4(xi))) ≥ pmin(βB,4,βX,4).
It is the case where the maximum and the minimum bids are contained in the range
of the transaction price. In this case, we deﬁne
suppβ4(xi)=s u p p β4,b(xi) ∪ suppβ4,s(xi).80 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
• Suppose
max(pmax(βB,4(xi)),p max(βX,4(xi))) >p max(βB,4,βX,4)
and
min(pmax(βB,4(xi)),p max(βX,4(xi))) ≥ pmin(βB,4,βX,4).
In this case, the maximum bids are above the range of the equilibrium prices. In
this case, we deﬁne
suppβ4(xi) = suppβB,4(xi) ∪ suppβX,4(xi) ∪ [pmax(βB,4,βX,4),b]
• Suppose
max(pmax(βB,4(xi)),p max(βX,4(xi))) ≤ pmax(βB,4,βX,4)
and
min(pmax(βB,4(xi)),p max(βX,4(xi))) <p min(βB,4,βX,4).
In this case, the minimum bids are below the range of the possible equilibrium
prices. In this case, we deﬁne
suppβ4(xi)=s u p p βB,4(xi) ∪ suppβX,4(xi) ∪ [0, pmin(βB,4,βX,4)].
Suppose
max(pmax(βB,4(xi)),p max(βX,4(xi))) ≥ pmax(βB,4,βX,4)
and
min(pmax(βB,4(xi)),p max(βX,4(xi))) <p min(βB,4,βX,4).
In this case, both the maximum bid and the minimum bids are above and below the
possible equilibrium prices. In this case, we deﬁne
suppβ4(xi)=[ 0 ,b].
This deﬁnition takes into account of the point where players can get the same outcome
for the bids outside the range of the equilibrium prices. The following ﬁgure explains
one construction of suppβ4(xi).
We ﬁrst compare the supports of the distribution of equilibrium bids for two signals
where both signals place bids in the range of equilibrium prices.
185. Monotonicity of the supports of the distribution of the equilibrium
bids when both signals place bids in the range of equilibrium prices. Let
xi >x i and bi ∈suppβ4(xi)∩ P(β∗
∆,b,β∗




∀bi ∈ suppβ4(xi) ∩ P(β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s),∀bi ∈ suppβ4(xi) ∩ P(β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s),bi ≥ bi. (137)A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 81
That is, if we take two signals, then every bid which is in the support of the bidding
strategies of a buyer and a seller of a higher signal is higher than every bid which is in
the support of the bidding strategy of a buyer and a seller of a lower signal.
We now present the proof of the above claim.
186. Proof of the claim. Suppose otherwise. Then there exists bi ∈suppβ4(xi) ∩
P(β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s)a n dbi ∈suppβ4(xi)∩P(β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) such that bi <b i. Since, bi ∈suppβ4(xi),







Since xi >x i, the previous lemma implies that, the player with the higher signal xi






This implies that both of the buyer with signal xi and the seller with signal xi will
not choose bi over bi. It follows that bi / ∈suppβ4(xi). It is a contradiction. The ﬁgure
below summarizes the argument.
Figure 8.–
We now extend the argument for signals which place a bid outside the range of
equilibrium prices.
187. Monotonicity of the supports of the distribution of the equilibrium
bids outside the range of equilibrium prices. Let xi >x i be two signals such
that suppβ4(xi)∩ P(β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) 6= φ and suppβ4(xi)∩ P(β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) 6= φ.T h a ti s ,b o t h









i / ∈ suppβ4(xi).
That is, for two signals xi and xi which will place a bid in the range of equilibrium
prices, if a player with signal xi places a bid outside the range of equilibrium prices,
the player with signal xi will not choose the bid.





















∆,s) ≥ U(xi,b i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) (143)
That is, from (141), (142), and (143),
U(xi,bi,β∗
∆,b,β∗






















i / ∈suppβB,4(xi). This implies that only the lowest signal who will place a
bid in the range of equilibrium prices will place a bid outside a range of equilibrium
prices.
Figure 9.–
We further extend the result to a signal such that the player with that signal will not
place a bid in the range of equilibrium prices.A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 83
Figure 10.–
190. Monotonicity of the support of the equilibrium bids of buyers for signals









xi be any signal such that suppβ4,b(xi)∩ P(β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) 6= φ. Then xi >x 0
i.
That is, a signal whose support of the equilibrium bid is less than the range of
equilibrium prices is less than any signal such that the player with that signal places a
bid in the range of equilibrium prices.
191. Proof of the claim. To see this, suppose, on the contrary that x0
i >x i.L e t
bi ∈suppβ4,b(xi)∩ P(β∗
∆,b,β∗







∆,s). Then, by construction,
bi >b 0
i.
Also, since bi is a best response for a player with signal xi,
U(xi,b i,β∗
∆,b,β∗














This is a contradiction to the fact that b0
i is a best response to a player with signal x0
i.
The ﬁgure below summarizes the argument.
We have so far derived monotonicity properties of the supports of the distribution of
equilibrium bidding strategies. That is, the support of the distribution of equilibrium
strategies by a player with the higher signal is higher than the support of the distri-
bution of equilibrium strategies by a player with the lower signal. We now derive a
consequence on the distribution of equilibrium bids.84 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
192. Distribution of the equilibrium bids. Consider two signals xi < xi.L e t
H∗
4,i(·|xi)a n dH∗
4,i(·|xi) be the distribution function of an equilibrium bidding strategy



















This is the case where both signals have the support of the equilibrium bids less




















This is the case where the support of the distribution of a player with a high signal
















This is the case where the supports of the distribution of a player with a high and a
low signal place a bid in the range of equilibrium prices. Suppose bi ∈ P(β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s)
and bi < maxsuppβ∗
∆(xi). In this case, a player with a higher signal xi will not
c h o o s et op l a c eab i do nbi,
H∗
4,i(bi|xi) ≥ 0 ≥ H∗
4,i(bi|xi)=0 .
For bi ∈ P(β∗
∆(β∗
∆,b,β∗




4,i(bi|xi).A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 85











Intuitively, when a strict single crossing condition holds, it cannot be that a player with
a higher signal places a bid strictly lower than a bid by a player with a lower signal.
Otherwise, a player with a higher signal strictly should have preferred a high bid chosen
by a player with a lower signal. This implies that the support of an equilibrium bid by a
low signal is less than the support of an equilibrium bid by a high signal. It will implies
that the probability distribution of bids by a player with a low signal is stochastically
dominated by the distribution of bids by a player with a high signal.
We now derive a stochastic dominance relationship of the distribution of equilibrium
bids conditional on the state.








From (146), and (147),




x0 ≥ x0 → H∗
4,s(bi|x0) ≥ H∗
4,s(bi|x0) (149)
It follows from (148)a n d( 149)t h a t
αH∗
4,b(bi|x0)+( 1− α)H∗
4,s(bi|x0) is nonincreasing in x0. (150)
Having established the stochastic dominance relationship about the distribution of
bids, we will now start working on existence of winner’s curse. As a ﬁrst step, we study
how the allocation probability changes as the signal changes.
194. The allocation function at the tie. Suppose there is a tie at bid bi in the range
of an equilibrium price when the state is x0.L e tq(bi,W = bi|x0) be the probability
that a player who bid bi will get the good when the market clearing price is bi and the
state is x0.W en o t e86 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
• The ratio of goods available for buyers and sellers with bid bi is the amount of the
ratio of the good left after the goods are allocated to buyers and sellers whose bids
are strictly above bi.N o t i n gt h a tt h es e to fp o s s i b l eb i dB∆ is ﬁnite, it is,
(1 − α)
| {z }





⎣α (1 − H∗
b,4(bi|x0))
| {z }
ratio of buyers who bid strictly above bi
+( 1− α)( 1 − H∗
s,4(bi|x0))
| {z }

























B,4(bi − ∆|x0)+( 1− α)H∗
X,4(bi − ∆|x0)
| {z }




It follows from (94),(151),(152),




































We now derive a monotonicity property of Pr(q(bi,W = bi|x0)=1 ) .
195. Monotonicity property of Pr(q(bi,W = bi|x0)=1 ) . It follows from (148)a n d
(149)t h a t
αH∗
B,4(bi|x0)+( 1− α)H∗
X,4(bi|x0) is nonincreasing in x0. (154)
and
αH∗
B,4(bi − ∆|x0)+( 1− α)H∗
X,4(bi − ∆|x0) is nonincreasing in x0 (155)





increases faster than (156)
(αH∗





as x0 increases.A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 87
Consequently, from (156),the numerator of (153) decreases faster than the denominator.
Therefore,
x0 ≥ x0 (157)
→ Pr(bi wins |θ = x0,W = bi) ≤ Pr(bi wins |θ = x0,W = bi).
It follows that
x0 ≥ x0 (158)
→ Pr(bi loses |θ = x0,W = bi) ≥ Pr(bi loses |θ = x0,W = bi).
That is, as x0 increases, the distribution of bids by other players increases in the sense
of stochastic dominance, so the ratio of bids equal or above at x0 increases. Given that
ab i dbi is tied with W, it implies that the ratio of bids strictly above x0 is the same
in these two cases of x0 = x0 and x0 = x0. This implies that the ratio of bids equal
to bi is larger with x0 compared with x0. It follows that the probability that a good is
assigned conditional on being at a tie will be lower with x0 rather with x0.
(157)a n d( 158) imply that losing at the tie is a good news compared with winning
at the tie.
196. Winner’s curse. Consider a player with signal xi and a bid bi. The expected
value of the good from winning at the tie is E[v(θ,Xi)|Xi = xi,W(θ)=bi,biwins at
the tie] and the expected value of the good from losing at the tie is E[v(θ,Xi)|Xi =
xi,W(θ)=bi,bi loses at the tie].
We ﬁrst examine the monotone likelihood ratio condition for f(x0|Xi = xi,W(θ)=
bi,bi loses at the tie). We note that
fθ|Xi,W(x0|xi,W(θ)=bi,b iloses at the tie) (159)
=
fθ,Xi,W(x0,x i,W(θ)=bi,b iloses at the tie)
fXi,W(xi,W(θ)=bi,b iloses at the tie)
=
fXi,Y |θ(xi,W(θ)=bi,b iloses at the tie|x0)fθ(x0)
fXi,Y(xi,W(θ)=bi,b iloses at the tie)
=
⎡




fXi,Y(xi,W(θ)=bi,b iloses at the tie)88 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
It follows from (159) that the likelihood ratio for x0 >x 0 is
fθ|Xi,Y(x0|xi,W(θ)=bi,b iloses at the tie)




Pr(biloses at the tie|x0,W(θ)=bi)
fXi,Y(xi,W(θ)=bi,biloses at the tie)
¶
µ
Pr(biwins at the tie|x0,W(θ)=bi)




Pr(biloses at the tie|x0,W(θ)=bi)
Pr(biwins at the tie|x0,W(θ)=bi)
·
fXi,Y(xi,W(θ)=bi,b iwins at the tie)
fXi,Y (xi,W(θ)=bi,b iloses at the tie)
>
Pr(biloses at the tie|W(θ)=bi,x 0)
Pr(biwins at the tie|W(θ)=bi,x 0)
by (157)a n d( 158)
·
fXi,Y(xi,W(θ)=bi,b iwins at the tie)
fXi,Y (xi,W(θ)=bi,b iloses at the tie)
=
fθ|Xi,Y(x0|xi,W(θ)=bi,b iloses at the tie)
fθ|Xi,Y (x0|xi,W(θ)=bi,b iwin at the tie)
That is, the variable θ and the variable bi wins or loses at the tie satisfy the monotone
likelihood ratio condition. Thus, it follows from Theorem 5 of Milgrom and Weber
(1982a) and Assumption 5 that the value is strictly increasing in the state with a
uniform lower bound that
E[v(θ,Xi)|Xi = xi,W(θ)=bi,b iloses at the tie] (161)
>E [v(θ,Xi)|Xi = xi,W(θ)=bi,b i wins at the tie]
It follows that
E[v(θ,Xi) − bi|Xi = xi,W(θ)=bi,b iloses at the tie] (162)
>E [v(θ,Xi) − bi|Xi = xi,W(θ)=bi,b i wins at the tie]
Intuitively, winning at the tie suggests, compared with losing at the tie, that the state
is lower, thus the value of the good is lower. Since the value function is strictly increas-
ing in the state with a uniform lower bound, the expected payoﬀ conditional on the
information of winning the tie is strictly lower than the expected payoﬀ conditional on
the information of losing the tie.
We have deduced the existence of winner’s curse. We now derive consequences of
the assumption that bidders with distinct signals will submit the same bid. For that
purpose, we consider a property of a mapping Z(p) which gives the set of states such
that p is the market clearing price given that players choose strategies β∗
∆.
197. Monotonicity properties of Z(p).Consider two prices p< p which are inA STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 89
P(β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s). We ﬁrst show that
for any x0 ∈ Z(p)a n dx0
0 ∈ Z(p),x 0 ≤ x0
0. (163)
That is, every state which will induces a lower price is lower than the state which will
induce a higher price.
To see this, suppose, on the contrary, that x0 >x 0
0. Then, for every bi, αH∗
B,4(bi|x0)+
(1−α)H∗
X,4(bi|x0) is nonincreasing in x0. It follows that p≥ p. It is a contradiction to
the assumption.
Next we consider another property of Z(p) such that Z(p) does not have a gap.
198. Z(p) does not have a gap. Suppose there are two signals x0< x0 such that the
market clearing prices under x0 and x0 are both p.F r o m( 150), the market clearing price
p(β∗




∆(x0)). Thus, x0 ∈ Z(p).
From these two properties, for each p ∈ P(β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s), there is an interval Z(p) ⊂ [0,1]
which yields p as an equilibrium market clearing price. We also note that Z(p) changes
’smoothly’ in p in the following sense.
199. Z(p) does not jump around. Let p< p be two consecutive prices in P(β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s).
Let Z(p) be the set of signals such that the equilibrium outcome price is p.L e t
x=s u p Z(p). Then, there does not exist ε>0 such that the equilibrium price with
x+ε is p and the equilibrium price p0 with x+ε0,ε0 <εis diﬀerent from p.
To see this, suppose otherwise. Then, if the price p0 is lower than p, it will contradict
monotonicity property of Z(p)i nt e r m so fp and p0,a n di fp0 is higher than p,it will
contradict monotonicity property of Z(p)i nt e r m so fp0 and p.
Intuitively, we have already seen that the distribution of equilibrium bids is increasing
in the sense of stochastic dominance as the state increases. This implies that, as the
state increases, the market clearing price, which is a convex combination of the order
statistics of the distribution of bids, increases monotonically.
We are now able to study the ﬁrst order conditions for the bidder with the high signal
xi,∆.
200. First order condition for the bidder with the high signal. It follows from
the ﬁrst order condition for the signal xi,∆ that it has to be that a player with a signal90 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
xi,∆ does not wish to increase a bid from bi,∆ to bi,∆ + 4.T h a ti s , Z
x0∈Z(bi,∆+4)(v(x0,x i,∆) − (bi,∆ + 4)) (164)
q(bi,∆ + 4,W = bi,∆ + 4|x0)fθ|Xi(x0|xi,∆)dx0
+
Z
x0∈Z(bi,∆)(v(x0,x i,∆) − bi,∆)
(1 − q(bi,∆,W = bi,∆|x0))fθ|Xi(x0|xi,∆)dx0
<0.
The ﬁrst term of (164) evaluates the payoﬀ of a player when a player’s new bid bi,∆+∆
wins when the market clearing price is bi,∆ + ∆ and the player wins the possible tie
and the allocation is q(bi,∆ +4,W = bi,∆ +4|x0). The second term of (164)e v a l u a t e s
the payoﬀ of a player when a player’s new bid bi,∆ +∆ wins when the market clearing
price is bi,∆.
We have already seen the ﬁrst order condition in the form of Y (bi,bi) in the previous
Lemma for example, in (113). The condition here, (164), explicitly deals with the
information about the state contained in Y (bi,bi)i nt h ef o r mo fZ(bi)a n dZ(bi). The
reason that we use this formulation here is that, since we know now more about the
structure of the equilibrium strategies, we know more about the structure of Z.
202. The limit of the ﬁrst order condition as ∆ → 0. We now take 4 → 0. By
taking subsequences, let xi denote a subsequence limit of xi,∆, bi is a subsequence limit
of bi,∆,a n dq(bi,W = bi,∆|x0) is a subsequence limit of q(bi + 4,W = bi,∆ + 4|x0),Z1
be the limit of the interval of Z(bi,∆+4)a n dZ2 be the limit of the intervals of Z(bi,∆).
Then, Z
Z1




(v(x0,x i) − bi)(1 − q(bi,∆,W = bi|x0))f(x0|xi)dx0<0
Given the monotonic structure of Z(p), we can draw inference on the payoﬀ of a high
signal bidder at the tie.
204. Estimation of the payoﬀ of a high signal player with losing at the tie.
From the monotonic structure of Z,l e tx0 be the common point of Z1 and Z2.
• Suppose
v(x0,x i) − bi ≥ 0. (166)
That is, at the highest state where the price is bi,∆,i ti sp r o ﬁtable to own the good.
Then, since, for every x0 ∈ Z1, x0 ≥ x0,i tf o l l o w sf r o m( 166)t h a t
v(x0,x i) − bi > 0. (167)
From q(bi,∆,W = bi|x0) ≥ 0a n d( 167), it implies that it is proﬁtable to win theA STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 91
good when the state is Z1 :
Z
Z1
(v(x0,x i) − bi)q(bi,∆,W = bi|x0)f(x0|xi)dx0 ≥ 0 (168)
Therefore, from (165)a n d( 168), it has to be that
Z
Z2
(v(x0,x i) − bi)(1 − q(bi,∆,W = bi|x0))f(x0|xi)dx0 ≤ 0 (169)
• Suppose
v(x0,x i) − bi < 0. (170)
That is, it is not proﬁtable to own the good at the highest state where the price is
bi. For every x0 ∈ Z1, x0 ≤ x0.T h u s ,f r o m( 170),
v(x0,x i) − bi < 0. (171)
Therefore, from q(bi,∆,W = bi|x0) ≥ 0a n d( 171),
Z
Z2
(v(x0,x i) − bi)(1 − q(bi,∆,W = bi|x0))f(x0|xi)dx0 ≤ 0 (172)
Consequently, (169) holds for all cases. That is, losing the tie at the price bi should not
be proﬁtable.
For intuition, suppose otherwise and that losing the tie at the price bi is proﬁtable.
Then, winning at the price bi + ∆ when the market clearing price is bi + ∆ is a better
news for the state than losing at the price bi.I ti sb e c a u s e ,i no r d e rf o rt h em a r k e t
clearing price to be bi+∆, the ratio of the bids equal or strictly above bi+∆ is at least
1 − α. In this case, it cannot be that the market clearing price is bi.T h i si m p l i e st h a t
winning when the market clearing price is bi + ∆ is a better news. This implies that,
if losing the tie at the price bi is proﬁtable, winning at the price bi + ∆ is proﬁtable
for suﬃciently small ∆, and it will provide contradiction to the assumption that the
player with the signal xi,∆ does not wish to increase the bid to bi + ∆.
We bow consider the ﬁrst order condition for the low signal.
205. First order condition for the low signal and its limit. It follows from (136),
as in the case of a high signal xi,∆,t h a tap l a y e rw i t hs i g n a lxj,∆ prefers to increase
the bid from bi,∆ − ∆ to bi∆.T h a ti s , Z
x0∈Z(bi,∆−∆)(v(x0,x j,∆) − (bi,∆ − ∆))(1 − q(bi,∆ − ∆,W = bi,∆ − ∆|x0))fθ|Xi(x0|xj,∆)dx
+
Z
x0∈Z(bi,∆)(v(x0,x j,∆) − bi,∆)q(bi,∆,W = bi,∆|x0)fθ|Xi(x0|xj,∆)dx0
≥ 0.
The ﬁrst term expresses the payoﬀ when the state is such that the market clearing
price is bi,∆ − ∆ and a higher bid of bi,∆ w i n st h eg o o de v e nw h e nt h eb i do fbi,∆ − ∆92 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
does not win the good. The second case expresses the payoﬀ from when the state is
such that the market clearing price is bi,∆ and a higher bid of bi,∆ wins the good. The
ﬁrst order condition implies that increasing the bid from bi,∆ −∆ to bi,∆ is preferable.
We take ∆ → 0. Let xi be a subsequence limit of xi,∆, bi is a subsequence limit
of bi,∆,a n dq(bi,W = bi,∆|x0) is a subsequence limit of q(bi + 4,W = bi,∆ + 4|x0),
q(bi,W = bi,∆|x0) is a subsequence limit of q(bi−4,W = bi,∆−4|x0)f o re a c hx0,Z2 be
the limit of the intervals of Z(bi,∆), and Z2 be the limit of the intervals of Z(bi,∆−∆).
Then, Z
Z2




(v(x0,x i) − bi)(1 − q(bi,∆,W = bi|x0))f(x0|xi)dx0 ≥ 0
207. Estimation of the payoﬀ of a low signal player with winning at the tie.
Let x0 be the common point of Z2 and Z3.
• Suppose
v(x0,x j) − bi ≥ 0. (174)
Then, for every x0 ∈ Z2,
v(x0,x j) − bi > 0. (175)
Therefore, from q(bi,W = bi|x0) ≥ 0,
Z
Z2
(v(x0,x j) − bi)q(bi,W = bi|x0)f(x0|xj)dx0 ≥ 0. (176)
• Suppose
v(x0,x j) − bi < 0. (177)
Then for every x0 ∈ Z3,
v(x0,x j) − bi < 0. (178)
It follows that, from 1 − q(bi,W = bi|x0) ≥ 0, by integrating,
Z
Z3
(v(x0,x j) − bi)(1 − q(bi,W = bi|x0))f(x0|xj)dx0 ≤ 0. (179)
It follows from (173)a n d( 179)t h a t
Z
Z2
(v(x0,x j) − bi)q(bi,W = bi|x0)f(x0|xj)dx0 ≥ 0. (180)
This implies that for a player with a low signal, it has to be that winning the tie at
when the market clearing price bi is proﬁtable. To see the intuition, suppose otherwise
and assume that it is not proﬁtable to win at the tie when the market clearing price is
bi. Then, for suﬃciently small ∆, since losing the tie at bi −∆ is a worse than winning
the tie at the price bi, it will be that losing the tie at the price bi −∆ and winning the
tie by a higher bid of bi is still nonproﬁtable. This implies that the player with signal
xj,∆ will not prefer to increase the bid from bi − ∆ to bi, which is a contradiction.A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 93
We now consider the relationship between winner’s curse (162)a n dt h eﬁrst order
condition (172)a n d( 180).
208. Derivation of contradiction. We note that from (162), for every xi, Z
Z2





















(v(x0,x j) − bi)qi(bi,p(b)=bi|x0)f(x0|xi)dx0
≥ 0
The ﬁrst inequality comes from (169).The second inequality comes from the aﬃliation
inequality and the strictly private value element. The third inequality comes from
(162).The fourth inequality comes from the aﬃliation inequality and the private value
element. The last inequality comes from (180).
(182) is not consistent. Consequently, the assumption (136) is not logically consistent.
Thus (135)h o l d s .
7.4. Lemma 3.4
Lemma. The limit strategy proﬁle β∗
∆ is an equilibrium of the limit game G(γ,f) and
is outcome equivalent to the fully revealing rational expectation equilibrium identiﬁed
in Lemma 1.
Proof.
210. Introduction. We show that the limit strategy proﬁle β∗
∆,b is an equilibrium
of the limit game G(γ,f). Then, we show outcome equivalence to the fully revealing
rational expectation equilibrium.
211. Consequence of the previous lemma. The previous lemma implies that for
suﬃciently small ∆, players with distinct signals will place distinct bids so that the
tie with distinct signals will not take place with positive probability. Players with the
same signal choose the same strategy. In the large economy, the allocation probability
is symmetric among buyers and sellers with the same signal. It follows that for each





4,s|x0)=1 )=P r ( q(bi,β∗
b,β∗
X|x0) = 1)). (183)94 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
Consequently, q(bi,β∗
4,b,β∗
4,s) converges in distribution to q(bi,β∗
b,β∗
s|x0).
212. Equilibrium conditions for β∗
∆. We ﬁrst consider convergence of expected
payoﬀ in G(γ,f,∆) to expected payoﬀ in G(γ,f).
U(xi,b i,β∗
4,b,β∗




















































































We now characterize the property of β∗
b and β∗




213. First order conditions for β∗
∆,b.S i n c eβ∗
4 is an equilibrium of G(γ,f,∆), for
each bi ∈ suppβ4,b(xi),
Z
x0∈Z(bi+4)(v(x0,x i) − (bi + 4)) (189)
q(bi + 4,W = bi + 4|x0)fθ|Xi(x0|xi)dx0
+
Z
x0∈Z(bi)(v(x0,x i) − bi)
(1 − q(bi,W = bi|x0))fθ|Xi(x0|xi)dx0
<0.A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 95
and Z




x0∈Z(bi−∆)(v(x0,x i) − bi)
(1 − q(bi,W = bi − ∆|x0))fθ|Xi(x0|xi)dx0
≥ 0.
The ﬁrst inequality says that for a player with signal xi, it is not preferable to increase
the bid from bi to bi + ∆. The second inequality says that it is preferable to increase
the bid from bi − ∆ to bi.
214. The limit of the ﬁrst order condition. Following the notation of the previous
lemma, we have, from (189), Z
Z1




(v(x0,x i) − bi)(1 − q(bi,∆,W = bi|x0))fθ|Xi(x0|xi)dx0<0
and from (190), Z
Z2




(v(x0,x i) − bi)(1 − q(bi,W = bi|x0))fθ|Xi(x0|xi)dx0>0.
216. Conditions for expected payoﬀs when the market clearing price is bi.
Following the steps of the previous lemma, from (191),
Z
Z2
(v(x0,x i) − bi)(1 − q(bi,∆,W = bi|x0))fθ|X(x0|xi)dx0 ≤ 0
and Z
Z2
(v(x0,x i) − bi)(1 − q(bi,∆,W = bi|x0))fθ|Xi(x0|xi)dx0 ≥ 0, (193)
and, from (161), Z
Z2




(v(x0,x i) − bi)qi(bi,W = bi|x0)fθ|Xi(x0|xi)dx0.
Therefore, from (193), and (194),
Z
Z2
(v(x0,x i) − bi)(1 − q(bi,∆,W = bi|x0))fθ|Xi(x0|xi)dx0 = 0 (195)
and Z
Z2
(v(x0,x i) − bi)(1 − q(bi,∆,W = bi|x0))fθ|Xi(x0|xi)dx0 =0 . (196)
From (195)a n d( 196),
Z
Z2
(v(x0,x i) − bi)fθ|Xi(x0|xi)dx0 =0 . (197)96 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
T h ea r g u m e n ti ss i m i l a rt ot h eo n eu s e di nt h ep r o o fo f4.9. The diﬀerence is that,
in the proof of the previous lemma, the assumption was that these two ﬁrst order
conditions about increasing the bid and decreasing the bid were derived for players with
distinct signals, and the winner’s curse condition was used to derive inconsistency of
the assumption that players with two distinct signals chooses the same bid. Here, after
the argument of the previous lemma, we already know that players with two distinct
signals will not choose the same bid, and the ﬁrst order conditions were applied to
players with the same signal.
218. Interpretation of the conditions (197)
By rewriting (197), we get
E[v(θ,Xi) − bi|Xi = xi,W(θ)=bi]=0 . (198)
That is,
bi = E[v(θ,Xi)|Xi = xi,W(θ)=bi]. (199)
This condition holds for both buyers and sellers, so we conclude that β∗
∆,b is symmetric
among buyers and sellers. This is the equilibrium strategy derived in Milgrom (1981),
Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997), and Reny and Perry (2006). In the large economy,
since buyers and sellers are symmetric, the equilibrium strategy in the ﬁnite one-sided
uniform price auctions continues to apply in the uniform price double auctions.
We now show that this bidding strategy is monotone in xi.







bi = E[v(θ,Xi)|Xi = xi,W(θ)=bi]. (201)
Suppose
bi ≥ bi. (202)
Then, from (200)a n d( 201)
E[v(θ,Xi)|Xi = xi,W(θ)=bi] (203)
≤ E[v(θ,Xi)|Xi = xi,W(θ)=bi].A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 97
On the other hand,



















The ﬁrst term is positive because Xi is aﬃliated with θ and from W(θ) is monotone
in x0. The second term is also positive. We note that (203)a n d( 204) are mutually
exclusive. Thus we conclude that (202) does not hold. Therefore we conclude bi >b i.
220. Asymptotic equivalence to the fully rational expectation equilibrium.
The above argument shows that the bidding strategy β∗
∆,b is pure, symmetric between
buyers and sellers, and strictly increasing in xi Since the market clearing price is deter-
mined by the 1−αth quantile of bids (counted from above), for each realization of state
x0 it is determined by the bid of the bidder who is on the margin xi(x0). Therefore,
p(x0)=v(x0,xi(x0)). Thus, the equilibrium under β∗
∆,b is outcome equivalent to the
fully revealing rational expectation equilibrium identiﬁed in Lemma 1.




∆ and consider the interim expected payoﬀ functions
Un,i(xi,bi,β∗
∆,b,n,β∗
∆,s,n) in the double auction game in the ﬁnite economy G(γ,f,∆,n)
and the interim expected payoﬀ function U(xi,bi,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) in the double auction game





uniformly for player i,s i g n a lxi,a n dab i dbi.
Proof.
222. Introduction. We show convergence for buyer i. An argument for a seller is
similar, and uniform convergence across buyers and sellers can be obtained by taking





∆,s) can be decomposed into the
diﬀerenced caused by the diﬀerence in strategies of other players an diﬀerence from
the size of the economy. We can deal with the ﬁrst diﬀerence from the fact that the
behavioral strategies converge for each signal and bids. We can deal with the second
diﬀerence from the fact that the distribution of bids converges for each signal and bids.98 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI


























change in the size of the economy
.





is decomposed into the change in the expected payoﬀ from (1) the change in other play-
ers’ strategies while keeping the size of the economy ﬁxed, and (2) the change in the
size of the economy while keeping other players’ strategies ﬁxed.
We now consider the ﬁrst term of (205).






X×... ×X | {z }
nS−1
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
X
B∆ × ... × B∆ | {z }
n−1
(v(x0,x i) − pn(bi,b −i))q(bi,b −i)h∆,n,−i(b−i|x−i)
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
fθ,X−i|Xi(x0,x −i|xi)dx0.
That is, the interim expected payoﬀ is obtained taking expectations in terms of the
distribution of bids of other players and the distribution of the state conditional on a
player’s signal.
It follows from (206)t h a tt h eﬁrst term of (205)i s
Un,b(xi,b i,β∗
∆,n,b,β∗













B∆ × ... × B∆ | {z }
n−1











∆,s) is expressed in terms of the diﬀerences in probabilities that these
strategies will assume for a bid proﬁle b−i.
It follows from the assumption of the lemma that β∗
∆,n → β∗
∆. Since the sets of
signals and bids are ﬁnite and we assume buyers use symmetric strategies and sellers
use symmetric strategies, we have, for each buyer or seller i,
lim n→∞h∆,n,i(bi|xi)=h∆,i(bi|xi). (208)
That is, for each buyer or seller i, bi and xi,f o re v e r yε>0, there exists ni,xi,bi(ε)s u c hA STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 99
that, for every n>n i,xi,bi(ε),
|hi,∆,n(bi|xi) − hi,∆(bi|xi)| <ε . (209)
It follows from (209)t h a t ,f o re v e r yε>0, there exists
n(ε)= m a x
i∈{b,s},xi∈Xγ,bi∈B∆
ni,xi,bi(ε)
such that, for every n>n (ε),
|hi,∆,n(bi|xi) − hi,∆(bi|xi)| <εfor every i,bi,a n dxi. (210)
Now, there exists v such that 0 ≤ v(x0,xi) < v for every x0 and xi. It follows that
there exists f such that 0 <f θ,X−i|Xi(x0,x−i|xi) < f for every x0,xi,a n dx−i. Then,
0 ≤ pn(bi,b−i) < b for every bi and b−i. Then, 0 ≤ q(bi,b−i) ≤ 1. It follows from (207)
that for every η>0, there exists n(η) such that, for every n>n (η),
|Un,b(xi,b i,β∗
∆,n,b,β∗
∆,n,s) − Un,b(xi,b i,β∗
b∆,n,β∗
∆,n,s)| <η (211)
for every i ∈ {b,s},e v e r yxi,a n dbi.
We now examine eﬀect of the change in the size of the economy. We note the distrib-
ution of bids conditional on signal xi and state x0. From Assumption 4, conditional on
x0, xi does not aﬀect the distribution of {xj}j6=i. Therefore, once we condition on x0,
the conditional distribution is independent of xi. (Of course xi aﬀects the conditional
distribution of x0 given xi).
225. The distribution of bids conditional on the state. Given signal xi,p l a y e ri
knows that the state x0 is distributed according to the conditional density fθ|Xi(x0|xi).
Conditional on x0, another buyer’s signal is distributed according to the conditional
density fXi|θ(xi|x0). A buyer’s bidding behavior is characterized by the behavioral
strategy h∆,n,b(bj|xj). Thus, the probability that another buyer’s bid is b0
j conditional




















=P r ( b0
j|x0)100 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
We now apply the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem to the distribution of bids conditional
on the state.
226. Application of Glivenko-Cantelli theorem. By (213), conditional on x0,
buyer’s bids are distributed independently and identically distributed. Let f(b0
j|x0)
be the probability mass function. Let Fn,−i(b0
j|x0) be the empirical probability mass













j|x0) almost surely (215)
We now derive the convergence of the distribution of bids given xi.
227. Convergence of the distribution of bids conditional on x0. It follows that,















= F(bj = b0
j|xi)
That is, for each bj ∈ B∆, the probability mass function of buyers’ bid by buyers other
than i, conditional on a player’s signal xi, converges as n → 0.
We now show that when player i chooses a bid bi, the outcome of the auction game
in G(γ,f,∆,n) converges to the outcome in G(γ,f,∆).





⎝ Fn,−i(bi ≤ b0
i − ∆|xi) <α
Fn,−i(bi >b 0
i + ∆|xi) ≥ α.
It follows from (216)t h a t
bnS:n\{i} → p(b) (219)
Similarly,
bnS−1:n\{i} → p(b) (220)A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 101
and
bn+1:n\{i} → p(b) (221)
Therefore,
kbnS+1:n\{i} +( 1− k)bnS:n\{i} → kp(b)+( 1− k)p(b) (222)
Now, the only way that the market clearing price can be diﬀerent from kp(b)+(1−k)p(b)
is
bnS+1:n\{i} <b i <b nS−1:n\{i}. (223)
We consider two cases.
• If p(b)=p(b), then, conditional on bnS+1:n\{i} <b i <b nS−1:n\{i},
kbnS+1:n\{i} +( 1− k)bi → kp(b)+( 1− k)p(b) (224)
and
kbi +( 1− k)bnS:n\{i} → kp(b)+( 1− k)p(b) (225)
• If p(b) < p(b), p(b)a n dp(b) are indeterminate because of bi. In this case, by a
convention adapted in the deﬁnition of p(b)a n dp(b), we can use choose the market
clearing price which will be a limit of the market clearing price in the ﬁnite economy.
It follows from (222), (224), and (225) that under strategies (β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s), for each bi,
pn(bi,b −i|xi) → p(bi,b −i|xi) (226)
229. Convergence of the allocation. Following steps similar to the one in the proof
of the previous lemma,
qn(bi,b −i|xi) → q(bi,b −i|xi) (227)
We are now able to show convergence of expected payoﬀs.
230. Convergence of expected payoﬀs. From (226)a n d( 227), it follows that, for
each bi and xi,
Un,b(xi,b i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) − Ub(xi,b i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) (228)
= E[(v(x0,x i) − pn(bi,b −i))qn(bi,b −i)|xi]
−E[(v(x0,x i) − p(bi,b −i))q(bi,b −i)|xi]
→ 0a sn →∞ .
We now combine (205), (211)a n d( 228)t og e tf o re a c hbi and xi,
Un,b(xi,b i,β∗
∆,n,b,β∗
∆,n,s) − U(xi,b i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) → 0a sn →∞ . (229)102 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
That is, for each ε, there exists n(xi,bi,ε) < ∞ such that for every n>n (xi,bi,ε),
|Un,b(xi,b i,β∗
∆,n,b,β∗
∆,n,s) − U(xi,b i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s)| <  . (230)
It follows from (230)t h a t ,f o re a c hε, there exists n(ε)=m a x xi∈Xγ,bi∈B∆ n(xi,bi,ε) < ∞
such that for every n>n (xi,bi,ε),
|Un,b(xi,b i,β∗
∆,n,b,β∗
∆,n,s) − U(xi,b i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s)| <  . (231)
8.2. Lemma 4.2
Lemma. There exists n such that for every n> n , for every player i and for every
signal xi,t h es e to fb e s tr e s p o n s eBRi,∆(xi,β∗
∆,n,b,β∗
∆,n,s) in G(γ,f,∆,n) and the set of
best response in G(γ,f,∆),BR∆(xi,β∗
∆,b,β∗







232. Suppose that the conclusion does not hold. Then, there exists player i and signal
xi such that there exists a bid bi which satisﬁes the following relationship:
bi ∈ BR∆,n,i(xi,β∗
∆,n,b,β∗
∆,n,s)b u tbi / ∈ BR∆(xi,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s). (233)
It follows from (233)t h a t
Un,i(xi,b i,β∗
∆,n,b,β∗
∆,n,s) ≥ Un,i(xi,b 0
i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) for every b0
i ∈ B∆ (234)
a n dt h a tt h e r ee x i s t sb00







Then, there exists η>0 such that
η = U(xi,b 00
i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) − U(xi,b i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) (236)




∆,s) − Un,i(xi,b 00
i,β∗
∆,n,b,β∗




∆,s) − Un,i(xi,b i,β∗
∆,n,b,β∗
∆,n,s)| <η / 2 (238)A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 103

































Let n=m a x i∈{b,s},xi∈Xγ,bi∈B∆ n(i,xi,bi). Then, since Xγ and B∆ are ﬁnite, n< ∞.F o r
any n> n , for every xi and bi,( 232)h o l d s .
8.3. Lemma 4.3
Lemma. There exists ∆ > 0 and n< ∞ such that for all 0 < ∆ < ∆ and n> n ,
in the uniform price auction game in the ﬁnite economy G(γ,f,∆,n), for every player
i, ab e s tr e s p o n s et oa ne q u i l i b r i u ms t r a t e g yβ∗
∆,n satisﬁes the strict single crossing
condition for bids in the range of the equilibrium prices.
Proof.
234. Deﬁnition of strict single crossing conditions. It follows from the deﬁnition
that we need to prove
If bi is a best reply for xi to (β∗
∆,n,b,β∗
∆,n,s),
then, for every bi >b i and every xi >x i,
Un,i(xi,b i,β∗
∆,n,b,β∗




if bi is preferred to a lower bid by a player with the signal xi
→ Un,i(xi,b i,β∗
∆,n,b,β∗




then bi is still preferred to a lower bid by player with the higher signal xi














then bi is still preferred to a higher bid by a player with the lower signal xi
We ﬁrst choose a signal xi, a best response bi and consider a condition for an ap-
proximation n such that single crossing condition holds for an economy larger than
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235. Strict single crossing conditions for a single comparison of bids and
signals. Let bi ∈ BR∆,n,i(xi,β∗
∆,n,b,β∗
∆,n,s). Let bi ∈ B∆ and xi >x i. It follows from
the previous Lemma that, for suﬃciently large n, bi is also a best response to (β∗
∆,b,
β∗
∆,s)i nG(γ,f,∆). It follows that
U(xi,b i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,n,s) ≥ U(xi,b i,β∗
∆,b,β∗
∆,s) (240)
It follows from the strict single crossing condition of best response in the large economy,






It follows that there exists n(xi,bi,bi) such that for every n>n (xi,bi,bi),
Ui,n(xi,b i,β∗
∆,n,b,β∗
∆,n,s) − Ui,n(xi,b i,β∗
∆,n,b,β∗
∆,n,s) > 0 (242)
That is, a strict single crossing condition holds for a comparison between bi and bi for
as i g n a lxi. It is because, a strict single crossing condition for the double auction game
in the large economy says that it is strictly preferable to increase the bid from bi to
bi for a player with signal xi. Since the payoﬀ o ft h ed o u b l ea u c t i o ng a m ei nt h el a r g e
ﬁnite economy will be very close to the payoﬀ of the double auction game in the large
economy, the strict single crossing condition extends to the large ﬁnite double auction
game.
We now extend the argument to obtain strict single crossing condition for every
comparison in the double auction game in the large ﬁnite economy. It is because the
set of possible signals and the set of possible bids are ﬁnite.
236. Single crossing condition for all cases. Let
n =m a x
xi∈Xi,bi∈B∆ such that there exists xi<xi
such that bi is a best response to xl
n(xi,b i,b i) (243)
Then, for every n>n,
Un,i(xi,b i,β∗
∆,n,b,β∗






∆,n,s) − Un,i(xi,b i,β∗
∆,n,b,β∗
∆,n,s) > 0. (244)
From (244), the result holds.
The other direction of single crossing condition can be shown in a similar manner.
Intuitively, the previous paragraph showed that for suﬃciently large n, a strict single
crossing condition holds for a set of a signal and two bids. Since the set of possible bids
and signals are ﬁnite, by taking the largest n which will work for all possible combina-
tions of a signal, and bids, we can ensure that the strict single crossing condition holds
of the double auction game in the large ﬁnite economy.A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 105
8.4. Lemma 4.4
Lemma. There exists ∆ > 0 and n< ∞ such that for all ∆ < ∆ and n> n ,( a )β∗
∆,b
has a monotone supports, and (b) for each buyer i 6= j, signal xi 6= xj,a n dab i db




The similar condition holds for sellers.
Proof.
238. Introduction. We prove the condition for buyers’ strategies. The argument
for the seller is similar. The argument is similar to the previous lemma extends to
the large economy. There are two diﬀerences. The ﬁrst diﬀerence is that, since buyers
and sellers are asymmetric in the ﬁnite economy, the supports of the distribution of
buyer’s equilibrium strategies and seller’s equilibrium strategies are monotone in their
signals. The second diﬀerence is that, since a bid can aﬀect a market clearing price
of the double auction in the ﬁnite economy. But these diﬀerences will not aﬀect the
argument
239. Suppose that there is no ∆ > 0 which satisﬁes (245). It follows that for every
∆ > 0, there exists buyer i,j and signal xi,∆ >x j,∆ and a bid bi,∆ such that
Pr(β∗
∆,b,n(xi,∆)=bi,∆) · Pr(β∗
∆,s,n(xj,∆)=bi,∆) > 0. (246)
From lemma 13, we derive some monotonic relationships of the support of the distri-
bution of equilibrium bids for buyers. We ﬁrst deﬁne the support of the distribution of
equilibrium bids as we did in the previous lemma.
240. Monotonicity of the supports of the distributions of bidding strate-
gies. Consider two signals xi < xi and consider the distribution of equilibrium bids
H∗
4,n,i(bi|xi)a n dH∗
4,n,i(bi|xi). Let bi be in the range of equilibrium prices. Then, we












x0 ≥ x0 → H∗
4,n,i(bi|x0) ≥ H∗




4,n,s(bi|x0) is nonincreasing in x0. (250)
That is, even if buyers and sellers have asymmetric payoﬀs, each of a buyer and a seller’s
best response has supports monotonically increasing in bids, thus the distribution of
bids, which is a convex combination of bids by buyers and sellers, is stochastically
increasing.
From (250), we have monotonicity of allocation probability at ties, as in the previous
lemma. It follows that there exists a winner’s curse at winning the tie. That is,
E[v(θ,Xi)|Xi = xi,W n,−i(θ)=bi,b iloses at the tie] (251)
>E [v(θ,Xi)|Xi = xi,W n,−i(θ)=bi,b i wins at the tie]
This implies that
E[v(θ,Xi) − bi|Xi = xi,W n,−i(θ)=bi,b iloses at the tie] (252)
>E [v(θ,Xi) − bi|Xi = xi,W n,−i(θ)=bi,b i wins at the tie]
8.5. Lemma 4.5
Lemma. There exists ∆ > 0 and n< ∞ such that for all ∆ < ∆ and n> n ,t h e r e
exists a monotone pure strategy equilibrium β∗
∆,n in the double auction game in the
ﬁnite market G(f,∆,n).
Proof
242. We ﬁrst extend the result of Lemma 4.4. to a setting with a continuous set of
signals. Since the distribution of signals with a ﬁnite set of possible signals converge
smoothly to the distribution of signals with a continuous set of signals, the limit strat-
egy proﬁle is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle. Furthermore, since every
Bayesian Nash equilibrium with ﬁnite set of signals has monotone and separating sup-
ports, the limit Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle has also monotone supports.
Given that the set of possible bids is ﬁnite and the set of possible signals is contin-
uous, it has to be that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is monotone and pure almost
everywhere.
243. Approximation by the game with a discrete signal. Consider G(f,∆,n)b e
a double auction game characterized by Assumption 1, Assumption 3-6. Thus we ﬁrst
approximate game G(f,∆,n) by a sequence of a double auction game G(γ,fγ,∆,n). The
following ﬁgure explains the approximation.
We ﬁrst verify that, given f satisﬁes Assumption 3 and 4, fγ satisﬁes Assumption 4
• Assumption 4(a) holds.
• Assumption 4(b) holds since fsatisﬁes Assumption 4(b).A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 107
Figure 11.–
• Assumption 4(c) holds since fsatisﬁes Assumption 4(c).
Thus it remains to show that fγ satisﬁes the monotone likelihood ratio condition
(Assumption 4(d)). Let x0 >x 0 in [0,1] and xi >xi in Xγ.B yd e ﬁnition, we need to
s h o w ,t h a t ,f o re a c hγ>0,
fXi|θ,γ(xi|x0)fXi|θ,γ(xi|x0) − fXi|θ,γ(xi|x0)fXi|θ,γ(xi|x0) ≥ 0.
























fXi|θ(xi|x0)i fxi =0 ,1/nγ,2/nγ,...,1
0e l s e
(254)
The following ﬁgure explains the approximation (254). We note
Figure 12.–




























































































It follows from (256)a n d( 257). By letting n →∞that fγ satisﬁes Assumption 4(d).
It follows that there exists a nontrivial monotone pure strategy β∗
∆,n,γ of the game
G(γ,fγ,∆,n).
244. Construction of a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of G(f,∆,n). Let β∗
∆,n be
a limit of a sequence of a nontrivial Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle β∗
∆,n,γ
of the game G(γ,fγ,∆,n)a sγ → 0. We need to show that β∗
∆,n is an equilibrium of




∆,n,−i) ≥ 0. (260)A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 109
Let β∆,n,γ be a strategy of the game G(γ,fγ,∆,n) such that
β∆,n,γ → β∆,n weakly5 (262)
It follows from the fact that β∗





∆,n,γ,−i) ≥ 0. (263)









∆,n,−i)a sγ → 0. (265)











B∆ × ... × B∆ | {z }
n−1
×X... ×X | {z }
n−1







B∆ × ... × B∆ | {z }
n−1
×X... ×X | {z }
n−1
ui(x0,x i,p(bi,b −i),q(bi,b −i))
h,∆,n,γ,−i(b−i|x−i)fθ,X−i|Xi(x0,x −i|xi)]h∆,n,γ,i(bi|xi)fXi(xi)
because h∆,n,γ,−i(b−i|x−i) → h∆,n,γ,−i(b−i|x−i)b y( 261),
fθ,X−i|Xi,γ(x0,x −i|xi) → fθ,X−i|Xi(x0,x −i|xi)
h∆,n,γ,i(bi|xi) → h∆,n,i(bi|xi)b y( 261)
and fXi,γ(xi) → fXi(xi)b y( 261)
Therefore, (264) holds. Similarly, (265)h o l d s .T h u s( 260)h o l d s .
We now show that the important property of an equilibrium, monotonicity of sup-
ports, also holds for β∗
∆,n since β∗
∆,n,γ converges to β∗
∆,n.
245. Monotonicity of supports of a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium as γ →∞ .
For each i,l e txi >x i and let bi be a minimum of the support of β∗
∆,n,i(xi)a n dl e tbi
be the maximum of the support of β∗
∆,n,i(xi). Then we claim that bi ≥ bi.
That is, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the double auction game in the large ﬁnite
economy with a continuous set of signals satisﬁes the monotone support property.
246. Proof. We ﬁrst consider the case that there exists some γ such that both xi and
xi are contained in Bγ. Then, by the construction of Xγ, for every γ> γ , xi and xi are110 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
contained in Xγ.L e tbγ,i be the minimum of the support of the distribution of bids
according to β∗
∆,n,γ,i(xi)a n dbγ,i be the maximum of the support of the distribution of
bids according to β∗
∆,n,i,γ(xi). Then the previous lemma implies that bγ,i >b γ,i.
By deﬁnition β∗
∆,n,γ,i → β∗
∆,n,i. This implies that, since the set of possible bids is
ﬁnite, for each xi and xi,f o re a c hbi ∈ B∆, the probability that β∗
∆,n,i,γ chooses a
bid bi converges to the probability that β∗
∆,n,i chooses a bid bi. That is, therefore, the
supports of β∗
∆,n,γ,i under xi and xi converge to the supports of β∗
∆,n,i under xi and xi.
Therefore, it has to be that bi ≥ bi.
It remains to consider the case where either xi and xi are not contained in Xγ for
any γ.In this case, since {Xγ}γ is dense in [0,1], there exists a sequence of signals
{xi,γ} and {xi,γ}which will be contained in some γ,s u c ht h a txi,γ → xi and xi,γ → xi.
Since the set of possible bids is ﬁnite and the payoﬀ function is continuous in xi in the
mixed extension, the equilibrium strategies under {xi,γ} and {xi,γ}also converges to
equilibrium strategies under {xi} and {xi} by the maximum theorem. Since bi,γ ≥ bi,γ
holds for each γ, bi ≥ bi follows.
The above result implies that the supports of equilibrium strategies β∗
∆,n,γ,i have
supports increasing in the signal, and separating except at the boundary of the support.
Since the set of possible bids is ﬁnite and the set of possible signals is continuous, it has
to be that the support of the equilibrium strategies β∗
∆,n,γ,i has to be singleton except
for a ﬁnite number of signals. It implies that β∗
∆,n,γ,i is monotone and pure almost
everywhere.
9. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1(D)
9.1. Lemma 5.1
Lemma. There exists n< ∞ such that for each n> n , there exists a nontrivial
monotone pure strategy equilibrium β∗
n of the double auction game in the ﬁnite market
G(f,n).
Proof.
248.Introduction. We ﬁrst construct a strategy proﬁle β∗
∆ from a sequence of a
monotone pure strategy proﬁle {β∗
∆,n}. If the probability that a tie occurs among
players in the β∗
∆ is zero, then an expected payoﬀ of a player under β∗
∆,n converges to
an expected payoﬀ under β∗
∆, therefore β∗
∆ is an equilibrium. Therefore, we need to
consider whether a tie occurs among players in β∗
∆. Contrary suppose that there are
players with distinct signals who will choose the same bid with a positive probability.
It implies that, for suﬃciently large ﬁnite game n,t h e i rb i d sa r es u ﬃciently close to
each other. This implies two conditions. A player with a high signal does not want to
extend the distance between two bids by increasing the bid and a player with a low
signal does not want to extend the distance between two bids by lowering the bid. ButA STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 111
a player with a low signal. But the winner’s curse eﬀect implies that a player with a
higher signal prefers to increase the bid suﬃciently higher than a player with a lower
signal. These conditions imply that players with distinct signals will bid distinct bids.
In contrast to a previous lemma, we need to show that players with distinct bids will
place distinct bids with some distance. It is possible because the strict private value
element and a uniform lower bound on the rate of increase in the value as a function
of signals provides a lower bound of the increase in the expected value of the good.
Consequently, when the distance between two bids is smaller than this lower bound, a
player with a higher signal prefers to increase the bid further.
249.Construction of a limit strategy proﬁle. From the previous lemma, there
exists a monotone pure strategy equilibrium {β∗
∆,n} o ft h ed o u b l ea u c t i o ng a m ei nt h e
large ﬁnite market G(f,∆,n)f o rs u ﬃciently small ∆ and suﬃciently large n.C o n s i d e r
a sequence of a monotone pure strategy equilibrium β∗
∆,n for ∆ → 0. Since every bid
in β∗
∆,n is bounded above by b and bounded below by b, by Helly selection theorem,
it is without loss of generality to assume that there exists a monotone pure strategy
proﬁle β∗ such that β∗
n → β∗ almost everywhere.
We now argue that β∗ is a monotone pure strategy equilibrium.







On the other hand, If there are no ties in β∗
∆, it follows from an argument similar to
the previous lemma, that β∗
∆ is an equilibrium of the double auction game in the large
ﬁnite market G(f,∆). Thus it now remains to show that β∗
∆ does not involve a tie.
251. Suppose, in order to derive contradiction, that β∗
∆ involves a tie with a positive
probability. Then, there exists two distinct signal xi and xi and a bid bi such that
players with signal xi and xi choose a bid bi under β∗
∆.
It follows that, for every d>0, there exists ∆ such that, for every ∆ < ∆, there
exists two bids b∆,i and b∆,i such that (a) a player with signal xi chooses a bid b∆,i,(b)
a player with signal xi chooses a bid b∆,i,a n d( c )b∆,i and b∆,i are less than d apart.
Since β∗
∆,n is a monotone pure strategy equilibrium, it implies that
252.First order conditions for a player with signal xi. A consequence of the
above condition is that a player with a signal xi does not prefer to bid above b∆,i,
otherwise the distance between two bids will be strictly more than d apart.112 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
It follows that, similar to (189)
Z
{x0:W−i,n=bi,∆+∆}(v(x0,x i) − pn(bi,∆ + ∆,b −i)) (267)
qn(bi,∆ + ∆,W −i,n(β∗
∆,n,−i(X−i)=bi,∆ + ∆|x0)fθ|Xi(x0|xi)dx0 +
+
Z
{x0:W−i,n=bi,∆}(v(x0,x i) − pn(bi,∆,b −i))
(1 − qn(bi,∆,W −i,n(β∗
∆,n,−i(X−i)) = bi,∆|x0))fθ|Xi(x0|xi)dx0<0.
The ﬁrst term deals with the case where a new bid bi,∆+∆ will win when the marginal
bid by other players is bi,∆+∆. The second term deals withe the case where a new bid
bi,∆ + ∆ will win and an old bid of bi,∆ will not win when the marginal bid by other
players is bi,∆.T h eﬁrst order condition says that it is not preferable for a player with
as i g n a lxi to increase the bid from bi,∆ to bi,∆ + ∆.
253.The ﬁrst order conditions of a player with a signal xi for suﬃciently
small ∆.I n( 167), we have seen that it has to be that the expected payoﬀ from losing at
the lower price has to be nonpositive in the double auction game in the large economy
G(γ,f,∆). We will show that the same conclusion holds for G(f,∆,n). That is,
Z
{x0:W−i,n=bi,∆}(v(x0,xi) − pn(bi,∆,b −i)) (268)
(1 − qn(bi,∆,W −i,n(β∗
∆,n,−i(X−i)) = bi,∆|x0))fθ|Xi(x0|xi)dx0 ≤ 0.
In other words,
E[v(θ,Xi) − bi,∆|Xi = xi,W n,−i(β∗
∆,n,−i(X−i)) = bi,∆,bi,∆loses at the tie] (269)
≤ 0.
254. Proof of the claim
To see this, suppose that, contrary to (268),
Z
{x0:W−i,n=bi,∆}(v(x0,xi) − pn(bi,∆,b −i)) (270)
(1 − qn(bi,∆,W −i,n(β∗
∆,n,−i(X−i)) = bi,∆|x0))fθ|Xi(x0|xi)dx0 > 0.
This implies that, Z
{x0:W−i,n=bi,∆}(v(x0,x i) − pn(bi,∆,b −i))(1 − qn(bi,∆,W −i,n(β∗
∆,n,−i(X−i)) = bi,∆|x0)) (271)
fθ|Xi(x0|xi)dx0 > 0.
Then, since players use a monotone strategy, the event that a player wins a tie when
the marginal bid by other players is bi,∆ + ∆ is a good news compared with the event
that a player lose a tie when the marginal bid by other players is bi,∆. Therefore, it
follows that Z
{x0:W−i,n=bi,∆+∆}(v(x0,x i) − pn(bi,∆,b −i)) (272)
qn(bi,∆ + ∆,W −i,n(β∗
∆,n,−i(X−i)=bi,∆ + ∆)fθ|Xi(x0|xi)dx0 > 0.A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 113
Also, from the pricing rule of k double auctions, it follows that
pn(bi,∆ + ∆,b −i) − pn(bi,∆,b −i) ≤ ∆. (273)
Therefore, for suﬃciently small ∆, it follows that Z
{x0:W−i,n=bi,∆+∆}(v(x0,x i) − pn(bi,∆ + ∆,b −i)) (274)
qn(bi,∆ + ∆,W −i,n(β∗
∆,n,−i(X−i)=bi,∆ + ∆)fθ|Xi(x0|xi)dx0 > 0.
Now, (270)a n d( 274) imply that, it is strictly preferable for a player with signal xi to
increase a bid from bi,∆ to bi,∆ + ∆. It is a contradiction to the ﬁrst order condition
(267).Therefore, it is not the case that (270)h o l d s .
255.The ﬁrst order conditions of a player with a signal xi for suﬃciently
small ∆. We can run a similar argument for a player with signal xi where it is not
preferable for a player with signal xi to decrease a bid from b∆,i to b∆,i − ∆.T h i s
implies that, similar to (268)
E[v(θ,Xi) − bi,∆|Xi = xi,W(β∗
∆,n,−i(X−i)=bi,∆,b i,∆wins at the tie] ≥ 0. (275)
That is, it is preferable for a player with signal xi to win the good when the marginal
bid by other players is bi,∆. Otherwise, if it is not preferable for a player with signal xi
to win the good when the marginal bid by other players is bi,∆,f o rs u ﬃciently small
∆, it is not preferable to win the good with a slightly lower price of bi,∆ − ∆ even by
winning the tie lost by a smaller bid, thus the player will want to decrease the bid to
bi,∆ − ∆.
256.Winner’s curse. We have seen that, in the double auction game in the large
economy G(γ,f,∆) that a winner’s curse holds in the sense that losing a tie is a good
news compared with winning a tie when players use monotone strategies. In the similar
argument, we have,
E[v(θ,Xi) − bi,∆|Xi = xi,W n,−i(β∗
∆,n,−i(X−i)) = bi,∆,bi,∆loses at the tie] (276)
>E [v(θ,Xi) − bi,∆|Xi = xi,W(β∗
∆,n,−i(X−i)=bi,∆,bi,∆ wins at the tie]
Intuitively, when other players use a monotone strategy, conditional on that the mar-
ginal bid by other players is bi,∆,ab i dbi,∆ is more likely win when the number of
competing bids is smaller, and it is the case when the state is lower. Since this in-
ference relation holds whether it is a large economy or a ﬁnite economy, the winner’s
curse relation holds.
257.Moving from xi to xi. It follows that, since Xi,X−i and θ are aﬃliated, v(x0,xi)
is strictly increasing in xi with a uniform lower bound of the rate of increase λ,a n di t
follows that
E[v(θ,Xi) − bi,∆|Xi = xi,W(β∗
∆,n,−i(X−i)=bi,∆,bi,∆ wins at the tie] (277)
>E [v(θ,Xi) − bi,∆|Xi = xi,W(β∗
∆,n,−i(X−i)=bi,∆,b i,∆ wins at the tie]
+λ(xi − xi).114 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
Therefore, for suﬃciently small d,s i n c ebi,∆ − bi,∆ <d ,f r o m( 277),
E[v(θ,Xi) − bi,∆|Xi = xi,W(β∗
∆,n,−i(X−i)=bi,∆,bi,∆ wins at the tie] (278)
>E [v(θ,Xi) − bi,∆|Xi = x,W(β∗
∆,n,−i(X−i)=bi,∆,b i,∆ wins at the tie].
258.Putting it all together. It now follows from (269), (276), and (278)t h a t ,
0 ≥ E[v(θ,Xi) − bi,∆|Xi = xi,W n,−i(β∗
∆,n,−i(X−i)) = bi,∆,bi,∆loses at the tie]
>E [v(θ,Xi) − bi,∆|Xi = xi,W(β∗
∆,n,−i(X−i)=bi,∆,bi,∆ wins at the tie]
>E [v(θ,Xi) − bi,∆|Xi = x,W(β∗
∆,n,−i(X−i)=bi,∆,b i,∆ wins at the tie]
≥ 0.
It is a contradiction, therefore, it cannot be that xi and xi and a bid bi such that players
with signal xi and xi choose a bid bi under β∗
∆. It follows that β∗
∆ is a monotone pure
strategy equilibrium.
9.2. Lemma 5.2
Lemma. A nontrivial monotone pure strategy equilibrium β∗
n in the double auction
game G(f,n) is asymptotically equivalent to a fully revealing rational expectation equi-
librium.
Proof.
258. Introduction. We proceed in two steps. First, we show that there exists a
monotone pure strategy equilibrium β∗ of a limit strategy proﬁle β∗ of the double
auction game in the large economy G(f). Second, we show that β∗ is outcome equivalent
to the fully revealing rational expectation equilibrium.
First we construct the limit strategy proﬁle β∗.
259. Deﬁnition of a limit strategy proﬁle β∗. From Proposition 1(c), there exists
a nontrivial monotone pure strategy equilibrium β∗
n of the double auction game in the
large ﬁnite economy G(f,n). Let {β∗
n}n be a sequence of pure strategy equilibria of
G(f,n). Since for every bid in β∗
n is bounded above by b and bounded below by b,b y
Helly’s selection theorem, it is without loss of generality to assume that there exists a
monotone pure strategy proﬁle β∗ such that β∗
n → β∗.
We now argue that β∗ is a monotone pure strategy equilibrium of G(f).






for every strategy βi.L e t{βn,i}n be a sequence of strategies which will converge to βi.A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 115
Since β∗





































−i) is expressed as the sum of the two terms where




−i) deals with the change in the strategies from
β∗
n,i to β∗





−i) deals with the change in the size of the economy n while
keeping the strategy proﬁle β∗
i constant.




−i). Since the discontinuity in payoﬀs
takes place only when ties occur with positive probabilities, and since β∗
n does not
involve ties, it is suﬃce to show that the limit strategy proﬁle β∗ does not involve ties.
For that purpose, we can apply the argument of the previous lemma to β∗.T h e
previous lemma shows that the limit strategy β∗
n obtained as a limit of a sequence
of equilibrium strategies β∗
n,∆ as ∆ → 0p r o ﬁle does not involve ties since a player.
Similarly, we can show that the limit strategy β∗ does not involve ties, since a player






−i) → 0a sn →∞ . (283)




−i). We have seen from above that β∗ does
not involve ties. Then, following an argument similar to that of the previous lemma,
since the empirical distribution of bids generated by β∗ converges in distribution to





−i) → 0a sn →∞ . (284)
It follows from (283)a n d( 284)t h a t(281) holds. We now consider the relation
between Un(βn,i,β∗
n,−i)a n dUn(βi,β∗
−i).We consider three cases.
264. Cases for (βi,β∗
−i). We can consider two cases:
(a) (βi,β∗
−i) does not involve a tie with positive probability.116 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
(b) (βi,β∗
−i) involves a tie with a positive probability
We ﬁrst consider the ﬁrst possibility.
265. Convergence of Un(βn,i,β∗
n,−i) → U(βi,β∗
−i) when (βi,β∗
−i) does not involve
at i e .Suppose player i is a buyer (a case where player i is a seller is similar.) Suppose
(βi,β∗
−i) does not involve a tie. Then, even if (βn,i,β∗
n,−i) involves a tie, there exists
another sequence of strategies {β
0
n,i}n such that β
0













We now consider the second case.
266. Case (βi,β∗
−i) involves a tie with a positive probability. Suppose a player
i is a buyer. Let xi be a signal such that player i with signal xi will bid βi(xi)w h i c h
will involve a tie with β−i(xi) with a positive probability.
We ﬁrst construct an alternative strategy which does not involve a tie with β−i(xi)
and still does at least equally well with β−i(xi)a sβi(xi). Suppose that player i with
signal xi has a nonnegative expected payoﬀ from winning a tie at a bid βi(xi). Then,
winner’s curse argument shows that it is preferable to increase a bid a little bit from
βi(xi) to win the tie. Therefore, there exists a bid β0
i(xi) such that a player with signal
xi prefers over βi(xi). Similarly, when player i with signal xi has a negative payoﬀ from
winning a tie at a bid βi(xi), there exists a bid β0
i(xi), which decrease a bid a little
bit from βi(xi) to lose a nonproﬁtable tie. Thus we can deﬁne a strategy e βi(xi)s u c h
that e βi(xi)i se q u a lt oβi(xi) when βi(xi) does not involve a tie with β∗
−i and equal to
β0
i(xi) when βi(xi) involves a tie with β∗
−i with positive probability. Then
U(e βi,β−i) ≥ U(βi,β−i). (287)
It follows that there exists a sequence of strategies {e βn,i}n such that (a) e βn,i(xi) →
e βi(xi)f o re a c hxi and (b) e βn,i(xi) does not involve β∗
n,−i(xi) with positive probability.




n,−i) ≥ U(e βn,i,βn,−i) (288)
It follows from (281) and applying the argument used to establish (281)t oe βn,i that
U(β∗
i,β∗
−i) ≥ U(e βi,β∗
−i) (289)A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 117
It now follows from (287)a n d( 288)t h a t
U(β∗
i,β∗
−i) ≥ U(βi,β−i). (290)
We have now shown that β∗ is an equilibrium strategy. We now argue that β∗ is
outcome equivalent to the fully revealing rational expectation equilibrium.
267. First order conditions for xi at β∗(xi). We consider the ﬁrst order condition
for xi that a player with signal xi does not prefer to increase a bid to β∗(xi)+∆ or
decrease a bid to β∗(xi) − ∆.T h eﬁrst condition is Z
(v(x0,x i) − β∗(xi))(1 − q(β∗(xi),W(x0)=β∗(xi)|x0)) (291)
f(x0|xi)dx0dx−i +
Z
(v(x0,x i) − β∗(xi))q(β∗(xi)+∆,W(x0)=β∗(xi)+∆|x0))
f(x0|xi)dx0dx−i
≤ 0.
Here the ﬁrst term represents the expected payoﬀ of winning the tie that a bid β∗(xi)
used to lose, and the second term represents the expected payoﬀ from winning the tie
when the market clearing price is β∗(xi)+∆.
The second condition is Z
(v(x0,x i) − β∗(xi))(1 − q(β∗(xi) − ∆,W(x0)=β∗(xi) − ∆|x0)) (292)
f(x0|xi)dx0dx−i +
Z
(v(x0,x i) − β∗(xi))q(β∗(xi),W(x0)=β∗(xi)|x0))
f(x0|xi)dx0dx−i
≥ 0.
Here the ﬁrst term represents the expected payoﬀ of winning the tie that a bid
β∗(xi) − ∆ used to lose, and the second term represents the expected payoﬀ from
winning the tie when the market clearing price is β∗(xi).
268. The limit of the ﬁrst order condition as ∆ → 0. It follows from the above
argument that the distribution of bids according to β∗(xi) does not involve a tie with
positive probability. It follows that
q(β∗(xi)+∆,W(x0)=β∗(xi)+∆|x0)) (293)
→ q(β∗(xi),W(x0)=β∗(xi)|x0)a s∆ → 0.
It follows from (291)a n d( 292)t h a t
Z
x0:W(x0)=β
∗(xi)(v(x0,x i) − β∗(xi))f(x0|xi)dx0dx−i = 0. (294)
That is,
β∗(xi)=E[v(x0,x i)|xi,W(x0)=β∗(xi)] (295)118 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
269. Outcome equivalence to the fully revealing rational expectation equi-
librium. It now follows from an argument used in the previous lemma that
β∗(xi)=v(x0(xi),x i) (296)
and the outcome is equivalent to the fully revealing rational expectation equilibrium.
9.3. Lemma 5.3
Lemma. Let Pn(β∗
n) be a price of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium β∗
n of the double auction
game in the large ﬁnite economy G(f,n). Then, √
n(Pn(β∗















270. Overview of the proof. We begin by noting that √
n(Pn(β∗
n) − v(x0,x i(x0)) (298)
=
√





where Pn(x0) is the price formed from the bids when every player i ∈ Nn bids
v(x0(xi),xi). The ﬁrst term deals with the sample size eﬀect. The second term deals
with the strategic eﬀect which considers misrepresentation from the price taking behav-



















We show them in case of k = 1 in the double auction pricing rule. The case for
k = 0 is similar. Then we can extend the result for a general k ∈ (0,1) by sandwiching
arguments.
271. Evaluation of the sample size eﬀect. By deﬁnition
Pn(x0)=v(x0(Xn:nS),X n:nS) (299)
That is, Pn(x0) is the expected value of the good conditional being on the margin by
a player with signal Xn:nS.A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 119
We recall, from David and Nagaraja (2004, Theorem 10.3) that, for each x0,
√










From Assumption 4, x0(Xn:nS) is well-deﬁned and x0
0(Xn:nS) ≥ 0.
Thus, we are now able to apply the delta method. According to van der Varrt (2000),
Theorem 3.1, when φ is diﬀerentiable at x,a n d
√
n(Tn−θ)

















































We now show the second assertion. We proceed as follows. First we consider the suﬃ-







p → 0. Then we show that indeed H∗












n) − v(x0,x i(x0)) ≤ a) (305)
−Pr(
√
n(Pn(x0) − v(x0,x i(x0)) ≤ a) → 0a sn →∞ .
It is equivalent to
ηn(a) (306)
≡ Pr(Pn(β∗










→ 0a sn →∞ .120 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
We recall that, from David and Nagaraja (2004, equation 2.1.6)











Beta(i,n − i +1 )
Z F(x)
0 ti−1(1 − t)n−idt.
In order to derive the condition, assume, ﬁrst, hypothetically, that each player uses
an equilibrium strategy of a buyer β∗
n,b(xi). Under this assumption, each player’s bid
is iid from the distribution Hn,b(bi). It follows from (306)a n d( 307)t h a t
ηn(a)=
1






n) tn−nS−1(1 − t)nSdt (308)
where H∗
n(bi) is the distribution function of bids when every player bids according to
the strategy v(x0(xi),xi).





Then, from (308)a n d( 309)t h a t
Beta(n − nS,n S +1 )=B e t a ( αn,n − αn + 1) (310)





where Γ(x) is a Gamma function. It follows from (311)t h a t
1
Beta(αn,n − αn +1 )
=
Γ(n +1 )
Γ(αn)Γ(n − αn +1 )
(312)
We now recall Stirling’s formula for Gamma function:
Γ(x)=















By substituting (313)i n t o( 312), we get
1
















(n +1 ) n+1/2
√
2π(αn)αn−1/2(n − αn +1 ) n−αn+1/2
=
(n +1 ) n(n +1 ) 1/2
√
2πnnααn−1/2(1 − α + 1
n)








n) tn−nS−1(1 − t)nSdt.




Then, by taking the logarithm,
logg(t)=( αn − 1)logt +( n − αn)log(1− t) (316)








(n − αn)t =( αn − 1)(1 − t) (318)
Then,
t(n +1 )=αn − 1 (319)













Then, by substituting into (315),
g(t) ≤ (α −
1
n
)αn−1(1 − α +
1
n
)n−αn (322)122 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
Thus we now have, by combining (314)a n d( 322),
ηn(a) ≤
(n +1 ) n(n +1 ) 1/2
√


























)|Nn|(n +1 ) 1/2
·
(α − 1
n)αn−1(1 − α + 1
n)n−αn































































⎠ → 0. (327)



















⎠ → 0 (328)

























) − Pn(x0)) → 0 (330)A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 123
Then, since Hn is sandwiched between max(HBNE
n,b ,HBNE
n,s )a n dm i n ( HBNE
n,b ,HBNE
n,s ),
it follows that √
n(Pn(β∗
n) − Pn(x0)) → 0. (331)
It follows that (327)a n d( 328)a r es u ﬃcient conditions.
We have now derived that both buyers and sellers bids converge at the rate faster
than O( 1 √
n)a r es u ﬃcient. We now derive the rate of convergence of buyers and sellers
bids.
273. Rate of convergence. We ﬁr s tn o t et h a ti ti ss u ﬃce to show that, ,for each
signal xi, the distance between v(x0(xi),xi) and the bids β∗
n,s and β∗
n,b vanishes at the
rate faster than O( 1 √
n). Because, if it is so, the distribution of bids at bi according
to each of β∗
n,s and β∗
n,b,which is bounded above by Hn(bi + O( 1 √
n)), will converge to
Hn(bi)a tt h er a t eo fO( 1 √
n).
To show the rate of convergence of buyers’ and sellers’ bids, we ﬁrst derive the ﬁrst
order condition for buyers and sellers.
274. First order conditions. We now derive the ﬁrst order condition of a buyer
following Rustichini, Satterthwaite, and Williams (1994). Suppose a buyer i increases
ab i df r o mbi to bi + ∆bi
6. This change in bids can change the outcome of the auction
for buyer i in three cases:
• If a bid bi is between nS-1st highest bid and nSth highest bid out of nB −2 buyers
and nS sellers, and if there is a buy bid between bi and bi + ∆bi, then a bid of bi
will not win, but increasing the bid to bi + ∆ will win the good by surpassing the
bid by the buyer.
• If a bid bi is between nS-1st highest bid and nSth highest bid out of nB −1 buyers
and nS −1 sellers, and if there is a sell bid between bi and bi+∆bi, then a bid of bi
will not win, but increasing the bid to bi + ∆ will win the good by surpassing the
bid by the seller.
• If a bid bi is between the nS − 1 st highest bid and the nSth highest bid out of
nB − 1 buyers and nS sellers, then a bid of bi will win and increasing the bid to
bi + ∆ will increase the payment by k∆.
We now deﬁne the following notations.
Let
A = the event that bi is between |Nn,S|-1 st highest bid and |Nn,S|th highest bid out of
|Nn,B|-2 buyers andnSsellers,and there is a buy bid between bi and bi + ∆bi,
B = the event that bi is between |Nn,S|-1 st highest bid and |Nn,S|th highest bid out of
|Nn,B|-1 buyers andnS-1 sellers,and there is a sell bid between bi and bi + ∆bi,
6Here ∆ represents a miniscule amount of the increase in bid in the model with a continuous set of bids.124 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
and
C = biis between thenS − 1st highest bid and thenSth highest bid out of
nB − 1buyers and nSsellers
Let us consider the ﬁrst case. The payoﬀ change from this case is
( En[v(x0,x i)|xi,A] − bi) · Pr n (A|xi) (332)
The payoﬀ change from the second case is
( En[v(x0,x i)|xi,B] − bi) · Pr n (B|xi) (333)
The payoﬀ change from the third case is
k∆ · Pr n (C|xi) (334)
Therefore, the ﬁrst order condition is, from (332), (333), and (334)
(En[v(x0,x i)|xi,A] − bi) · Pr n (A|xi)+( En[v(x0,x i)|xi,B] − bi) · Pr n (B|xi) (335)
−k∆ · Pr n (C|xi)=0
A preliminary result. As a step for deriving the rate of convergence of bidding strategies,
we now evaluate the ﬁrst order condition (335).
It follows from (335)t h a t
³
En[v(x0,x i)|xi,A] − bi
´
· Pr n (A|xi) − k∆ · Pr n (C|xi) ≤ 0. (336)
Therefore, it follows from (336)t h a t


















Prn(A|x0)Pr n(there is a buy bid between bi and bi + ∆bi)fθ|Xi(x0|xi)dx0
(339)
by conditional independence. (340)A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 125
In order to evaluate (338), we recall, from Lemma 5 in Milgrom (1979), that if there
is C>0 such that ai



















Thus now we need to show (342)a n d( 343). We ﬁrst show (342).
275. Show (342). We note, given x0, each player’s signal is independently and identi-
cally distributed with the distribution FXi|θ(xi|x0). Given this independence structure,
we can
• Prn(C|x0) corresponds to the probability MnS:nB in Rustichini, Satterthwaite, and
Williams (1994), page 1060 where the distribution of types in Rustichini, Satterth-
waite, and Williams (1994) is now FXi|θ(xi|x0).
• Prn(A|x0) corresponds to the probability LnS:nB in Rustichini, Satterthwaite, and
Williams (1994), page 1060.










Intuition is as follows: Both numerator and denominator calculate the probability that
bi will fall in the interval between adjacent order statistics of bids. In the numerator,
there are nB +nS −1 bids and in the denominator there are nB +nS −2. This implies,
on one hand, there are more bids in the event in the numerator to fall in the interval.
But on the other hand, the length of the interval of the adjacent order statistics will
decrease at the rate of O(1/n). As a result of these two balances, the ratio does not
g r o wa n dd e c l i n ee v e ni fn changes.
276. Show (343). We note, from Rustichini, Satterthwaite, and Williams (1994), (3.1)126 EIICHIRO KAZUMORI
that
Pr n (there is a buy bid between bi and bi + ∆bi out of nB − 1 buyers) (346)
=( nB − 1)h∗
n,b(bi)
= O(n)
An intuition is as follows. We are now considering a possibility that there will be a bid
hitting a ﬁxed length of an interval. This probability increases at the order O(n) since
any one of nB − 1 buyers can hit the interval.
It now follows from (337)a n d( 344)t h a t




We can now derive the rate of convergence of bidding strategies building on the
preliminary result
277. Characterization of the rate of convergence of bidding strategies. In the
previous calculation, we obtained a bound on
En[v(x0,x i)|xi,A] − bi,n → 0
by omitting terms for En[v(x0,x i)|xi,B] − bi
We can now, by omitting the ﬁrst term instead, following a similar procedure used
to derive (347), that




It now follows from (347)a n d( 348)t h a t




We note that these two conditioning events are only diﬀerent by switching one buyer
and one seller. Since (349)h o l d sf o re v e r yxi, it follows that the distributions of bids
by a buyer and a seller converge at the rate O(1
n). Since the distribution of signals








This in turn implies that, since the buyer’s and seller’s strategies are getting symmetric,
bi → En[v(x0,x i)|xi,A] (351)
→ En[v(x0,x i)|xi,B]A STRATEGIC THEORY OF A MARKET 127
at the rate O(1
n). Since this holds for every n, it implies that asymptotically the equilib-
rium bidding strategies are symmetric across n.T h u s ,f o re a c hx0, by Glivenko-Cantelli
theorem, En[v(x0,xi)|xi,A] converges to v(x0(xi),xi)a tt h er a t eO(1
n)a sn →∞ .
Thus (327)a n d( 328) follow.